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BS  A TRACT 
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Bostock v. Clayton County,
Georgia—recognizing that anti-gay and anti-trans discrimination are
forms of sex discrimination under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act—
has already gained a steady reputation as a textualist statutory
interpretation decision. The reality of the ruling is far more complicated
than that. Bostock is a textualist decision, but, as the argument here
shows, Bostock also offers a construction of Title VII’s sex discrimination 
rule that sounds in a rule-of-law norm of legal justice about LGBT
equality that itself traces roots to the Supreme Court’s constitutional 
LGBT rights jurisprudence. Bostock’s rule-of-law norm of legal justice, 
which expands and diffuses constitutional norms of LGBT equality in new 
ways, does more than shape Bostock’s interpretation of Title VII.
Through it, Bostock supplies state actors, including courts, with
instruction on how to treat all claims of lesbian, gay, and now trans
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State University. © Marc Spindelman, All Rights Reserved, 2021. Reprint requests should be
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Martha Chamallas, Doug Cole, Joshua Dressler, Brookes Hammock, Angela Harris, Deb
Tuerkheimer, Ethan Weber, and Robin West for different forms of supportive engagement
with earlier drafts. Thanks also to Marcus Andrews, Renier Halter-Rainey, Miles Sibley,
Jesse Vogel, and Brittney Welch for various forms of research and editorial assistance, and to
James Pfeiffer for distinctive help with different aspects of the notes and text. I am also
indebted to Matt Cooper and Kaylie Vermillion, who came through, as always, with sharp
help with sources, and to Kevin Hartnett, who went far above and beyond the ordinary call of
editorial duty to bring this work to press.
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554 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  69
rights, whether they formally involve constitutional rights claims or, as 
in Bostock, do not. In Bostock’s wake, state actors must ordinarily treat
LGBT persons just the same as their cisheterosexual counterparts,
affording them the same benefits of established and new legal protections
that cisheterosexuals receive. 
The path to this larger picture proceeds through an account that 
explains Bostock both is—and is not—a textualist decision. The opinion’s
textualist self-accounting, tracked in these pages, lacks normative
justificatory punch on the central interpretive question raised by the
claims it decides: whether Title VII’s sex discrimination ban covers anti-
gay and anti-trans discrimination. A careful reading of Bostock shows 
the opinion both disparaging and then ultimately embracing “extra-
textual” reasons for choosing to read Title VII’s sex discrimination rule
in the pro-gay and pro-trans directions that it does. 
The most telling of these reasons, in a dramatic turn, abandons the
majority’s textualist hunt, and reaches for a general, rule-of-law ideal of 
legal justice—a distinctive understanding of formal equality involving
LGBT persons—that emerges from, and extends to new levels, the legal
foundations of the U.S. Supreme Court’s pro-lesbian and pro-gay
constitutional rights jurisprudence, whose pro-trans legal implications
are expressly recognized by the Supreme Court in Bostock for the first 
time. Bostock’s announcement of the operations of legal justice in the 
case—a stylized extension of operative constitutional norms—has far-
reaching implications for the interpretation of other statutes that may
benefit LGBT persons, as well as other legal rules that, now or in the
future, implicate LGBT rights.
Understanding how Bostock follows a line of justification found in
the Supreme Court’s constitutional promises of equal dignity and respect 
for lesbian women, gay men, and trans people frames an account of what 
is legally misguided about the textualist approaches taken up by the
Bostock dissents. These opinions, which indulge both anti-gay and anti-
trans sentiments as touchstones for their own preferred choices for how
to read Title VII’s sex discrimination ban, flout constitutional values that 
strip those choices of their own easy claims to legality. Having identified
the legal flaws of the dissents’ textualist analytics, discussion turns to the
most significant of the likely reasons why the Bostock majority opinion
does not expressly avow the constitutional and rule-of-law grounds for
its decision. No matter, the recognition of Bostock’s foundations in
constitutionalism recasts the pressures the Supreme Court will face in
future cases taking up questions that Bostock formally brackets, as well
   
          
       
        
   
   
    
     
      
       
        
       
          
   
      
           
        
        
       
   
       
   
     
     
    
  
5552021] BOSTOCK’S PARADOX
as other wonders about its own text’s meaning. With time, Bostock may
prove to be an even bigger breakthrough for LGBT equality and rights
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556 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  69
How wonderful that we have met with a paradox.
Now we have some hope of making progress.
–Niels Bohr1 
INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Bostock v. Clayton County,
Georgia—holding that anti-gay and anti-trans discrimination are forms
of sex discrimination under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act—has
already gained notoriety as a textualist statutory interpretation ruling
announcing Title VII’s authoritative meaning based on its “plain” 
language alone.2 Bostock’s truth is much more complicated, conflicted,
and interesting than that. As the argument in these pages shows, Bostock
1. RUTH MOORE, NIELS BOHR: THE MAN, HIS SCIENCE, & THE WORLD THEY CHANGED
196 (1966).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e; Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., Ga., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1742 (2020). On
Bostock’s textualism operating as a function of Title VII’s plain language, see id. at 1743 (“At
bottom, these cases involve no more than the straightforward application of legal terms with 
plain and settled meanings.”); id. (“plain terms”); id. at 1748 (“plain terms”); id. at 1749
(discussing plain meaning in relation to defense arguments). For a few of the growing number 
of sources affirming Bostock’s textualism, see Tara Leigh Grove, Comment, Which
Textualism?, 134 HARV. L. REV. 265, 267 (2020) (describing the Bostock majority opinion as
involving a kind of “formalistic textualism”); Andrew Koppelman, Bostock, LGBT
Discrimination, and the Subtractive Moves, 105 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 1, 6 (2020)
(proposing that Bostock “provided the Court with an opportunity to prove the cynics wrong,
and to show that it really does take its textualism seriously”); Nancy C. Marcus, Bostock v.
Clayton County and the Problem of Bisexual Erasure, 115 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 223, 226
(figuring Bostock as “textualism-embracing . . . to an extreme”); George T. Conway III, Why
Scalia Should Have Loved the Supreme Court’s Title VII Decision, WASH. POST (June 16,
2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/06/16/why-scalia-would-have-loved
-supreme-courts-title-vii-decision/ [https://perma.cc/XT5K-YE2K] (describing Bostock as a 
“victory for textualism in the interpretation of statutes”); Michael C. Dorf, Does Justice
Gorsuch’s Magnificent Opinion in the Title VII Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Cases 
Redeem Textualism?, DORF ON LAW (June 16, 2020 11:46 AM), http://www.dorf
onlaw.org/2020/06/does-justice-gorsuchs-magnificent.html [https://perma.cc/MD3L-MZ8X]
(characterizing Bostock as a “highly textualist opinion”); Katie Eyer, Symposium: Progressive
Textualism and LGBTQ Rights, SCOTUSBLOG (June 16, 2020, 10:23AM),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/06/symposium-progressive-textualism-and-lgbtq-rights/
[https://perma.cc/D433-DBGL] (describing Bostock’s textualism as a form of “progressive 
textualism”); Jonathan Skrmetti, Symposium: The Triumph of Textualism: “Only the Written 
Word Is the Law”, SCOTUSBLOG (June 15, 2020, 9:04PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/
2020/06/symposium-the-triumph-of-textualism-only-the-written-word-is-the-law/ [https://pe
rma.cc/NW5U-GG7S] (commenting that “the three Bostock opinions are a master class in
defining and applying textualism”); Ezra Ishmael Young, Bostock is a Textualist Triumph,
JURIST (June 25, 2020, 3:53PM), https://www.jurist.org/commentary/2020/06/ezra-young-
bostock-textualist-triumph/# [https://perma.cc/8Y6V-GRCC] (calling Bostock “a win for
principled textualists of all political persuasions”).
   
       
        
       
       
           
             
        
        
       
       
      
        
         
       
        
 
        
           
     
           
 
        
        
              
           
           
    
               
              
         
        
      
   
           
            
  
     
         
            
       
         
              
            
          
5572021] BOSTOCK’S PARADOX
is, in a way, the straightforward textualist statutory interpretation decision
it claims to be—but it is also not that. Along with Bostock’s self-
professed textualism is an account of its interpretive conclusion that 
ultimately looks beyond Title VII’s text to a rule-of-law ideal of legal 
justice.3 This legal justice ideal—which speaks with precision to the
formal equality that lesbian women, gay men, and trans people are as a
rule now to receive in our rule-of-law system, equal to their
cisheterosexual counterparts—emerges from, and is finally justified by,
the Supreme Court’s pro-LGBT constitutional rights jurisprudence. For
the first time ever, Bostock explicitly extends the Court’s earlier legal 
protections for lesbian women and gay men to trans people as well.4 
Bostock announces that all these individuals now “are entitled to the 
benefit[s] of the law’s terms”—benefits that begin in this case with Title
VII’s sex discrimination protections, but that, by virtue of Bostock’s
configurations, also include equal legal protections in a much wider
sense.5 
Bostock and its dueling textualisms—the textualist thrusts of the
majority opinion that are met by the textualist parries of the dissents— 
illustrate textualism’s deep and inescapable methodological 
indeterminacy.6 No matter what Bostock says for itself, it cannot be the
3. See ROBIN WEST, RE-IMAGINING JUSTICE: PROGRESSIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF
FORMAL EQUALITY, RIGHTS, AND THE RULE-OF-LAW NORMATIVE JURISPRUDENCE 107 (2003)
(tying the idea of legal justice to the “basic ideal of formal equality,” the ideal “that likes 
should be treated alike”); see also id. at 1–11 (discussing “legal justice”). For some relevant 
context on the wider “[l]egal-[a]cademic [r]ule of [l]aw [d]ebate” within which the ideal of 
legal justice surfaces, see id. at 18–26.
4. For one notation of the pro-trans implications of the Supreme Court’s decision in
Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015), see Kylar W. Broadus, The Legal Status of
Transgender Relationships, GPSOLO, Jan./Feb. 2017, at 23, 23–25 (describing how Obergefell
“removed the question of whether someone is ‘biologically’ a man or a woman” from the 
constitutional analysis of the right to marry).
5. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1751. 
6. Accord John Vlahoplus, Bostock, Zarda, and R.G & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes: 
Affirming Equality and Challenging Textualism, GEO. WASH. L. REV. ON THE DOCKET (June
18, 2020), https://www.gwlr.org/bostock-zarda-harris-funeral-homes-affirming-equality-
and-challenging-textualism/ [https://perma.cc/Z5ZV-KSXH] (“Ultimately, the Justices’
dueling visions undermine textualism as an independent interpretive theory. If the Justices
cannot agree on the meaning of ‘because of sex’ in a statute enacted or amended in their
lifetimes, then it is difficult to conclude that textualism can resolve legal disputes.”). 
Textualism’s indeterminacy problems involve the problems of legal indeterminacy famously
explored within the Critical Legal Studies movement. For a few examples of work in that
tradition, see James Boyle, The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Theory and Local Social
Thought, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 685, 703 n.54 (1985) (describing “the legal system’s need for 
   
        
       
      
        
      
           
     
           
            
      
         
           
          
         
            
         
 
         
            
          
      
          
         
            
            
           
       
       
         
             
          
 
          
               
            
            
  
        
         
          
          
          
            
            
    
                 
558 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  69
pure product of the textualist method of statutory interpretation that it
maintains, as though its interpretive conclusions were wholly divorced
from substantive, extra-textual values that ground the opinion’s results. 
This helps explain why Bostock bears the traces of honest struggles with 
its professed textualist methodology, showing signs of internal doubts
about it. On close inspection, Bostock’s relation to textualism is far less
doctrinaire than its confident self-presentation superficially suggests.
One way to make sense of Bostock’s underlying textual struggles is
to understand them as the residue of the lingering anxieties, if not doubts,
that Justice Neil Gorsuch, its named author, has about what the opinion
does, behind the confident rhetorical posture that the opinion regularly
adopts. During oral arguments in R.G. and G.R. Harris Funeral Homes
v. EEOC, one of the cases that Bostock collects, Justice Gorsuch candidly
and repeatedly voiced reservations about the “drastic . . . change”—or, as
he later put it, “the massive social upheaval”—that a decision like the one
he winds up writing for the Supreme Court might yield.7 Unremarkably,
neutrality” as “premised on the unstable, conflicting, and indeterminate nature of non-legal 
value judgments”); Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94
YALE L. J. 997, 1007–08 (1984) (discussing the Derridian underpinnings of the critical
analytic that the work develops and deploys to show the limits of doctrine as a determinate 
force); Duncan Kennedy, Toward a Critical Phenomenology of Judging, in THE RULE-OF-
LAW: IDEAL OR IDEOLOGY 141, 164–65 (Allan C. Hutchinson & Patrick Monahan eds., 1987)
(discussing the indeterminacy thesis and its relation to interpretive practice and experience);
Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1151, 1160–61 n.6 (1985)
(discussing Derrida and the deconstructive dimensions of the indeterminacy thesis); id. at
1181 (“The insights of linguistic and literary theory can be applied to legal practice by
demonstrating the indeterminacy inhering in legal texts, taking the term ‘texts’ in its
commonsense meaning. . . . Such applications debunk the claims that legal interpretation is 
ruled by objective, determinate meaning residing in a written text.”); Gary Peller, Debates
About Theory Within Critical Legal Studies, 1 LIZARD 3–4 (1984), https://
legalleft.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2015/11/Lizard-no-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/JK37-
ZH8M] (discussing the connection between irrationalism and indeterminacy); Joseph William
Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L. J. 1, 9–25 (1984)
(discussing determinacy). See also Tor Krever, Carl Lisberger & Max Utzschneider, Law on
the Left: A Conversation with Duncan Kennedy, 10 UNBOUND: HARV. J. LEGAL LEFT 1, 26– 
28 (2015), https://legalleft.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2015/11/Krever-Formatted.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G44P-NWMJ] (discussing Duncan Kennedy’s work on indeterminacy and
its reception by different audiences). For a still-classic response, see Lawrence B. Solum, On
the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 462 (1987).
Although I am generally simpatico with the insights of a number of forms of the
indeterminacy thesis, I do not mount a critique of Bostock that expressly builds on it here, 
partly given the ways that Bostock turns out not to be the perfect specimen of textualism that
it boasts and that many of its readers have seemed sure that they, too, see in the opinion. See, 
e.g., supra note 2 (collecting sources).
7. Transcript of Oral Argument at 24, 26, R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc. v.
   
    
         
       
          
      
        
         
         
         
      
 
          
            
         
         
      
         
       
         
 
         
   
         
                
          
       
          
             
              
            
             
           
            
           
             
           
           
            
            
            
            
            
        
                 
               
5592021] BOSTOCK’S PARADOX
Bostock does not openly herald these allegedly socially destabilizing 
prospects.8 Rather, it strategically manages them by deferring certain
questions—including questions about showers and locker rooms the
defense raised—that make it unnecessary for now for the Court to
announce more culturally charged legal conclusions involving, in
particular, trans sex discrimination rights.9 At the same time, Bostock’s
decision to look beyond the four corners of Title VII’s text to a principle
of legal justice to justify its construction of Title VII’s meaning shows a
felt need within the opinion, whether conscious or not, for a deeper and
more secure, values-based explanation in the case than the opinion’s
textualist account achieves.
The new ground this Article stakes out amidst discussions of
Bostock’s meaning does not pretend novelty as to its key intuition, which
other readers of Bostock have also had in relation to the case: There is
something happening in Bostock beyond the textualism that at first
appears—something that is somehow a function of the Supreme Court’s
pre-Bostock constitutional rulings vindicating lesbian and gay rights.10 An
important element of the present work is to detail the contact points that 
affirm the thought that Bostock is in important ways a consequence—and
EEOC, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019) (No. 18-107), https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/
argument_transcripts/2019/18-107_4gcj.pdf [https://perma.cc/CZ2G-EZJV] [hereinafter
Harris Funeral Homes Transcript] (statement of Justice Neil Gorsuch).
8. Allegedly for the sorts of reasons that David Cole offered to the Supreme Court
during oral arguments in Harris Funeral Homes: “There’s been no upheaval” even as “federal 
courts of appeals have been recognizing that discrimination against transgender people is sex 
discrimination for 20 years.” Id. at 27 (answer by David D. Cole).
9. For critical engagements with the Bostock litigation, see Ezra Ishmael Young, What
the Supreme Court Could Have Heard in R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes v. EEOC and
Aimee Stephens, 11 CALIF. L. REV. ONLINE 9 (2020); Marc Spindelman, The Shower’s
Return: A Serial Essay on the LGBT Title VII Sex Discrimination Cases, Part I, 81 OHIO ST.
L.J. ONLINE 81 (2020) [hereinafter Spindelman, The Shower’s Return: Part I]; Marc
Spindelman, The Shower’s Return: A Serial Essay on the LGBT Title VII Sex Discrimination 
Cases, Part II, 81 OHIO ST. L.J. ONLINE 87 (2020) [hereinafter Spindelman, The Shower’s
Return: Part II]; Marc Spindelman, The Shower’s Return: A Serial Essay on the LGBT Title
VII Sex Discrimination Cases, Part III, 81 OHIO ST. L.J. ONLINE 101 (2020) [hereinafter
Spindelman, The Shower’s Return: Part III]; Marc Spindelman, The Shower’s Return: A 
Serial Essay on the LGBT Title VII Sex Discrimination Cases, Part IV, 81 OHIO ST. L.J.
ONLINE 117 (2020); Marc Spindelman, The Shower’s Return: A Serial Essay on the LGBT
Title VII Sex Discrimination Cases, Part V, 81 OHIO ST. L.J. ONLINE 133 (2020) [hereinafter
Spindelman, The Shower’s Return: Part V]; Marc Spindelman, The Shower’s Return: A Serial
Essay on the LGBT Title VII Sex Discrimination Cases, Part VI, 81 OHIO ST. L.J. ONLINE 153
(2020) [hereinafter Spindelman, The Shower’s Return: Part VI].
10. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003);
United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013); Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015).
   
         
       
       
       
     
    
            
    
             
      
     
       
       
       
            
        
           
       
           
       
           
            
        
         
      
     
       
         
       
 
      
             
          
        
     
       
       
            
       
          
 
  
560 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  69
justified and justifiable as a consequence—of the Supreme Court’s pro-
LGBT constitutional rights jurisprudence. The argument here specifies
how the Court’s constitutional pro-LGBT rights jurisprudence provides
positive-law content to the rule-of-law norm of legal justice that 
structures the Court’s Bostock opinion, yielding a ruling advancing a rule-
of-law ideal of legal justice that governmental actors, including courts, 
must heed in the full run of cases involving LGBT rights—even where,
as in Bostock itself, no formal claim of constitutional right is involved.11
By means of its announcement of a rule of legal justice that draws
legal authority from the Court’s pro-LGBT constitutional right
jurisprudence, Bostock normalizes the constitutional promises of equal 
dignity and respect that LGBT people deserve in ways that expand and 
entrench those promises as part of the ordinary, day-to-day experiences
of rule-of-law-governed life in the United States, part of its standard fresh 
air—air that circulates in the Court’s opinion in the case.12 The present
undertaking thus brings a widely sensed intuition about the law of the
case to legal life in a way that gives differently situated legal actors direct,
operative access to it as they undertake the work of wrestling with and 
respecting Bostock as the legal authority that it is.13 Among other things,
recognizing Bostock’s underlying constitutional law and rule-of-law
dimensions widens the range of legal meanings that Bostock carries and
conveys. This new decision is a powerful legal signifier of a vibrant, if
not unlimited, array of LGBT legal rights—more powerful and
significant certainly than accounts of the ruling as a mere textualist
statutory interpretation ruling could properly think.
Bostock nowhere explicitly declares its own jurisprudential
indebtedness to the Court’s pro-LGBT constitutional rights decisions.
Indeed, Bostock meticulously avoids direct textual citation, much less
engaged discussion, of the major Supreme Court pro-LGBT rights
11. See supra note 3.
12. Cf. Romer, 517 U.S. at 631 (“These are protections taken for granted by most people
either because they already have them or do not need them; these are protections against
exclusion from an almost limitless number of transactions and endeavors that constitute 
ordinary civic life in a free society.”).
13. In this respect, the work provides a justification for the through-line from Bostock to
pro-LGBT governmental actions, including judicial decisions, that have arrived in its wake, 
see infra notes 180, 182, even as it frames a series of anti-trans measures since Bostock as 
inconsistent with both constitutional and rule-of-law principles. See, e.g., David Crary, No
Big Backlash for States Passing Anti-transgender Laws, APNEWS.COM (Apr. 27, 2021),
https://apnews.com/article/us-news-health-laws-legislature-bills-5726fdeb8a5e7cf2c89a4a2
d176e8a7f [https://perma.cc/X62H-KZNP].
   
      
        
        
        
          
     
      
         
        
            
 
       
       
       
        
        
       
       
         
      
           
 
         
           
        
         
          
       
         
          
          
 
          
                
              
          
             
              
            
          
5612021] BOSTOCK’S PARADOX
rulings. Reverberation from those decisions, however, including the
guarantee that the constitutional right to marry includes the right to same-
sex marriage, are felt and can be seen in the decision. The image of
workers, in fact, “model” workers, in same-sex marriages is woven into
the opinion’s text, which looks to them to help explain why sexual 
orientation discrimination is sex discrimination.14 Subtle, casual, and in-
plain-sight notations like this function as in-passing, approving, if
unconventional, nods to the legal and social effects of the Court’s
constitutional pro-LGBT rights caselaw. Even more significant is how
these nods are replicated in the deep structure of the Bostock opinion’s
text and its approach to LGBT statutory rights.
Bostock’s studied evasion of the relevant constitutional caselaw
conduces to its crisp self-presentation as a textualist statutory 
interpretation ruling, one that eschews reliance on any non-statutory
sources of interpretive judgment, the express invocation of which would
mar the opinion’s high-gloss textualist finish. Despite Bostock’s
painstaking care on this front, the Supreme Court’s pro-LGBT rights
jurisprudence figures in the opinion in important ways. This
jurisprudence is the elephant in the textual room—found, as it happens,
in an important textual “mousehole”—no matter how many of Bostock’s
readers, for different reasons, have chosen and may continue to choose to
ignore it while crediting the opinion’s textualist self-definition.15 
To be clear, nothing in what follows seeks to deny that Justice
Gorsuch is sincerely committed to textualism as a normative practice of
statutory interpretation. Rather, recognizing that Justice Gorsuch is a
textualist supplies the background for tracing the ways that Bostock bears
a difficult form of witness to how a committed textualist may still expose 
this interpretive method as wanting, and that, standing alone, it may not 
provide an adequate public justification for the interpretive choices that a
particular decision, like Bostock, involves.16 This is part of what makes
Bostock so fascinating as a text—and worth digging into in depth.
14. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1742 (“A model employee arrives and introduces a manager to
Susan, the employee’s wife. Will that employee be fired? If the policy works as the employer
intends, the answer depends entirely on whether the model employee is a man or a woman.”). 
15. Id. at 1753 (“[T]he employers . . . cannot hide behind the no-elephants-in-mouseholes
canon. . . . We can’t deny that today’s holding . . . is an elephant. But where’s the mousehole?
. . . This elephant has never hidden in a mousehole; it has been standing before us all along.”).
16. See infra note 40. On public justification, see generally, for example, John Rawls,
The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 CHI. L. REV. 765 (1997).
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Here is a roadmap for the discussion that follows.
Part I formally begins by giving an account of Bostock’s textualist
approach to determining the meaning of Title VII’s sex discrimination 
ban and its position that lesbian woman, gay men, and trans people are
all within the ambit of its antidiscrimination protections.
Part II spotlights significant moments in the Bostock opinion where
it openly grapples with how much of an extra-textualist account for its
conclusion it wishes to provide. Of the passages engaged in this Part, the 
most impactful involves the opinion reaching for an extra-textualist 
source of interpretive judgment: an undefined vision of justice that is
ultimately identified as a rule-of-law ideal of legal justice that draws
heavily from the Supreme Court’s pro-LGBT rights jurisprudence. This
does not make Bostock a constitutional decision, but, rather, one that
announces a broad rule-of-law principle that is to be applied in a range of
cases, whether a constitutional claim is involved in them, or—as in
Bostock—not. In this respect, Bostock leverages constitutional ideals and
corresponding notions of constitutional justice into the rule-of-law
domain via its legal justice ideal.17 Bostock does much more than simply 
mirror the plain meaning of statutory text.18 
Part III shifts focus away from the Bostock majority opinion and
onto the Bostock dissents, giving them—and the charges of lawlessness 
and illegitimacy that they level against the majority opinion—a close and
critical look. This Part also wrestles with the question of why Bostock
does not simply announce that it means to embrace the constitutional
roots underlying its rule-of-law legal justice ideal if this is what the 
opinion means to do. Considering a range of legal questions that Bostock
effectively tees up, including conflicts between LGBT rights claims and
rights claims advanced by faithful conservatives and traditional moralists, 
this Part reaffirms in a different way that Bostock may, in time, show
itself to be a bigger win for LGBT rights than it is presently generally
understood to be. 
The Conclusion takes a step back from the various details of the
argument to offer some final reflections on the paradoxicality, internal 
rivenness, and the messiness of the Court’s Bostock opinion. It ventures
a pitch for not indulging the urge to try, conceptually, to clean it up,
17. For movements in these directions, see sources cited infra notes 180, 182.
18. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1743 (“At bottom, these cases involve no more than the 
straightforward application of legal terms with plain and settled meanings.”).
   
      
        
         
   
           
      
          
         
         
        
        
          
        
    
          
       
         
         
         
          
          
   
 
            
            
                 
          
        
              
            
   
          
        
           
         
      
        
           
   
5632021] BOSTOCK’S PARADOX
understanding both the beauty of the opinion in its current state, along
with its potential jurisgenerativity for future claims involving
LGBTQIA+ rights, which may themselves be messily queer in
conventional category-defying ways.
I. BOSTOCK’S TEXTUALISM 
First, then, Bostock’s textualism. Three moves from the text of Title
VII lift Bostock off the ground.
Move one is a basically conservative biological definition of “sex.”19 
The Bostock Court’s opinion invokes defense arguments “[a]ppealing to
roughly contemporaneous dictionaries” in which “the term ‘sex’ in 1964
referred to ‘status as either male or female [as] determined by
reproductive biology.’”20 Commenting that “the employees concede the
point for argument’s sake,” Bostock says it will “proceed on the
assumption that ‘sex’ signified what the employers suggest, referring
only to biological distinctions between male and female.”21 
Move two involves Title VII’s expression “because of,” as in
“‘because of’ sex,” which delimits the range of sex discrimination cases
that Title VII outlaws.22 Here, the Bostock opinion’s structure makes it 
seem as though it is generating its own understanding of “because of”
directly from Title VII’s text. A look at how the discussion unfolds,
however, indicates that Bostock is punctuated by citations to Supreme
Court gloss on Title VII’s text. Citing Title VII caselaw, Bostock says 
“because of” means “simple” and “traditional” but-for cause.23 
19. Id. at 1739 (“[W]e proceed on the assumption that ‘sex’ signified what the employers 
suggest, referring only to biological distinctions between male and female.”). For similar ideas
in the Bostock dissents, see id. at 1767 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“In 1964, . . . [t]he ordinary
meaning of discrimination because of ‘sex’ was discrimination because of a person’s
biological sex . . . .”); id. at 1828 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (discussing the “ordinary 
meaning of the phrase ‘discriminate because of sex’”)). For critical engagement of some of
the pro-trans arguments from “sex” in the litigation that resulted in Bostock, see Young, supra
note 9, at 27–37.
20. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1739 (majority opinion). For some historical perspective not
noted by Bostock on the treatment of homosexuality in Washington, D.C., in 1964, see
generally Lee Edelman, Tearooms and Sympathy, or, the Epistemology of the Water Closet,
in THE LESBIAN AND GAY STUDIES READER 553 (Henry Abelove et al. eds., 1993).
21. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1739.
22. Id. (“The question isn’t just what ‘sex’ meant, but what Title VII says about it. Most 
notably, the statute prohibits employers from taking certain actions ‘because of’ sex.”).
23. Id. (citing Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 346, 360 (2013)).
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Continuing: “That form of causation is established whenever a particular
outcome would not have happened ‘but for’ the purported cause. In other
words, a but-for test directs us to change one thing at a time and see if the
outcome changes. If it does, we have found a but-for cause.”24 Notably,
none of the citations supporting this view is expressly heralded by
Bostock for its textualist commitments. This is perhaps the first sign in
the opinion, subtle though it is, indicating that judicial precedent is doing
meaningful work at Bostock’s ostensibly textualist foundations.25 
Move three takes up the meaning of “discrimination” under Title
VII.26 On this front, Bostock emphasizes that “discrimination” is not mere 
differentiation, but differentially unfavorable treatment, and more
exactly, worse treatment as compared to others.27 Leaning on Webster’s
New International Dictionary (2d ed. 1954), Bostock explains that: “To
‘discriminate against’ a person, then, would seem to mean treating that
individual worse than others who are similarly situated.”28 This
discrimination against an individual, which accords with what the opinion 
figures as Title VII’s focus on individuals and not groups, must also,
according to the precedent that Bostock invokes, “be intentional.”29 As to
Title VII’s focus on the individual, Bostock is emphatic—and repeatedly
24. Id. (citing Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009)).
25. See id. (explaining Title VII’s causation rule and quoting and citing Supreme Court
authority). In this respect, judicial precedent doing this work in Bostock may help explain why
Bostock describes Title VII’s sex discrimination ban’s meaning not only as “plain,” but also 
as “settled.” Id. at 1743 (“At bottom, these cases involve no more than the straightforward 
application of legal terms with plain and settled meanings.”). Nelson Lund drills down on the 
gap between the statutory term “because of” and the meaning Bostock gives it in Nelson Lund,
Unleashed and Unbound: Living Textualism in Bostock v. Clayton County, 21 FEDERALIST 
SOC’Y REV. 176, 180 (2020) (insisting, after noting that Bostock “says that ‘in the language of
law’ the term ‘because of X’ can only mean ‘X was a but-for cause of,’” that “the text of the
statute says no such thing[, a]nd Gorsuch points to nothing in the statute that implies or even
suggests any such thing”). Lund’s observations spotlight from a different angle the work that
precedent is doing at just this point in Bostock’s text.
26. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1740.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. The quoted language comes from id. (“In so-called ‘disparate treatment’ cases like 
today’s, this Court has also held that the difference in treatment based on sex must be
intentional.” (citing Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 487 U.S. 977, 986 (1988))). For more
extended discussion of the individual-based versus group-based interpretation of the statute,
see id. at 1740–41 (recognizing the prospect of a group-based understanding of the statute,
but, with repeated reference to Title VII’s text, decisively rejecting it in favor of an individual-
rights-based reading).
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so. It underscores that the statute “tells us three times—including
immediately after the words ‘discriminate against’—that our focus
should be on individuals, not groups.”30 After detailing those three
expressions, Bostock goes on to say—quoting from the same dictionary 
as before—that “the meaning of ‘individual’ was as uncontroversial in
1964 as it is today: ‘A particular being as distinguished from a class,
species, or collection.’”31 
Moves one, two, and three in place, Bostock stacks them together to
produce an operative Title VII sex discrimination rule. “So, taken 
together, an employer who intentionally treats a person worse because of
sex—such as by firing the person for actions or attributes it would tolerate
in an individual of another sex—discriminates against that person in 
violation of Title VII.”32 
This being the relevant rule, Bostock proceeds to apply it to anti-gay 
and anti-trans discrimination, which it categorically holds to be unlawful 
sex discrimination under Title VII.33 With some mechanical details set
forth quite clearly, Bostock explains:
The statute’s message for our cases is . . . simple and momentous: An
individual’s homosexuality or transgender status is not relevant to
employment decisions. That’s because it is impossible to discriminate against
a person for being homosexual or transgender without discriminating against
that individual based on sex. Consider, for example, an employer with two
employees, both of whom are attracted to men. The two individuals are, to the 
employer’s mind, materially identical in all respects, except that one is a man
and the other a woman. If the employer fires the male employee for no reason
other than the fact he is attracted to men, the employer discriminates against
him for traits or actions it tolerates in his female colleague. Put differently, the
employer intentionally singles out an employee to fire based in part on the 
employee’s sex, and the affected employee’s sex is a but-for cause of his
discharge. Or take an employer who fires a transgender person who was
identified as a male at birth but who now identifies as a female. If the employer
retains an otherwise identical employee who was identified as female at birth,
30. Id. at 1740.
31. Id. (citing WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1267 (2d ed. 1954). For
moments during oral arguments when this idea took center stage, see Harris Funeral Homes
Transcript, supra note 7, at 39 (“JUSTICE KAGAN: . . . Mr. Bursch, . . . [y]ou’re making
Title VII into a statute about groups but Title VII is not a statute about groups.”); see also id.
at 40–44 (providing additional discussion of the individual versus group-based understanding 
of Title VII). Talk later in Bostock about “disfavored group[s]” raises different possibilities.
See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1751. See infra Part II.A.3.
32. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1740.
33. Id. at 1741–43.
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the employer intentionally penalizes a person identified as male at birth for
traits or actions that it tolerates in an employee identified as female at birth.
Again, the individual employee’s sex plays an unmistakable and
impermissible role in the discharge decision.34 
This is the crux of Bostock’s textualist account of Title VII’s sex
discrimination ban. Notice how it rounds the bases without departing—
or too obviously departing—from Title VII’s text.35 Without insisting on
textualist perfection, Bostock may broadly be thought a textualist decision
in this respect.
II. BOSTOCK’S TEXTUALISM RECONSIDERED 
If Bostock’s textualist reasoning feels thin and dissatisfying to you,
you are not alone. The dissents said it first. From their own textualist
grounds, the dissents announce they are unpersuaded, if not exactly 
unmoved.36 Justice Samuel Alito’s dissent aggressively—and angrily— 
characterizes Bostock as fake, lousy, “pirate” textualism that involves the
Court in the illegitimate business of legislating from the Bench.37 Devoid
34. Id. at 1741–42.
35. The qualification is to recognize the opinion’s reliance on precedent in making its
early points. The foundations for a different perspective may emerge from views like those 
that Justice Clarence Thomas recently expressed in Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 
1981 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“In my view, the Court’s typical formulation of the
stare decisis standard does not comport with our judicial duty under Article III because it
elevates demonstrably erroneous decisions—meaning decisions outside the realm of
permissible interpretation—over the text of the Constitution and other duly enacted federal
law.”); id. at 1984 (“Federal courts may (but need not) adhere to an incorrect decision as
precedent, but only when traditional tools of legal interpretation show that the earlier decision
adopted a textually permissible interpretation of the law.”). See also supra note 25 (noting 
Nelson Lund’s views).
36. For a relevant account of the need for justification addressed to those who are subject
to Bostock’s rule, see Paul Gowder, Equal Law in an Unequal World, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1021,
1025 (2014) (“For a law to be general, . . . it must be justifiable by public reasons, understood
as an expressive idea . . . . To be justifiable by public reasons is to be justifiable by reasons
that each person affected by the law can reasonably accept, conceiving of him or herself as an
equal member of the political community.”). For additional discussion, see PAUL GOWDER,
THE RULE OF LAW IN THE REAL WORLD 33 (2016) (“[C]oercing someone based on reasons that
at least have the potential to count as reasons for her, rather than simply determining her fate
based on the idiosyncratic reasons of the decision maker, expresses respect for her status as 
an agent to whom justification is owed for what is done to her.”).
37. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1755–56 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s opinion is like a
pirate ship. It sails under a textualist flag, but . . . actually represents . . . the theory that courts
should ‘update’ old statutes so that they better reflect the current values of society.” (citation
omitted)); id. at 1754 (“There is only one word for what the Court has done today:
   
           
          
  
          
       
          
 
         
             
              
          
       
         
              
         
               
         
        
    
       
            
            
            
    
             
         
          
     
        
           
       
                
           
        
      
    
         
         
             
          
      
           
         
          
             
      
   
            
5672021] BOSTOCK’S PARADOX
of the same intensity, Justice Brett Kavanaugh’s dissent agrees that the
majority’s textualist method is improper, because of its law-giving, as
opposed to its own law-interpreting, results.38 
The dissents hit the mark in important respects. Bostock is
“wooden,” “literal,” and formalistic.39 Its textualist account of its results
is analytically thin.40 On its own, Bostock’s textualist tally of itself does
legislation.”). For a taste of some of the language in Justice Alito’s dissent suggesting its 
rhetorical aggression and anger, see, for example, id. at 1755 (“A more brazen abuse of our
authority to interpret statutes is hard to recall.”); id. (“The Court tries to convince readers that
it is merely enforcing the terms of the statute, but that is preposterous.”); id. at 1757 (“The 
arrogance of this argument is breathtaking.”); id. at 1759 (“The Court follows this strange 
hypothetical with an even stranger argument.”); id. at 1772 (“To call this evidence merely 
feeble would be generous.”); id. (“While Americans in 1964 would have been shocked to
learn that Congress had enacted a law prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination, they
would have been bewildered to hear that this law also forbids discrimination on the basis of
‘transgender status’ or ‘gender identity,’ terms that would have left people at the time
scratching their heads.”); id. at 1775 (“The Court’s extensive discussion of causation
standards is so much smoke.”).
38. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1825 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“[C]ourts must follow
ordinary meaning, not literal meaning. . . . As Justice Scalia explained, ‘the good textualist is
not a literalist.’” (citation omitted)); id. at 1836 (“In judicially rewriting Title VII, the Court
today cashiers an ongoing legislative process, at a time when a new law to prohibit sexual 
orientation discrimination was probably close at hand.”).
39. Id. at 1745 (majority opinion) (“You can call the statute’s but-for causation test what
you will—expansive, legalistic, the dissents even dismiss it as wooden or literal.”); id. at 1834
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“[T]he majority opinion achieves the same outcome [“judicially
updating or amending Title VII”] by seizing on literal meaning and overlooking the ordinary
meaning of the phrase ‘discriminate because of sex.’”).
40. Others have noted Bostock’s textualism and its weakness. See, e.g., Dorf, supra note
2 (affirming Bostock as a “highly textualist opinion,” and praising the opinion, while 
indicating “it would have been . . . child’s play to write an equally or more persuasive opinion
in a purposivist style,” along lines indicating “that discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation or gender identity is sex-role stereotyping”); Michael C. Dorf, Will Liberal 
Justices Pay A Price For Signing Onto Justice Gorsuch’s Textualist Opinions?, DORF ON LAW
(July 22, 2020), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2020/07/will-liberal-justices-pay-price-for.html
[https://perma.cc/LBR7-BZ4G] (noting argument by Eric Segall to the effect that “the
conventional legal materials (text, history, precedent) are so under-determinate that one pretty 
much must look to extra-legal causes for any jurist’s decision,” and “object[ing]” again “to
the extreme textualism of the opinion’s style,” while venturing that the opinion “would have 
been stronger if it had explained why discrimination based on gender identity or sexual
orientation does not merely count as sex discrimination as a formal matter but that both gender
identity discrimination and sexual orientation discrimination are rooted in pernicious sex-role
stereotyping, which is the central evil that the prohibition on sex discrimination combats”);
Eric Segall, A Different View About Chief Justice Roberts and this Year’s Term: The Return 
of O’Connorism, DORF ON LAW (July 17, 2020), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2020/07/a-
different-view-about-chief-justice.html [https://perma.cc/2SQB-PBJL] (“So-called rigid
textualism didn’t require or in my opinion even lead to the result. Cases about equality almost
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not persuasively explain why Bostock has made the interpretive choice to 
read Title VII’s sex discrimination ban categorically as encompassing
both anti-gay and anti-trans discrimination.
This is not surprising. Bostock’s self-representation positions the
decision as one that dutifully follows Congress’s lead, without indulging 
its own preferences. It thus needs no justification for its interpretive
conclusion beyond that. Viewed more critically, Bostock’s textualist
logic at most establishes that its interpretation of Title VII may be squared
with the language of Title VII’s sex discrimination ban. The problem with
this position, however, as the defense arguments in the case and the
dissents’ positions illustrate, is that Bostock involves an interpretive
choice—even within textualism itself. Bostock’s reading of Title VII’s
text is not the only possible interpretive—even the only possible textualist
interpretive—route.
Given Bostock’s confidence in its textualism, it is a welcome turn-
about when the opinion acknowledges its own thinness by proceeding to
thicken its textualist explanation of itself. If the opinion’s rhetoric is at 
times palpably Kingsfieldian—particularly when it dismissively defends
its textualism against defense positions through its own forward-leaning
attacks—it is amidst its larger defense of itself that Bostock indicates
there is more to its bottom line than the text of Title VII alone.41 Bostock
always implicate values all the way down. The most that should be said is that in this case,
for most of us (meaning the American people), six of nine Justices held the right values.”) 
Vlahoplus, supra note 6 (“Ultimately, the Justices’ dueling visions undermine textualism as 
an independent interpretive theory.”). Compare Lund, supra note 25, at 176–78, 180 (flagging 
Bostock’s self-presentation as “cast[ing] . . . [itself] as the true intellectual successor to . . . 
the high priest of statutory textualism, Justice Antonin Scalia,” but then proposing that 
Bostock’s “analytical approach resembles a theory known as ‘living originalism,’” which
Bostock takes “beyond the academy, beyond the field of constitutional law, and even beyond
the limits recognized by its academic adherents,” into what is described as “living textualism,” 
likened to the idea of “living literalism” described by Justice Brett Kavanaugh’s Bostock
dissent), with Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 352 (7th Cir. 2017)
(Posner, J., concurring) (“[I]nterpretation can mean giving a fresh meaning to a statement . . . 
a meaning that infuses the statement with vitality and significance today.”), and William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1479, 1481 (1987)
(setting forth an argument that “[s]tatutes . . . should—like the Constitution and the common
law—be interpreted ‘dynamically,’ that is, in light of their present societal, political, and legal
context,” and situating the argument in the context of a “functioning representative
democracy” within which “the legislature is the primary lawmaking body,” while arguing for
the “advantages of the proposed model of dynamic statutory interpretation over other current 
approaches to statutory interpretation”).
41. For Kingsfield, see THE PAPER CHASE 1:36:46 (Twentieth Century Fox 1973)
(Kingsfield: “Mister Hart, here is a dime. Call your mother. Tell her there is serious doubt
about your becoming a lawyer.”). For illustrations of the opinion going on the offensive, see 
   
           
          
         
           
        
        
        
          
     
       
     
         
     
           
           
        
        
       
           
          
     
      
           
     
  
 
    
           
          
           
             
            
             
            
            
         
          
           
        
    
5692021] BOSTOCK’S PARADOX
does not showcase these points or perform them didactically, but it
ventilates their terms in variegated ways that bury the ledes that they 
announce. This is doubtless partly a function of the fact that the more 
Bostock expressly locates its own reasons and values in sources of
judgment or justifications beyond Title VII’s text, the more the opinion 
compromises the high gloss of its claimed, exclusively textualist finish. 
Still, at certain moments, Bostock veers away from textualist claim-
making, and, in one stunning tell, eventually abandons its textualism
more or less entirely.
Amidst this rupture of its textualist method, Bostock—almost
despite itself—points the way toward seeing and accounting for its own 
truth, as well as the deeply legally problematic normativity of the
dissents, in extra-textualist terms. Bostock’s temporary abandonment of
textualism does not make it illegitimate or lawless in the ways the dissents
charge, nor, for that matter, as its own textualist commitments might be 
thought to indicate.42 To the contrary, Bostock’s reliance on extra-textual 
grounds to justify its interpretation of Title VII points to the decision’s
deep reservoir of legal strengths and how far the opinion practically 
extends the lessons of caselaw that it does not directly cite or discuss in 
conventionally recognizable terms. If it is easy to resist cranking up the 
anti-textualist volume at this point—insisting on what textualism’s
shortcomings look like—the reason is that Bostock’s analytics
themselves make the case that, within the four corners of its own text, 
Bostock is defined by paradox. It both is—and is not—a textualist text.
infra Parts II.A.1, II.A.2.
42. For the dissents’ charges, see, for example, Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1755–56, 1784 
(Alito, J., dissenting) (characterizing the opinion as “sail[ing] under a textualist flag,” while
indicating that it “actually” involves the Court in the project of “‘updat[ing]’ old statutes,” an
undertaking that exceeds the limited “authority of this Court . . . [to] say[] what the law is”);
id. at 1824 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (venturing that, because the majority has embraced a
literal over an ordinary meaning of the expression “discriminate because of sex,” it has moved
onto grounds of “rewrit[ing] the law simply because of . . . [judicial] policy views”—grounds
that threaten the rule-of-law and the value of democratic accountability, turning “the Judiciary
[into] a democratically illegitimate super-legislature”). For the idea operating within the
majority opinion itself, see id. at 1737–38 (majority opinion) (noting the illegitimacy of resort
to “extratextual considerations” “[w]hen the express terms of a statute” provide the answer,
and commenting that the judicial reliance on such “extratextual considerations” “risk[s]
amending statutes outside the legislative process reserved for the people’s representatives”).
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A. Three Textual Recognitions  
There are at least three textual moments in Bostock’s larger 
discussion of, and engagement with, defense arguments in the case that
show Bostock grappling with and effectively exceeding the limits of its
own professed textualism. As a matter of sequencing, these textual
moments arrive after Bostock has offered its own textualist self-account
and holding.43 
In the first passage, Bostock is pressing back against the notion that
it has lawlessly conflated sex, sexual orientation, and trans discrimination
when figuring the meaning and scope of Title VII’s sex discrimination
ban.45 Bostock responds that it understands perfectly well that
“homosexuality and transgender status are distinct concepts from sex.”46
Its ruling that anti-gay and anti-trans discrimination “necessarily” and
“unmistakabl[y]”—and hence categorically—involve sex discrimination
is beset by no confusion about who is who or what is what with these
different terms and what they mean.47 “Sex” discrimination is the grand,
43. This account puts to one side Bostock’s treatment of three major sex discrimination
cases that it says confirm its textualist first-principles account of Title VII’s sex discrimination 
ban, id. at 1743–44 (discussing Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (per
curiam), Los Angeles Department of Water and Power v. Manhart, 425 U.S. 702 (1978), and
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998)), though a close reading of
this discussion might, like the examples discussed in the text, show how the Bostock Court
actually derives its interpretation of Title VII and its rules not simply from the statute, but
through the relevant Title VII caselaw, which might have been threatened by, or appeared to
have been threatened by, a contrary result in the case. Because this point is crisply made later
in the Bostock Court’s opinion, and requires less excavation to get to it, that is where the point
lives. Still, the Bostock Court’s focus on legal doctrine, and so, however tacitly, principles of
stare decisis, is important in ways that will become clearer as part of the discussion of the 
three passages from Bostock that are treated in the text. See infra Parts II.A.1–3, II.B.
44. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1747.
45. The passage appears in id. at 1746–47.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1747 (“But, as we’ve seen, discrimination based on homosexuality or
transgender status necessarily entails discrimination based on sex; the first cannot happen
without the second.”); id. at 1741–42 (the term is “unmistakable” in the original); see also id.
at 1778 (Alito, J., dissenting) (describing the majority as “intervening and proclaiming
categorically that employment discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity
is simply a form of discrimination because of sex”); Larry Rohter, Off Base, Many Sailors
Voice Anger Toward Homosexuals, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 1993), https://www.nytimes.com/
1993/01/31/us/the-gay-troop-issue-off-base-many-sailors-voice-anger-toward-homosexuals
.html [https://perma.cc/ZGL7-YZUQ] (quoting “a 32-year-old tugboat master” observing, in 
   
    
      
           
      
            
           
          
          
            
         
    
 
        
        
         
       
    
    
       
     
          
    
            
        
        
     
      
      
 
              
     
            
        
   
     
    
                 
    
            
            
        
5712021] BOSTOCK’S PARADOX
operative statutory category under which sexual orientation and trans
discrimination “necessarily” fall as subcategories given the operation of
Title VII’s “but for” sex discrimination rules.48 There being, as the
opinion memorably says, no “such thing as a ‘canon of donut holes,’ in 
which Congress’s failure to speak directly to a specific case that falls
within a more general statutory rule creates a tacit exception,” “courts
apply the broad rule” “when Congress chooses not to include any
exceptions to [it].”49 That is what Bostock says it has done here.
This might have ended the matter. Had it, the opinion would have
done little more than recapitulate its earlier textualist holding. In
proceeding with its explanation, the opinion begins suggesting an extra-
textual reason for what it has done.
Recognizing how this no-donut-hole rule has worked in the past,
Bostock invokes two purportedly clarifying examples involving cis
women (though the opinion does not call them this, quite).50 The opinion
notes that the Court has long held “[s]exual harassment” and 
“motherhood discrimination” are outlawed by Title VII even though— 
like anti-gay and anti-trans discrimination—they are “conceptually
distinct from sex discrimination.”51 Despite this, Bostock observes,
nobody in the litigation—not even the employers defending against
charges of unlawful sex discrimination—would wish to deny that sexual
harassment and motherhood discrimination are properly within Title
VII’s purview. The Court is confident enough of this position that, instead
of pointing to anything in the briefing or the oral arguments to this effect,
it delivers the point rhetorically: “Would the employers have us reverse
those cases [involving sexual harassment and motherhood
discrimination] on the theory that Congress could have spoken to those
problems more specifically? Of course not.”52 
part, that “if these people are allowed to come out of the closet, I’ll be serving aboard a ship 
and wondering who’s who and what’s what”).
48. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1739, 1747 (noting “sex” is the broad term that it is dealing
with); id. at 1747 (“necessarily”); id. at 1739–40, 1746–47 (discussing “but-for” sex causation
rules and their operation).
49. Id. at 1747.
50. Id.
51. Id. The opinion also brings up these examples very early on. Id. at 1737. And later
on. Id. at 1752.
52. Id. at 1747. The same rhetorical gesture is repeated in part, as to sexual harassment,
in id. at 1751–52. Bostock’s unqualified answer might actually be subject to some
qualifications not engaged here, but noted in Spindelman, Shower’s Return: Part III, supra
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Lest it be missed, that rhetorical delivery right there is not strictly an
expression about statutory text and its meaning. Building from the
unthinkability of reversing Supreme Court cases involving sexual
harassment and motherhood discrimination, it is also vitally a play from
precedent and stare decisis, which is itself, as Justice Antonin Scalia
explained, “not a part of textualism.”53 In indicating its unwillingness to
contemplate overturning the Court’s sexual harassment and motherhood
discrimination cases for the sake of a dubious theory, Bostock’s reply to
its own question draws its legal force from the ongoing authority that the
Court’s Title VII sexual harassment and motherhood discrimination cases
possess. That authority packs sufficient legal punch that the mere
invocation of those cases here helps to seal the fortunes of anti-gay and 
anti-trans discrimination as Title VII sex discrimination.54 Thus, Bostock
says as it concludes: “As enacted, Title VII prohibits all forms of
discrimination because of sex, however they may manifest themselves or
whatever other labels might attach to them.”55 
One challenge that this line of thinking presents is how it 
recognizes—even as it obscures—an important facet of the relationship
between the Court’s sexual harassment and motherhood discrimination 
cases and Title VII’s text. Read in conjunction with an earlier passage in
the opinion, Bostock’s recognition that sexual harassment and
motherhood discrimination are “conceptually distinct from sex
discrimination” under the statute means that they do not precisely track 
what Bostock accepts as Title VII’s definition of “sex”: the original public 
meaning of the term, according to which, “sex” refers to the biological
differences between men and women in an entirely cisnormative sense.56 
Sexuality and its consequences, including reproduction thence
motherhood, and hence both sexual harassment and motherhood 
note 9, at 108–110 (flagging the prospects of a “family values” understanding of Title VII’s
sex discrimination ban).
53. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF
LEGAL TEXTS 413–14 (2012) (“Stare decisis—a doctrine whose function ‘is to make us say
that what is false under proper analysis must nonetheless be held to be true, all in the interest 
of stability’—is not a part of textualism. It is an exception to textualism (as it is to any theory
of interpretation) born not of logic but of necessity.” (quoting ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER
OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 138–40 (1997))).
54. So does their invocation elsewhere in the opinion. See, e.g., Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 
1737, 1743–44, 1751–52. 
55. Id. at 1747.
56. Id. (“conceptually distinct from sex discrimination”). For the earlier passage in the
opinion in which Bostock announces its working definition of sex, see id. at 1738–39.
   
          
      
        
      
    
        
         
        
         
         
      
       
          
            
           
       
     
        
        
          
         
 
          
          
          
       
        
       
      
              
            
            
        
            
             
         
        
             
        
        
        
          
      
    
5732021] BOSTOCK’S PARADOX
discrimination, are not about “sex” in this precise, narrow sense. Close,
they involve something else again: something like sexual desire, 
attraction, or motivation, where sexual harassment is concerned, and
motherhood, or perhaps sexual reproduction or parenting, where
motherhood discrimination is. 
This conceptualization of the Supreme Court’s sexual harassment
and motherhood discrimination cases and their relation to Title VII
recognizes that a certain gap exists—and persists—between Title VII’s
text, with its biological and cisnormative understanding of “sex,” and the
Court’s more expansive understanding of the term in its sex
discrimination caselaw.57 Even though sexual harassment and
motherhood discrimination are “conceptually distinct from sex
discrimination,” the Court has held that they “can [and do] fall within
Title VII’s sweep.”58 Seen this way, Bostock is actively building upon the
caselaw side of the gap when it leverages the unlawfulness of those forms
of discrimination under Title VII to treat anti-gay and anti-trans
discrimination as sex discrimination likewise banned by the statute.
However illuminating of Bostock’s efforts and its thinking,
Bostock’s rhetorical question and answer, and the larger interpretive
conclusions toward which they point, involve a notable strategy of
evasion. They enable the opinion to avoid dealing head on with deeper
57. Here it appears that Bostock arcs toward figuring sexual harassment, motherhood 
discrimination, as well as anti-gay and anti-trans discrimination as forms of “sex-plus”
discrimination under Title VII without ever using these precise terms or elaborating their
implications. On “sex-plus” discrimination under Title VII, see MARTHA CHAMALLAS,
PRINCIPLES OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 68 (2019) (“Title VII’s ban on sex 
discrimination has extended to so-called ‘sex-plus’ claims that involve selective
discrimination based on the plaintiff’s sex but also on some other characteristic.” (citing 
Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 542 (1971))); see also id. at 165 (“Martin
Marietta is best known for endorsing the ‘sex plus’ theory of discrimination, a doctrine that 
underscores that a plaintiff need not prove that sex is the sole basis for a decision or that the 
employer discriminates against all members of a protected group.”). For relevant discussions 
of Phillips v. Martin Marietta in the Bostock majority opinion, see Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 
1743–46. See also id. at 1752 (same). This perspective on Bostock illuminates the Tenth
Circuit’s invocation of Bostock as authority for expanding the Title VII’s sex-plus doctrine in 
an opinion holding “that sex-plus-age claims are cognizable under Title VII.” Frappied v.
Affinity Gaming Black Hawk, L.L.C., 966 F.3d 1038, 1048 (10th Circ. 2020). Thoughtful
discussion of sexual orientation discrimination as sex-plus discrimination under Title VII is
in Marc Chase McAllister, Sexual Orientation Discrimination as a Form of Sex-Plus
Discrimination, 67 BUFF. L. REV. 1007 (2019), and Brian Soucek, Queering Sexual
Harassment Law, 128 YALE L.J. FORUM 67 (2018). Thanks to Martha Chamallas for
discussion of this dimension of the Bostock opinion.
58. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1747.
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objections raised by the parallels they figure among the various forms of 
sex discrimination they indicate Bostock involves.
An initial wonder focuses on whether Bostock is serious about the
counterfactual impact that a ruling against the anti-gay and anti-trans
discrimination claims in the case would have had on the Court’s sexual
harassment and motherhood discrimination cases. For some time now,
those cases have been regarded as comprising deeply settled law. Bostock
attests to this through its indication that the parties to the litigation
understood that reversing those cases was beyond the legal pale.59 The
accuracy of this description of the vibrancy of the Court’s sexual 
harassment and motherhood discrimination rules, however, frames the
oddity of Bostock’s position. If those rules are as rock solid as the opinion
evidently believes, why—suddenly—would refusing to extend their
logics to encompass anti-gay and anti-trans discrimination under Title
VII imperil them, much less require them to be overturned? If, given the
solidity of the sexual harassment and motherhood discrimination cases, 
they are in no such danger, how perfect are their parallels to anti-gay and 
anti-trans discrimination? And if these parallels are less perfect than 
Bostock intimates, why exactly does the Court’s opinion reject the
prospects of distinguishing between and among them?
Bostock is silent on these matters—a silence that dovetails with 
another on a related set of counter-arguments associated with thinking
found in Justice Alito’s Bostock dissent, casting doubt on Bostock’s
insistence that sexual harassment, motherhood discrimination, and anti-
gay and anti-trans discrimination are like elements in a larger legal set. 
Justice Alito’s dissent offers reasons for believing that sexual harassment,
59. Id.; see also id. at 1751–52. This is not to overlook the critiques of the Supreme
Court’s sexual harassment rules that have been ventured. See, e.g., Janet Halley, Sexuality
Harassment, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 182, 198 (Catharine A. MacKinnon
& Reva B. Siegel eds., 2004) (“[Vicki Schultz’s] work allows us to imagine refocusing sex
harassment regulation to emphasize women’s equal participation in the workforce obtained 
in the most sexually liberating, rather than the most sexually regulatory, terms possible.
Perhaps it is time to break even more eggs than Schultz does.”); Eugene Scalia, The Strange
Career of Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 307, 308 (1998)
(arguing that the Supreme Court “should abandon quid pro quo [harassment] rather than
shoulder the pointless task of clarifying it”). A reply to Halley’s argument is in Marc 
Spindelman, Sex Equality Panic, 13 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1 (2004) [hereinafter
Spindelman, Sex Equality Panic]. An important critique of “[t]he [r]epronormativity of
[m]otherhood” that could be worked up into a position critical of Title VII’s motherhood
discrimination rules is in Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law,
and Desire, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 181, 183–97 (2001). An important reply is in Mary Becker,
Caring for Children and Caretakers, 76 CHI-KENT L. REV. 1495, 1522–39 (2001).
   
       
    
            
       
    
          
          
        
      
   
        
       
       
          
     
         
       
       
           
          
     
        
          
              
 
             
          
         
           
        
              
       
           
      
            
          
        
             
            
           
                
       
           
5752021] BOSTOCK’S PARADOX
including male-on-male sexual harassment, along with motherhood
discrimination, are meaningfully—and distinguishably—different,
because they bear different sorts of relationships to the core of Title VII’s
sex discrimination concerns about ensuring and promoting workplace
equality for cisheterosexual women.60 
One position, consistent with ideas in Justice Alito’s dissent, though
not itself a position the dissent fully ventilates, sees the differences
between and among these various forms of sex discrimination as stark 
across the board, but starkest where traditional (meaning:
cisheterosexual-male-on-cisheterosexual-female) sexual harassment and
motherhood discrimination claims are concerned.61 While there once
were “hot[]” “contest[s]” over whether these types of discrimination were
actionable under Title VII’s sex discrimination ban, the Court’s decisions
recognizing them as “fall[ing] within Title VII’s sweep” seem generally
easier—to the point of being practically obvious—now.62 In this respect,
the Bostock majority opinion reflects what have become mainstream legal
sensibilities that see cross-sex sexual harassment and motherhood
discrimination rules not as just close to—but as comfortably within— 
Title VII’s core sex discrimination concerns. If so, Bostock’s position that
anti-gay and anti-trans discrimination are like them looks to skip over a
needed explanation for how including these types of discrimination 
within Title VII’s terms promotes cisheterosexual women’s workplace
equality. Explanations along these lines, of course, exist, and so Bostock
might have embraced them.63 That it does not even reach for them in this
60. For the Alito dissent’s relevant discussion of sexual harassment rules, see Bostock,
140 S. Ct. at 1773–74 (Alito, J., dissenting). For the relevant discussion of motherhood 
discrimination rules, see id. at 1775. As to motherhood discrimination, the dissent emphasizes 
that “motherhood, by definition, is a condition that can be experienced only by women, so a
policy that distinguishes between motherhood and parenthood is necessarily a policy that
draws a sex-based distinction.” Id. In making this point, the dissent is evidently thinking only
about cis women, missing the realities of different forms of trans parenting.
61. The dissent comes closest to this articulation in relation to motherhood
discrimination. See id. at 1775.
62. Id. at 1752 (majority opinion) (“While to the modern eye each of these examples may
seem ‘plainly [to] constitut[e] discrimination because of biological sex,’ all were hotly
contested for years following Title VII’s enactment.” (citation omitted)); id. at 1747
(“fall[ing] within Title VII’s sweep”). See also Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REV.
813, 817 (1991) (observing, in the context of sex-plus discrimination cases, that “[e]arly
decisions struggled with issues which to most people now seem easy”). Part of the reason the
majority does not engage them is related to its view of Title VII as an individual rights statute
that protects both women and men as individuals, not as members of groups.
63. See, e.g., Ann C. McGinley et al., Feminist Perspectives on Bostock v. Clayton
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passage scarcely aids understanding Bostock’s reasons for its conclusion
that all these forms of discrimination are statutorily alike.64 
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Services, Inc., extending traditional, cross-sex sexual harassment
protections to encompass male-on-male sexual harassment, makes sense
of Justice Alito’s dissent’s decision not to press this point and claim
advantage in just this way.65 After Oncale, anti-gay and anti-trans
discrimination need not be shown to implicate core Title VII sex
discrimination concerns in order for them to be held within the ambit of
the statute’s protections. As the Bostock majority opinion repeatedly
notes, Oncale emphasized that male-on-male sexual harassment “was
assuredly not the principal evil Congress was concerned with when it
enacted Title VII.”66 Oncale, however, regarded this fact as “immaterial”
County, 53 CONN. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 12 (2020) (“[T]he Court misses . . . the real argument
for why Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination protects persons who are LGBTQ+. . . .
Discrimination against persons on the basis of LGBTQ+ status is rooted in and implicitly
‘justified’ by their perceived and actual violation of the patriarchal norms that structure our
society.” (observations of Pamela Wilkins)).
64. See id. (observing that “the majority’s . . . opinion never seriously acknowledges what 
is at stake,” and then going on to note the patriarchal stakes of the case). The majority’s
decision not to reach for arguments linking anti-gay and anti-trans discrimination to women’s
workplace equality in this passage or elsewhere is part of the reason that Justice Alito’s dissent
can so easily observe that “sexual orientation is not historically tied to a project that aims to
subjugate either men or women[;] [a]n employer who discriminates on this ground might be
called ‘homophobic’ or ‘transphobic,’ but not sexist.” Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1765 (Alito, J., 
dissenting). Not incidentally, in saying this, the dissent also appears to be saying that trans
identity is also “not historically tied to a project that aims to subjugate either men or women.”
Id. For replies to this idea, see infra note 76 (collecting a few sources). Relevant discussion is
also found infra Part II.B.1.
65. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79, 82 (1998).
66. Id. at 79. The Bostock majority opinion repeatedly points to this dimension of Oncale.
Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1744, 1749, 1751. For the Bostock majority’s larger engagements with
Oncale, see id. at 1743–44, 1747, 1749, 1751–52. Examples of lowers courts reading Oncale
along these lines to ground both anti-gay and anti-trans sex discrimination claims under Title
VII include: E.E.O.C. v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560, 577 (6th 
Cir. 2018) (“[T]he drafters’ failure to anticipate that Title VII would cover transgender status
is of little interpretive value, because ‘statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil 
to cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws . . . by
which we are governed.’” (quoting Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79)); Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc.,
883 F.3d 100, 115 (2d Cir. 2018) (en banc) (“Oncale instructs that the text is the lodestar of
statutory interpretation . . . . We give these words their full scope and conclude that, because
sexual orientation discrimination is a function of sex, and is comparable to sexual harassment,
gender stereotyping, and other evils long recognized as violating Title VII, the statute must
prohibit it.”); and Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College of Indiana, 853 F.3d 339, 342 (7th
Cir. 2017) (en banc) (noting relevance, inter alia, of Oncale “to the issue before” the court);
   
           
       
       
            
         
        
       
        
        
       
        
         
        
            
           
       
    
       
       
          
          
       
   
         
           
             
           
        
        
 
                
      
       
       
               
           
              
      
   
        
5772021] BOSTOCK’S PARADOX
when it offered its interpretation of the law.67 Justice Scalia’s opinion for
the Oncale Court explained that “statutory prohibitions often go beyond 
the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is
ultimately the provisions of our laws . . . by which we are governed.”68 
Protections for men against same-sex sexual harassment in Oncale thus
reduced to, and became a function of, “the plain scope” of Title VII’s
statutory protections: Since men, too, can suffer “sex” discrimination
under Title VII’s definition, their rights to sexual harassment protections
were at least “reasonably comparable” to women’s in traditional cross-
sex sexual harassment cases. Men could thus hardly be categorically 
blocked from receiving the benefits of the Supreme Court’s sexual
harassment rules once the Court’s “precedent[s] . . . established that 
sexual harassment may constitute sex discrimination within the meaning
of Title VII.”69 Refusing to recognize men as entitled to these legal
benefits would have required the Oncale Court to do precisely what
Bostock is saying the Court categorically must not do: “carve out an
exception to the statutory text.”70 
Justice Alito’s dissent parts ways with the Bostock majority in
thinking that what makes Bostock different from Oncale is that anti-gay 
and anti-trans discrimination do not come within Title VII’s definition of
sex—at all. Refusing to recognize that they do, therefore, does not
involve any improper “carve out” from—or any “donut hole” being 
created within—its statutory terms.71 
Justice Alito’s dissent presents its explanation for this position as a
targeted report on why “Oncale does not provide the slightest support for
what the Court has done today,” but the reasons the opinion offers apply
more broadly, and they effectively convey why the dissent regards it as
an error to assimilate anti-gay and anti-trans discrimination to the wider
sex discrimination set that includes the Court’s sexual harassment and
id. at 344 (“Our interpretive task is guided . . . by the Supreme Court’s approach in the closely
related case of Oncale . . . .”).
67. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1743; see also id. at 1774 (Alito, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 1774 (quoting Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79).
69. Id.; id. at 1747 (majority opinion); see also id. at 1741 (“This statute works to protect
individuals of both sexes from discrimination, and does so equally.”); see also infra note 138. 
As Justice Alito’s dissent puts the point in other terms: “Given these premises, syllogistic
reasoning dictated the holding” in Oncale. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1774 (Alito, J., dissenting).
70. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1774 (Alito, J., dissenting).
71. Id.; id. at 1747 (majority opinion).
   
          
           
      
           
        
        
     
        
         
      
        
          
    
        
    
          
     
   
        
         
          
          
          
         
         
       
        
       
          
            
          
           
 
        
            
          
 
         
      
      
578 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  69
motherhood discrimination cases.72 This is the dissent: “Whether we like
to admit it now or not, in the thinking of Congress and the public at that 
time [in 1964], such discrimination[, namely, “discrimination because of
sexual orientation and transgender status”] would not have been evil at
all.”73 Bostock, on this view, involves no evil that is “comparable” to the
evils implicated by the Court’s sexual harassment cases, including
Oncale, or its motherhood discrimination cases. The conclusion that
Justice Alito’s dissent reaches, based on all this, is that anti-gay and anti-
trans discrimination should not be regarded as forms of sex
discrimination outlawed by Title VII. The gap between Title VII’s text
and the Court’s rules of statutory anti-discrimination coverage, such as
they are—and the dissent does not deny them entirely—does not, in the
dissent’s view, tolerably extend that far.
There is a certain painful truth in Justice Alito’s dissent’s
observation about anti-gay and anti-trans discrimination historically
comprising no legal “evil at all.”74 Recognizing this truth without
endorsing the historical anti-gay and anti-trans normativities that the
dissent thereby legally operationalizes, Bostock’s stance that it must 
recognize anti-gay and anti-trans discrimination so as to avoid imperiling
and even having to overturn the Court’s sexual harassment and
motherhood discrimination cases falters. If the majority’s position is to
be sustained, it calls for a more nuanced argument—one that seriously 
engages the view that differences of degree and kind exist between and
among the types of sex discrimination cases that the opinion has in mind.
Missing such an engagement, Bostock’s rhetorical position that the
Court’s sexual harassment and motherhood discrimination doctrines
stand or fall based on its treatment of anti-gay and anti-trans
discrimination appears evasive—and overfed. Bostock may ultimately be
right that the Court’s longstanding tolerance for the gap between Title
VII’s definition of “sex,” on the one hand, and sexual harassment and
motherhood discrimination rules, on the other, should imply a more
categorical toleration of that gap as it widens beyond Oncale to
72. Id. at 1774 (Alito, J., dissenting).
73. Id. As the dissent elsewhere notices, the evils of anti-gay discrimination were
historically such that they were not only not regarded as evil, but a good that was affirmatively 
called for, including under law: “[T]he plain truth is that in 1964 homosexuality was thought
to be a mental disorder, and homosexual conduct was regarded as morally culpable and 
worthy of punishment.” Id. at 1769.
74. Id. at 1774.
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5792021] BOSTOCK’S PARADOX
encompass anti-gay and anti-trans sex discrimination claims.75 However
imaginable that position may be, it is not, finally, spelled out in Bostock’s
text.76 
This leaves Bostock’s readers, even after this passage, searching for 
a stable account that persuasively explains why anti-gay and anti-trans
discrimination—forms of discrimination that Bostock confirms are 
“conceptually distinct from sex” discrimination—are nevertheless
properly treated by the opinion as coming within Title VII’s sex 
discrimination rule, rather than being held to be beyond it.77 The clue that
Bostock supplies in this setting—and it is an important one—is that the
reasons have something centrally to do with the steadying weight of 
precedent that Bostock means to build on and not “reverse.”78 
Later in the opinion, Bostock replays some of these basic dynamics
in a different setting.80 Here, Bostock is dealing with defense arguments
militating against the Title VII causation standard that the opinion has
embraced as a standard that applies in all cases claiming sex
discrimination, including in cases of anti-gay and anti-trans
discrimination, held to involve sex discrimination under the statute. As in 
the earlier passage on the no-donut-hole canon, Bostock proceeds from
the firm foundation of its own textualist ruling as it critically engages—
then dismisses—defense counterarguments.
75. At least it is categorical in the context of the forms of sex discrimination that Bostock
involves, all of which are “inextricably” related to sex, rather than being “related [to it only]
in ‘some vague sense.’” Id. at 1761 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing id. at 1741–42 (majority 
opinion)).
76. See supra note 64. As to anti-trans discrimination as sex discrimination, see also Lori 
Watson, The Woman Question, 3 TSQ: TRANSGENDER STUDIES QUARTERLY 246 (2016); Brief
for Anti-Discrimination Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting the Employees at 8–22,
Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., Ga., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020) (Nos. 17-1618, 17-1623, 18-107). As
to anti-gay discrimination as sex discrimination, see, for example, Andrew Koppelman, Why
Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197 
(1994); Marc Spindelman, Gay Men and Sex Equality, 46 TULSA L. REV. 123 (2013)
[hereinafter Spindelman, Gay Men and Sex Equality]. Additional sources are collected in id. 
at 131 n.27. For some movement in at least some of these directions in Bostock, not worked
up into a full-dress account, see Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1741–43, 1748–49. The discussion
infra Parts II.B.1, II.B.3 speaks more to these points.
77. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1746–47 (majority opinion).
78. Id. at 1747.
79. Id. at 1749.
80. See generally id. at 1748–49.
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Training its sights on employer positions that surfaced during the
litigation, Bostock maintains that they reflect an understanding of Title
VII’s sex discrimination ban that would invoke the deployment of a 
“stricter causation test for use only in cases involving discrimination
based on sexual orientation or transgender status.”81 Having put the point
this way—particularly situated against the backdrop of its own legal 
conclusions in the case—Bostock characterizes this approach as one that
would “create a curious discontinuity in our case law” that the text of
Title VII does not warrant, and that the Court’s opinion, accordingly,
rejects.82 At first blush, this looks like a text-based reason for rebuffing 
the employers’ claims.
On closer inspection, however, this is an argument from a conclusion
that has practically shifted the burden of textual justification away from
the Bostock Court’s opinion and its understanding of Title VII and onto 
the defense position that the Court wishes to dismiss.83 Clever as a
debater’s trick, this is not an especially thoughtful means of addressing 
the parties, their related publics, and their shared litigation arguments
with an account for why the Court has interpreted the text of Title VII the
way that it has. The “curious discontinuity” of the differential causation
standard pushed by the defense is only “curious” and a “discontinuity”
with the caselaw if one agrees that Bostock’s pro-gay and pro-trans
interpretation of Title VII’s sex discrimination ban is correct.84
For the majority and its supporters, the observation carries, but the
point that Bostock is dismissing here is grounded in the view that Title
VII’s text does not at all warrant the conclusion that lesbian women, gay
men, and trans people are entitled to the conventional protections of Title
VII’s sex discrimination ban, including its conventional causation rules.85 
81. Id. at 1749.
82. Id. The move partakes of what Andrew Koppelman calls “the subtractive strategy”:
“The subtractive strategy is an innovation in statutory interpretation. It seeks to draw upon
the cultural context at the time of enactment to avoid unwelcome implications of a statute’s
plain language—and to call what one has done ‘textualism.’” Koppelman, supra note 2, at 3.
83. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1739–40 (discussion of “because of” and the but-for causation
standard); id. at 1739 (“In the language of law, this means that Title VII’s ‘because of’ test 
incorporates the ‘“simple”’ and ‘traditional’ standard of but-for causation.” (citation
omitted)); id. at 1749 (“No one thinks that, so the employers must scramble to justify
deploying a stricter causation test for use only in cases involving discrimination based on 
sexual orientation or transgender status.”).
84. Id. at 1749 (“curious discontinuity”).
85. One version of this argument is in Justice Alito’s dissent. See, e.g., id. at 1775 (Alito,
   
         
           
      
         
    
  
         
           
          
       
        
        
            
 
             
      
     
         
    
       
          
          
         
          
           
              
      
 
         
        
         
          
 
       
         
            
   
             
   
     
5812021] BOSTOCK’S PARADOX
Seen that way and stated plainly: If anti-gay and anti-trans discrimination
were not properly within the ambit of Title VII’s sex discrimination
protections, then there would be nothing legally problematic about the
idea that a different set of causation rules might apply “only in cases
involving discrimination based on sexual orientation or transgender
status.”86
Keeping with this perspective, the Court’s position is readily
reversed. From the point of view that the Court’s opinion dismisses, the
question persists: What in the text of Title VII warrants Bostock affording
anti-gay and anti-trans discrimination the full and equal measure of Title
VII’s sex discrimination protections? Bostock’s position, inverting that
question, offers no satisfactory account that explains why it has read the
statute the way it has read it in this case. The debater’s trick on this level 
looks to be just that: a trick, a dodge.
Nor is it only from within a textualist perspective like those in the
Bostock dissents that Bostock’s apparent answer-by-deflection is
insufficient. It is, though, still an important step that reads as a tacit 
acknowledgement by the Court that a demand for justification is rightly
being placed upon it. Why does Bostock eliminate the “curious
discontinuity” that has been allowed to exist in the caselaw until now?87
Bostock is correct that the text of Title VII does not speak to the
imposition of a more onerous standard for lesbian, gay, and trans people
involving their discrimination claims, but it is also the case that Title VII
does not expressly speak to whether they should get the same benefit of
the “simple” and “traditional” “but-for” test the Court says that they
deserve.88 Whether they do (or do not) is part of the basic issue Bostock
involves, which the Court resolves, but without pointing to an answer in
the very text whose meaning is at issue. 
As before, Bostock indicates that a result contrary to the one it 
actually reaches would produce a distortion in the caselaw. This suggests
that Bostock is concerned about preserving precedent for the sake of those
cisheterosexuals whose rights are being implicated by it, but, just as in
J., dissenting) (“[T]he essential question—whether discrimination because of sexual 
orientation or gender identity constitutes sex discrimination—would be the same no matter
what causation standard applied. The Court’s extensive discussion of causation standards is
so much smoke.”).
86. Id. at 1749 (majority opinion). For problems with this view, see infra Part III.A.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1739.
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the no-donut-hole-canon passage, precedent itself does not make the 
choice for the Bostock Court. Bostock’s reading of Title VII’s sex
discrimination ban here is not a function of the text, but its own choosing.
Once again, Bostock leaves the reason for that choice undeclared.
But not for long. Much to its credit, in a subsequent passage, Bostock
finally relents and explains the grounds for its interpretive choice in terms
that do not sound with textualism, but against it.
Here, then, is what may very well be the single most important
passage in the Court’s Bostock opinion.90 
Like the earlier passages where Bostock looks beyond Title VII’s
text for the basis of its interpretation of it, this one arrives in Bostock’s
larger discussion of statutory interpretation arguments negatively
portrayed as purposivist accounts of Title VII’s meaning and related 
policy claims from defendants about how to read the statute.91 By this
point, Bostock has already established its textualist positions and 
observed that extra-textualist touchstones for interpretive judgment, 
including legislative purpose, are, in the main, unnecessary, even
illegitimate, for the Court to consider within the four corners of its
textualist ruling.92 According to Bostock, since the meaning of Title VII’s
89. Id. at 1751 (in the original it is “disfavored group”; “justice” is as it is).
90. See generally id.
91. Id. at 1749 (“Ultimately, the employers are forced to abandon the statutory text and
precedent altogether and appeal to assumptions and policy.”); see also id. at 1745 (“[T]he 
employers are left to retreat beyond the statute’s text, where they fault us for ignoring the 
legislature’s purposes in enacting Title VII . . . . But none of these contentions about what the 
employers think the law was meant to do, or should do, allow us to ignore the law as it is.”).
92. For some earlier discussion of the point in the majority opinion, see id. at 1739–41.
For additional discussion, see also, for example, id. at 1737 (“When the express terms of a 
statute give us one answer and extratextual considerations suggest another, it’s no contest.
Only the written word is the law . . . .”); id. at 1738 (“[O]nly the words on the page constitute 
the law adopted by Congress and approved by the President. If judges could add to, remodel,
update, or detract from old statutory terms inspired only by extratextual sources and our own 
imaginations, we would risk amending statutes outside the legislative process reserved for the
people’s representatives.”); id. at 1745 (“In the end, the employers are left to retreat beyond
the statute’s text, where they fault us for ignoring the legislature’s purposes in enacting Title
VII or certain expectations about its operation. . . . But none of these contentions about what
the employers think the law was meant to do, or should do, allow us to ignore the law as it 
is.”); id. at 1747 (“[S]peculation about why a later Congress declined to adopt new legislation
offers a ‘particularly dangerous’ basis on which to rest an interpretation of an existing law a
different and earlier Congress did adopt.” (citation omitted)); id. at 1749 (“[W]hen the
meaning of the statute’s terms is plain, our job is at an end. The people are entitled to rely on
   
      
       
          
          
            
           
        
          
           
       
         
    
          
           
            
        
          
            
     
 
            
       
          
            
         
             
       
               
          
         
        
  
            
 
           
        
         
             
        
     
            
             
       
   
5832021] BOSTOCK’S PARADOX
sex discrimination ban is “plain,” extra-textual considerations for
figuring statutory meaning are improper and inevitably involve judicial
policy making.93 Bostock notes the exception of a special set of cases in 
which historical sources may be consulted to determine a statute’s
meaning, but explains that that exception does not apply in this case.94 
After a passage in which Bostock actively poses a series of rhetorical
questions that challenge its own normative underpinnings, the opinion
zeroes in on a concern that it recognizes its ruling “reasonably” raises,
about whether the approach it has taken in the case will or “will not be 
deployed neutrally.”95 Bostock perceives that behind this concern is a
“lurking . . . cynicism that Congress could not possibly have meant to 
protect a disfavored group.”96
Bracketing the opinion’s remark on “lurking . . . cynicism,” which
subtly casts Bostock’s opponents as political brutes who side with, and
would have the Court side with, the mighty over the meek, Bostock’s
suggestion that the statutory interpretation project it is undertaking
involves protecting “a disfavored group” is puzzling.97 Why is Bostock
leaning on this notion in its account of Title VII’s meaning? Did the Court 
not itself adamantly insist amidst an extended discussion early on that
the law as written, without fearing that courts might disregard its plain terms based on some
extratextual consideration.”); id. at 1750 (“[T]he employers take pains to couch their
argument in terms of seeking to honor the statute’s ‘expected applications’ rather than
vindicate its ‘legislative intent.’ But the concepts are closely related. . . . However framed, the
employer’s logic impermissibly seeks to displace the plain meaning of the law in favor of
something lying beyond it.”); id. at 1753 (“[E]mployers are left [with] . . . the last line of
defense for all failing statutory interpretation arguments: naked policy appeals. . . . [T]hat’s
an invitation no court should ever take up.”); id. (“As judges we possess no special expertise
or authority to declare . . . what a self-governing people should consider just or wise.”); id. at
1754 (“Ours is a society of written laws. Judges are not free to overlook plain statutory 
commands on the strength of nothing more than suppositions about intentions or guesswork
about expectations.”).
93. See, e.g., id. at 1743 (noting “plain” meaning); id. at 1748 (same); id. at 1749–50 
(same).
94. Id. at 1749 (granting that, “[o]f course, some Members of this Court have consulted
legislative history when interpreting ambiguous statutory language,” but restating that “no 
ambiguity exists about how Title VII’s terms apply to the facts before us”); id. at 1750
(allowing that the context of an enactment can sometimes change the ordinary meaning of a
statute, but noting that the employers in Bostock “advocate nothing like that”).
95. Id. at 1751.
96. Id. (“One could also reasonably fear that objections about unexpected applications
will not be deployed neutrally. Often lurking just behind such objections resides a cynicism 
that Congress could not possibly have meant to protect a disfavored group.”).
97. Id.
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Title VII’s sex discrimination ban is about protecting “women” and
“men” as individuals only, and not as members of groups?98 If so, this
concern about “disfavored group[s]” is beset by extra-textualist 
resonances.99 There may yet be a way to reconcile the points, but this
reads as an indication that something not very textualist is going down
here.
Bostock proceeds to invoke “this Court’s encounter with [a directive
of] the Americans with Disabilities Act” for what it can teach, valuable
to the matter at hand.100 Bostock processes the example by sketching a
larger lesson that transcends the Americans with Disabilities Act. The
point of the digression emerges as a high-minded and far-reaching
observation about what the law requires. Immediately before delivering
its punchline, Bostock indicates that what it is about to say applies
generally “to groups that were politically unpopular at the time of the
law’s passage.”101 Here, again, is group-focused thinking at work, though
this time around, the opinion is specific about the groups it has in mind. 
What it is about to say involves the forerunners to the Bostock plaintiffs:
“homosexual and transgender employees in the 1960s.”102
Having mentioned these once-politically unpopular groups (or these
once-and-still politically unpopular groups), and having thus made gay
and trans people salient in its readers’ minds, Bostock observes that:
[T]o refuse enforcement [of a statute] just because . . . the parties before us
happened to be unpopular at the time of the law’s passage, would not only 
require us to abandon our role as interpreters of statutes; it would tilt the scales
of justice in favor of the strong or popular and neglect the promise that all
persons are entitled to the benefit of the law’s terms.103 
98. Id. at 1740–41 (discussing the point in some detail). For some additional discussion 
of groups in Bostock, see id. at 1740, 1744, 1748.
99. Id. at 1751.
100. Id.; see also id. (“Congress, of course, didn’t list every public entity the statute would
apply to. And no one batted an eye at its application to, say, post offices. But when the statute 
was applied to prisons, curiously, some demanded a closer look . . . .”); cf. 42 U.S.C.
§12112(a) (“No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis
of disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of
employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges
of employment.”).
101. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1751.
102. Id.
103. Id. It is worth noting a reading of this language from the opinion not pursued in the
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This appeal, with its concluding language, is reminiscent of an
observation that Justice Anthony Kennedy once might have sewn into 
one of his opinions involving LGBT rights.104 Against the backdrop of
Bostock’s own invocation of “homosexual and transgender employees in
the 1960s,” it delivers Bostock’s most extra-textualist reason yet for not 
“refus[ing] enforcement” of the statute.105
Past the double-negatives, Bostock is at long last serving up a
substantive, non-textualist, values-based reason for its categorical, pro-
gay and pro-trans reading of Title VII’s sex discrimination ban. This
reading means to attend to—and not “neglect”—the individuals who
belong to these “disfavored group[s]” as a general matter of the fair “tilt
[of] the scales of justice.”106 By these means, Bostock is going to make
good—indeed, has already made good—on “the promise that all persons 
are entitled to the benefit of the law’s terms.”107 However confusing this
talk of “the scales of justice” may be, it should neither cause worry nor
be mystifying. This is Bostock coming out as Lady Justice finding
balance—and doing impartial justice—with her scales.108 
text. The opinion’s indication that it does not wish to “abandon our role as interpreters of
statutes” may be thought of as a way for the opinion to stick to its basic textualist claim. Id.
From there, it looks like the second part of the sentence, involving improperly tilting “the
scales of justice,” might operate as a way of saying that justice does not counsel any other
result. Id. Even if the passage were to be read along these lines, there would still be a question
about the strength of the majority’s textualist claim that Title VII’s “clear” or “plain” meaning
is at stake. Id. at 1737 (“clear”); id. at 1743 (“plain”). In any event, the additional recognition
of a justice-based check on Bostock’s textualist conclusion reads as an indication that this is
a legitimate ground on which to base thinking about how to read the statute in the case, and,
what is more, that the majority has considered it in its conclusion. Notwithstanding the
opinion’s ongoing sense of its need to police its own “role as interpreters of statutes,” which 
makes sense given the leading significance of the opinion’s textualism, the opinion’s outreach
to a principle of justice may not register as an extra-textualist move, but it still is, particularly
in a passage that is not strictly and only about Title VII’s text, which is never claimed as the
basis for the vision of justice the opinion embraces, although the opinion has it in mind as it 
writes. Id. at 1751. Another possibility that, at least partially, “saves” Bostock’s textualism as
it functions in this passage is discussed infra note 139.
104. For one comparison, see Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) (“These are
protections taken for granted by most people either because they already have them or do not
need them; these are protections against exclusion from an almost limitless number of
transactions and endeavors that constitute ordinary civic life in a free society.”).
105. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1751.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. This is not the first opinion implicating LGBT rights in which the Supreme Court has
represented itself as donning Lady Justice’s mantle. For discussion of earlier examples, see
Marc Spindelman, Masterpiece Cakeshop’s Homiletics, 68 CLEVELAND ST. L. REV. 347, 410
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B. From the Abstract to the Concrete: Justice’s Positive Law Legal 
Genealogy 
This image is lovely, but the thought behind it is disorienting.
Having disavowed extra-textualist thinking about statutory interpretation, 
Bostock is invoking and explaining itself in relation to an ideal of justice
like this?109 
Bostock’s justice-based explanation of its choice to read Title VII’s
sex discrimination provision to cover anti-gay and anti-trans
discrimination is not formally derived from Title VII’s text. Accordingly,
it does not involve an “interpretation” of that particular statute in that 
particular sense. In making this point, the opinion leads with a discussion
of the Americans with Disabilities Act.110 Title VII and its original
enactment date merely lurk in the foreground of the background of the
opinion’s observations. Title VII is first subtext in this discussion before
subtext bursts through the text—as text.
Had it wished to, Bostock could easily have identified an ideal of
justice within Title VII and its sex discrimination rule. The law’s wider
remedial purposes—operating retrospectively and prospectively to 
overcome histories of discrimination—“do justice” on multiple fronts,
including along the lines of sex. If Bostock does not invoke these remedial
purposes, it is no doubt because that would involve embracing 
purposivism, an illicit move within the textualist terms that Bostock has
set.111 From an orthodox textualist point of view, Bostock’s alternative— 
(2020) [hereinafter Spindelman, Masterpiece Cakeshop’s Homiletics] (noting that Obergefell,
Windsor, and Lawrence all adopted “the rhetorical posture of the fearsome figure of Lady 
Justice with her blindfold on, balancing her scales without being able to see who the parties 
are”), and Marc Spindelman Obergefell’s Dreams, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 1039, 1094–1108 (2016)
(sketching these rhetorical postures as they operated in Obergefell, and highlighting some of
the phantasmatic horrors that Lady Justice can inspire).
109. Ultimately, it does not appear to be. The first look here is, in a sense, somewhat 
deceiving. For a counterpoint focused on Bostock, see Jamison v. McClendon, No. 3:16-CV-
595-CWR-LRA, 2020 WL 4497723, at *26 n.266 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 4, 2020) (“Justice
Gorsuch’s majority opinion in Bostock emphasized that ‘no court should ever’ dispense with
a statutory text ‘to do as we think best,’ adding, ‘the same judicial humility that requires us to
refrain from adding to statutes requires us to refrain from diminishing them.’” (citing Bostock,
140 S. Ct. at 1753)).
110. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1751.
111. For an invocation of the purposivist point in Bostock, see id. at 1745 (“In the end, the 
employers . . . fault us for ignoring the legislature’s purposes in enacting Title VII or certain
expectations about its operation. . . . But none of these contentions . . . allow us to ignore the
law as it is.”).
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5872021] BOSTOCK’S PARADOX
reaching beyond Title VII’s four corners for this vision of justice—is no 
better, and is arguably worse. Bostock’s vision of justice—the one on
which its reading of Title VII’s sex discrimination provision depends—
being wholly extra-textual, defeats the opinion’s textualism.112
But it is not, without more, the total defeat of Bostock’s text. Indeed,
in a vital way that Bostock itself does not detail, this extra-textualist 
principle of justice saves Bostock’s own larger legal purposes by
providing it legal grounding that its invocation tacitly suggests the Court
knows its ruling otherwise lacks.
Where, though, does Bostock’s extra-textual vision of justice come 
from? What is its source?
One initial prospect is that Bostock’s vision of justice is a general
principle of political morality or a first-order moral or ethical precept. Of
the various ways to specify these ideas, one that recommends itself relates
to how Bostock indexes justice to the relative status of groups in
hierarchical arrangements. When Bostock talks about delivering justice
to “politically unpopular” groups, including “homosexual and
transgender employees,” it brings to mind a politically problematic
historicized sociology of group-based political power relations that it 
does not indulge, but works to transcend.113 Bostock does this by legally 
flattening the historical, group-based hierarchical power arrangements in 
the present tense, redistributing group-based political power as its way of
“doing” justice.114 
112. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 53, at 347–48 (discussing “[t]he false notion that the
quest in statutory interpretation is to do justice”).
113. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1751.
114. Id. In this respect, the opinion echoes language from Romer v. Evans. See 517 U.S.
620, 634 (1996) (“‘[I]f the constitutional conception of “equal protection of the laws” means
anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular
group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.’” (quoting Dep’t of Agric. v. 
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973))). In saying what it does on this score, Bostock temporarily
occludes the fact that even politically dominant groups, like cisheterosexuals, are not always
homogenous. Concretely, this group has historically been rank-ordered hierarchically, among
other things, by sex. For an anti-subordinationist vision of Title VII’s sex discrimination rule 
that builds on this understanding and has had a major influence on the Supreme Court’s
doctrine of it, without yet reducing it to an anti-subordination project, see generally
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX
DISCRIMINATION (1979), which was referred to in the course of the Supreme Court litigation
that resulted in Bostock. Harris Funeral Homes Transcript, supra note 7, at 58 (“JUSTICE
GINSBURG: No one ever thought sexual harassment was encompassed by discrimination on
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Bostock’s justice-based political power rearrangements—achieved
through its freeform balance of justice’s scales, Lady-Justice-as-Robin-
Hood-like—involve group-based political uplift that has something of an 
anti-subordinationist flair.115 This substantive advance is most dramatic
for trans people, who, for the first time in U.S. history, expressly receive
legal protections from the Supreme Court within Title VII, the crown
jewel of federal anti-discrimination law, not just a statute but a “super-
statute.”116 Lesbians and gay men receive their own affirmative boost in
the form of legal protection and enhanced group-based power in the
workplace setting. What is more, neither of these advances are or could
be limited to work and only work life.
Still, Bostock’s group-based redistributivist maneuvering is no 
the basis of sex back in ’64. It wasn’t until a book was written in the middle ’70s bringing that
out.”). For further treatment of anti-subordinationist visions of Title VII, see, for example,
Martha Chamallas, Structuralist and Cultural Domination Theories Meet Title VII: Some
Contemporary Influences, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2370, 2378–2408 (1994). For more on the basic
point, see, inter alia, CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE
127–54 (1989).
115. Here this would effectively be a kind of reversal of the ways that “the strong dominate
and exploit the weak.” Robin West, Reconstructing the Rule of Law, 90 GEO. L.J. 215, 217 
(2001) [hereinafter West, Reconstructing the Rule of Law]. For reasons to be discussed in the
text, it may be significant to note that West makes this point in the context of a rule-of-law
discussion, as when highlighting the notion that “[l]aw is a more or less good thing, when and
because it tempers the aggressions of the strong; it betters the condition of the weak; it makes
life less brutal, less nasty, and a little longer, for all.” Id. at 218. For more comprehensive
engagement, see WEST, supra note 3 at 17–61 (discussing various conceptions of the rule-of-
law, including a Hobbesian vision). See also generally GOWDER, supra note 36 (offering a
related equality-based account, grounded in the rule-of-law value of generality); Gowder,
supra note 36, at 1021 (contending that “the rule-of-law . . . positively demand[s] at least a
basic level of egalitarian justice, in the form of the command to eliminate social hierarchies
embedded in the law” in counterpoint to a formal equality vision). Prominent tendencies in
rule-of-law thinking and ideology may impose limits on the rule of law’s substantive equality
and redistributivist prospects. See, e.g., Robin West, Paul Gowder’s Rule of Law, 62 ST. LOUIS
U. L.J. 303, 308 (2018) (describing concerns that “rule of law thinking and rule of law
ideology has driven too many—e.g., F.A. Hayek and Robert Nozick—to the conclusion that 
it cannot [redistribute income from the rich toward the poor]: that the very idea of ‘law’ puts
burdens on progressive, redistributive understandings, of say, tort law, contract law, or for
that matter tax law, because ‘generality’ forbids this kind of eyes-open wide-awake 
differential treatment of rich and poor”).
116. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J.
1215, 1231–46 (2001) (treating “super-statutes,” including Title VII). The notion of the 
“super-statute” surfaces in Bostock, both directly, 140 S. Ct. at 1754 (describing the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 “as a kind of super statute”), and indirectly, as where the
1964 Civil Rights Act is flagged as a stand-out measure within the U.S. legal system. Id. at
1737 (“In our time, few pieces of federal legislation rank in significance with the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.”).
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programmatic announcement that the Supreme Court will henceforth 
read Title VII’s sex discrimination rule to require substantive equal
justice generally for historically politically subordinated groups like
“homosexual and transgender employees.”117 Although other indications
of anti-subordinationist thinking can be found in Bostock’s text— 
indications that might, in the future, serve as a basis for treating Bostock
as an anti-subordinationist ruling—the opinion’s emphatic and repeated
declarations that Title VII is an individual rights statute, and not a statute 
involving group rights, cuts short whatever anti-subordinationist
prospects it may otherwise presently have. This is because anti-
subordinationism is classically bound up with the relative positions and
conditions of social groups.118 Nor, in this setting, should anyone forget
some of the anti-anti-subordinationist positions that Bostock’s author and
one of its signatories (that would be Chief Justice John Roberts) have
elsewhere embraced, which reinforce the impression that Bostock’s
vision of justice does not convert the Court’s opinion into an anti-
subordinationist text.119 
A different and more compelling account of Bostock’s ideal of 
“justice” emerges by resurfacing details of the larger textual passage in
which this ideal appears. Context framing like this is, of course,
inevitably choice-bound, a means of making—not simply discovering—
a text. What recommends the choice in this setting is that the vision of
“justice” it yields accords with Bostock’s broad textual sensibilities,
including the positions that it takes on the meaning of Title VII’s sex
117. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1751. The extension of such a point beyond the sex
discrimination context seems equally difficult to imagine as a matter of authorial intent.
118. For the standard of the thought, see generally Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal
Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107 (1976).
119. For some relevant indications of Justice Gorsuch’s position, see, for example, June
Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2175–76 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (dissenting 
from a ruling striking down Louisiana abortion law); Thompson R2-J Sch. Dist. v. Luke P.,
540 F.3d 1143, 1155 (10th Cir. 2008) (Gorsuch, J., authoring majority opinion) (treating 
protections of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act as “limited in scope,” and not 
requiring “that States do whatever is necessary to ensure that all students achieve a particular 
standardized level of ability and knowledge”). Relevant indications of Chief Justice Roberts’s 
position are in, inter alia, his opinions in Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 686 (2015)
(Robert, C.J., dissenting), and Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 557 (2013)
(Roberts, C.J., authoring majority opinion) (holding that Congress’s “failure to act leaves us
today with no choice but to declare §4(b) [of the Voting Rights Act of 1965]
unconstitutional”).
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discrimination ban.
Bostock surfaces its ideal of “justice” in a paragraph responding to
“reasonabl[e] fear[s]” about the “neutral[ity]” of its ruling, an
“unexpected application[]” of Title VII’s demands.120 Will Bostock prove
to be a neutral decision, as some—given this surprising turn of events—
may understandably fear? “Neutrality” in this setting is less precisely a
textualist value than one that corresponds to textualism’s roots in rule-of-
law thinking.121 
This passage, with its witness of Bostock’s rule-of-law
commitments, meets Justice Kavanaugh’s Bostock dissent on terrain that
the dissent expressly claims for itself. The Kavanaugh dissent describes
its own textualism in terms of deeper rule-of-law and democratic
accountability values.122 According to the dissent, these foundations are 
120. The opening sentence of the paragraph is: “One could also reasonably fear that
objections about unexpected applications will not be deployed neutrally.” Bostock, 140 S. Ct.
at 1751.
121. Id. (the term is “neutrally” in the original). Prominently, Justice Antonin Scalia’s
canonical accounts of textualism present this interpretive method as a species of rule-of-law
argument. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE LAW 25 (1997) (“Of all the criticisms leveled against textualism, the most mindless is
that it is ‘formalistic.’ The answer to that is, of course it’s formalistic! The rule-of-law is about
form. . . . Long live formalism. It is what makes a government of laws and not of men.”). Not
surprisingly, rule-of-law values regularly animate and weave throughout textualist practices
as a result. For additional thoughts on Scalian textualism and the rule of law, see Gautam
Bhatia, The Politics of Statutory Interpretation: The Hayekian Foundations of Justice Antonin
Scalia’s Jurisprudence, 42 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 525, 526 (2015) (“Justice Scalia’s
approach to statutory interpretation rests upon his belief in a thin concept of the rule of law—
that is, generally worded rules ought to be applied prospectively and impartially across the
board.”); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism and Normative Canons, 113 COLUM.
L. REV. 531, 555 (2013) (reviewing SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 53) (“Scalia and Garner’s
particular list of canons is dominated by a nonconstitutional value, that of continuity. 
Continuity is a rule of law value . . . . Similarly, the rule of law abhors uncertainty and
fluctuating rules.”); Abigail R. Moncrieff, Statutory Realism: The Jurisprudential
Ambivalence of Interpretive Theory, 72 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 39, 141 (2019) (describing 
Justice Scalia as one of “the most explicit thinkers about the rule-of-law motivations of
textualism”); Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., The Rule-of-law: More Than Just a Law of Rules, 97
NEB. L. REV. 925, 926 (2019) (“Due in large part to the influence of Justice Scalia, the rule of
law has become synonymous with a formalist kind of textualism in statutory construction and
with originalism in constitutional interpretation. The idea is that these interpretive methods
ensure fidelity to the rule of law . . . .”). 
122. Democratic accountability, or, more simply, democracy, is sometimes counted as a
rule-of-law value, too. See, e.g., WEST, supra note 3, at 16–18 (noting that the rule-of-law
“sometimes refers to America’s shared commitment to democracy” and sketching the 
argument); id. at 43–58 (discussing the rule-of-law “as expressive of the value of
representative democracy” with particular reference to the views of Thomas Paine).
   
           
          
        
     
         
         
        
            
  
           
            
             
     
      
      
            
 
         
    
            
           
              
 
           
  
            
          
  
                 
           
         
         
         
         
             
            
         
             
            
              
      
          
       
        
     
5912021] BOSTOCK’S PARADOX
the “two main reasons” why “[j]udges adhere to [the] ordinary meaning”
of statutory texts.123 “A society governed by the rule of law must have
laws that are known and understandable to the citizenry. And judicial 
adherence to ordinary meaning facilitates the democratic accountability
of America’s elected representatives for the laws they enact.”124 The
Bostock majority’s own more qualified notation of neutrality gesturally
indicates that it is likewise responsive to rule-of-law values and concerns, 
though they run in the opposite directions of those in the Kavanaugh
dissent.125 
It is significant that Bostock’s vision of “justice” arises in a passage
that is linked to the rule of law in these ways.126 The placement suggests 
the prospect that Bostock’s talk of justice is a way of invoking the rule-
of-law ideal of “legal justice.”127 Classically, the ideal of legal justice—a 
distinctive way of discussing formal equality in the rule-of-law setting—
broadly and procedurally requires, to use Bostock’s language, that “all
[similarly situated] persons” are to be treated alike in the eyes of the law,
123. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1825 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). For further discussion of the
rule-of-law underpinnings of the case, see id. at 1828.
124. Id. at 1825. Some important extensions of rule-of-law principles, including of justice, 
to the international setting, focusing on the climate change context, are discussed in Cinnamon
Carlarne, Climate Change, Human Rights, & The Rule of Law, 25 UCLA J. INT’L L. &
FOREIGN AFFS. 11 (2020).
125. Rule-of-law values, it turns out, can be as indeterminate as the textualisms that 
emerge from them.
126. See infra note 138 (discussing Bostock’s representation of Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998), as an opinion that reflects and reinforces a
particular rule-of-law ideal of legal justice).
127. For treatment of “legal justice,” not as a singular, but rather as a contested concept,
see generally WEST, supra note 3, at 1–4. For an important underlying source, see generally
JUDITH N. SHKLAR, LEGALISM: LAW, MORALS, AND POLITICAL TRIALS (1986). Another to 
account for in this connection is David Luban, Justice and Law, in INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 932 (James D. Wright ed., 2 ed.
2015). For additional refinements, see, inter alia, Jeremy Waldron, Does Law Promise 
Justice?, 17 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 759, 773–75 (2001) (rounding out some different types of
“legal justice”). As used here, the concept of legal justice hews closely to what Robin West
calls “the ‘dominant interpretation,’ or the ‘reigning interpretation,’ of ‘legal justice,’” WEST,
supra note 3, at 3, discussed in some detail in id. at 4–11, and described there as keyed to the
idea of “formal equality” and “the imperative that presses upon judges to ‘treat likes alike,’
or to follow precedent, or to comply with stare decisis.” Id. at 7. For a different way of
identifying “legal justice” as used here, see Waldron, supra, at 774–76 (discussing “formal
legal justice” and “substantive legal justice”). Given the various operations of the term legal 
justice, there is a certain continuity between and among the three textual passages from
Bostock discussed in these pages. The first two may be read to solidify the rule-of-law context 
for the third being treated here.
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“entitled to” all the same “benefit[s] of the law’s terms” as everybody
else.128 
Figuring Bostock’s ideal of justice as a principle of legal justice, it 
bears noting that, as this principle circulates in Bostock, it does not simply 
involve an abstract concept of formal equality, a rule requiring likes to be
treated alike. It involves that abstract concept along with a distinctive 
conception—or specification—of it, according to which lesbian women, 
gay men, and trans people are recognized as formally just like their
cisheterosexual counterparts, and hence entitled to the same legal 
treatment.
Elsewhere in the opinion, Bostock confirms that it has aligned itself
with ideas about formal equality. Formal equality thinking—and, in
particular, formal equality thinking that attends to the demands for the
equal treatment of LGBT and non-LGBT persons—is woven throughout 
Bostock’s text.129 If Bostock repeatedly brings up group membership as it
indicates that lesbian women, gay men, and trans people are to receive
Title VII’s sex discrimination protections, it does so in order to declare
that memberships in these groups is legally irrelevant, much in the way
that the opinion announces that “homosexuality . . . [and] transgender
status . . . [are] not relevant to employment decisions.”130 Read back in
terms of the rule-of-law value of “neutrality” that Bostock mentions, legal
justice is also a way for the Court to achieve and practice a “neutral” legal 
stance.131 Bostock’s vision of legal justice positions the Court to remain
“neutral” as between and among persons who venture Title VII sex
discrimination claims. No one receives any different legal treatment
based on the happenstance of their membership in groups defined by 
128. See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1751; see also, e.g., id. at 1740 (“To ‘discriminate against’
a person, then, would seem to mean treating that individual worse than others who are 
similarly situated.”). See supra note 127. An important set of related thoughts on the rule of
law and equality under law is found in NEIL M. GORSUCH, A REPUBLIC, IF YOU CAN KEEP IT
9, 24, 41, 76, 125, 198, 237–41, 283–84, 323 (2019).
129. See, e.g., id. at 1737 (“Only the written word is the law, and all persons are entitled
to its benefit.”); id. at 1749 (noting that Title VII’s sex discrimination rule’s application “in
these cases reaches ‘beyond the principal evil’ legislators may have intended or expected to
address,” but does so because the law’s terms are general and similar evils are to be treated
similarly under law (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 
(1997))); id. at 1750 (making a similar point).
130. Id. at 1741
131. Id. at 1751 (the language in the opinion is “neutrally”).
   
         
 
      
         
         
          
 
             
            
           
           
         
          
        
     
          
           
 
               
       
   
     
             
           
             
          
 
   
          
              
                 
             
           
          
         
            
          
            
             
              
               
         
             
5932021] BOSTOCK’S PARADOX
sexual orientation or “transgender status.”132 “[A]ll persons are entitled to
the benefits of the law’s terms.”133 
Interrupting the seamlessness of Bostock’s embrace of a rule-of-law
vision of legal justice and how it underwrites the opinion’s textualist
positions is the issue, problematic from a textualist point of view, that 
legal justice, as a rule-of-law ideal, does not derive from Title VII’s
text.134 
To say this is partly to note the details of Bostock’s discussion, which
raises its undefined idea of justice in a passage that is not about Title VII
in its leading terms.135 More basically, it means to register a conceptual
point. At least when it is understood to involve an abstract principle of
formal equality calling for likes, generally, to be treated alike, legal 
justice is widely seen as a necessary condition of rule-of-law decision-
making and practice.136 On this level, all textualist decisions—indeed, all 
statutory interpretation decisions regardless of their interpretive
method—must satisfy legal justice’s strictures if they are to satisfy the
rule of law’s demands.137 Even as Bostock, in its way, attests to the felt
132. Id. at 1741. In this respect, Bostock internalizes and follows the promise of neutrality
prominently featured in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission,
138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
133. Id. at 1751.
134. See id. at 1753 (suggesting that justice is not a textualist value when it observes that,
“[a]s judges we possess no special expertise or authority to declare for ourselves what a self-
governing people should consider just or wise”). Cf. also SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 53,
at 347–48 (discussing “[t]he false notion that the quest in statutory interpretation is to do
justice”).
135. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1751.
136. WEST, supra note 3, at 1–3 (discussing dominant understanding of legal justice).
137. For some expression of this view in authoritative textualist sources, see Antonin
Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1178 (1989):
To achieve what is, from the standpoint of the substantive policies involved, the
“perfect” answer is nice—but it is just one of a number of competing values. And 
one of the most substantial of those competing values, which often contradicts the 
search for perfection, is the appearance of equal treatment. . . . The Equal Protection
Clause epitomizes justice more than any other provision of the Constitution. And
the trouble with the discretion-conferring approach to judicial law making is that it 
does not satisfy this sense of justice very well. When a case is accorded a different
disposition from an earlier one, it is important, if the system of justice is to be
respected, not only that the later case be different, but that it be seen to be so. When
one is dealing . . . with issues so heartfelt that they are believed by one side or the
other to be resolved by the Constitution itself, it does not greatly appeal to one’s
sense of justice to say: “Well, that earlier case had nine factors, this one has nine
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pressures to follow the dictates of legal justice when interpreting Title
VII, it does not do so strictly as a function of anything found within the
four corners of Title VII’s text. As a rule-of-law value, legal justice is—
and remains—extrinsic to the statute. In somewhat technical terms, legal 
justice is, legally, lexically prior to Title VII, which makes Bostock’s
invocation of it the invocation of an extra-textual consideration. This, in
turn, makes Bostock’s reading of Title VII, based upon this extra-textual 
consideration, itself extra-textualist.
Nor does it change matters that, immediately after this break in its
otherwise largely smooth textualist self-narrative, Bostock jumps back
into the textualist saddle to resume its talk about “Title VII’s plain
text.”138 Insofar as Bostock’s reading of Title VII’s sex discrimination rule
depends on a rule-of-law conception of legal justice that is itself not found 
plus one.” Much better, even at the expense of the mild substantive distortion that
any generalization introduces, to have a clear, previously enunciated rule that one 
can point to in explanation of the decision.
See also Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79–80 (1997)
(“[S]tatutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable
evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our
legislators by which we are governed. . . . Our holding that [Title VII’s ban on sex
discrimination] includes sexual harassment must extend to sexual harassment of any kind that
meets the statutory requirements.”). Bostock pulls on this thinking from Oncale. See Bostock,
140 S. Ct. at 1743–44 (discussing and quoting this aspect of Oncale); id. at 1751–52 (same);
see also infra note 138. Commentary tracking the underlying textualist points is in Richard 
Lavoie, Activist or Automaton: The Institutional Need to Reach a Middle Ground in American
Jurisprudence, 68 ALB. L. REV. 611, 625 (2005) (“New Textualism maintains that equality,
uniformity and predictability are essential elements for promoting the Rule of Law. These
three concepts are closely linked and share a similar aim: to cause every judge to reach similar
results in similar cases based on similar rationales.”).
138. See, e.g., Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1751 (“The employer’s position also proves too much. 
If we applied Title VII’s plain text only to applications some (yet-to-be-determined) group 
expected in 1964, we’d have more than a little law to overturn.”). Importantly, in the course 
of jumping back into the textualist saddle, Bostock ties its textualist method to a rule-of-law
conception of legal justice in a different way. Discussing Oncale, Bostock indicates—without
using these terms—that Oncale was in its own way based on a conception of legal justice.
According to Bostock, Oncale affirmed Title VII’s “plain terms” ban “male-on-male sexual
harassment” on exactly the same terms as its cross-sex harassment counterpart. Id. at 1751– 
52. The subtler point is an indication that Oncale conformed to the Supreme Court’s 
constitutional sex discrimination rules and their broad-based requirements of sex neutrality,
which emerge from an individualist view of sex discrimination’s harms. Cf. id. at 1774 (Alito,
J., dissenting) (“[A]nybody reading [Title VII’s sex discrimination ban’s] . . . terms would
immediately appreciate that it applies equally to both sexes, and by the time Oncale reached
the Court, our precedent already established that sexual harassment may constitute sex
discrimination within the meaning of Title VII. Given these premises, syllogistic reasoning 
dictated the holding.” (citation omitted)). In this sense, legal sex discrimination norms play
an important role in determining Bostock’s outcome on this level, too.
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5952021] BOSTOCK’S PARADOX
within Title VII’s text, Bostock cannot be the pure textualist ruling that it 
maintains.139 
One way to register the implications of this point is that it strips
Bostock of its textualist bona fides altogether. Another—this one more
faithful to Bostock’s own larger purposes and to what it says—recognizes
how complicated those textualist credentials are. Partaking of
contradiction and paradox, Bostock is both a textualist ruling and an anti-
textualist ruling at once.
Bostock’s indications that its readings of Title VII’s sex
discrimination rule emerge from an extra-textualist principle of legal 
justice with pro-gay and pro-trans content imply a stance on what formal 
equality under law means for LGBT persons. Without more, it is not,
strictly speaking, a defense of it.
How does Bostock know and defend its knowledge that legal justice
requires LGBT persons to be treated just like cisheterosexuals? Lacking
further authority for its concrete vision of legal justice, Bostock is a sitting
duck, subject to attacks like those in the Bostock dissents that insist it
problematically fills up Title VII’s sex discrimination rule with judicial
policy preference, judicial will, or the values of the Zeitgeist, cunningly
but ultimately emptily passed off as what legal justice demands.140 A 
139. A possible reply here is that legal justice—understood to implicate an abstract formal
equality principle—may, on a certain account of it, be thought of as not simply a background 
rule-of-law rule governing statutory interpretation, but as a background rule-of-law rule that 
effectively supplies an implied term of statutory text. Recognizing the prospects of such an
argument in the context of Bostock and Title VII, it still leaves Bostock’s pro-LGBT 
specification of the abstract formal equality principle to consider. Before Bostock anyway, as 
a positive law matter, the pro-LGBT specification of the abstract ideal of legal justice was not 
a basic rule-of-law condition, meaning that it—if not the abstract principle of formal equality
from which it derives—remained at the time of decision in Bostock an extra-textualist value. 
Bostock’s reliance on it is thus an extra-textualist consideration inconsistent with its self-
representation as an uncomplicatedly “straightforward” textualist ruling grounded in nothing
more than Title VII’s “plain” or “clear” statutory text. Id. at 1743 (“At bottom, these cases 
involve no more than the straightforward application of legal terms with plain and settled
meanings.”); id. at 1737 (“The answer is clear.”). Thanks to Robin West for engagement on
this point.
140. Id. at 1751. An approximation of this view that mentions “justice” is this observation
from Justice Kavanaugh’s dissent that: “Some will surmise that the Court succumbed to ‘the
natural desire that beguiles judges along with other human beings into imposing their own 
views of goodness, truth, and justice upon others.’” Id. at 1836 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting)
(quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 467 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)). For some
additional views along these lines, see id. at 1824; id. at 1755–56 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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sharper version of this critique characterizes Bostock as illegitimate and
lawless, a power grab by a majority of the Supreme Court that has stolen
the authority of the American people’s congressional representatives, 
appropriating their legislative power—no longer legitimate authority 
because in the Court’s hands—to use it for the Court’s own ends.141 
Contrasted with the charges of extra-textualism, which stick because
of how Bostock imbues Title VII’s text with meaning from outside of it 
via its pro-gay and pro-trans vision of legal justice, the broader attacks on
Bostock as illegitimate and lawless fail. Bostock’s ideal of legal justice,
with its position on LGBT equality within it, tracks, and is finally justified
by, authoritative legal supports. But these supports do not themselves
emerge from Title VII’s text.
To say this is to invoke the authority of the Supreme Court’s pro-
LGBT constitutional rights jurisprudence. Over objections at every step,
this body of law is now settled, legitimate, and fully law-bound.142 Justice
Kennedy’s swansong LGBT rights opinion for the Supreme Court in
Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, which
recognized the constitutional rights of faithful conservatives, went out of 
its way to reaffirm the foundations of his signature jurisprudential
handiwork, including its high watermark, Obergefell v. Hodges,
affording lesbian women, gay men, and, by extension, trans people equal
marriage rights.143 Masterpiece Cakeshop featured consensus on the 
141. For some earlier examples of charges like these in the Court’s decisions involving
LGBT rights, see Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“Today’s opinion is the product of a Court . . . that has largely signed on to the so-called
homosexual agenda . . . . It is clear . . . that the Court has taken sides in the culture war, 
departing from its role of assuring, as neutral observer, that the democratic rules of
engagement are observed.”); United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 778 (2013) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (“This case is about . . . the power of our people to govern themselves, and the
power of this Court to pronounce the law. Today’s opinion aggrandizes the latter, with the
predictable consequence of diminishing the former.”); Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644,
687 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court invalidates the marriage laws of more
than half the States and orders the transformation of a social institution that has formed the
basis of human society for millennia, for the Kalahari Bushmen and the Han Chinese, the
Carthaginians and the Aztecs. Just who do we think we are?”); id. at 713–14 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (“Today’s decree says that my Ruler, and the Ruler of 320 million Americans
coast-to-coast, is a majority of the nine lawyers on the Supreme Court.”).
142. See infra Part II.B.3.b.
143. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1732 (2018)
(holding that “official expressions of hostility to religion” by state commissioners,
subsequently undisavowed, “were inconsistent with the Free Exercise Clause” of the First
Amendment); id. at 1727 (approving constitutional protections for “gay persons and gay
couples,” and citing Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015), positively); Obergefell, 576
   
            
       
        
           
         
      
  
         
   
          
       
        
       
       
        
          
 
             
             
           
         
               
             
     
              
        
            
            
            
   
  
               
        
           
         
             
            
                  
            
 
          
  
                 
    
5972021] BOSTOCK’S PARADOX
Court on Obergefell’s authority, securing it and steeling the cases in the
constitutional line it built on against future legal attack.144 
Conspicuously, even the Bostock dissents abide that consensus.
Nothing they say openly breaks from it. Thus, the dissents reject the
Bostock majority’s interpretation of Title VII’s sex discrimination ban,
but without expressly casting doubt on the Supreme Court’s pro-LGBT 
constitutional rulings.145 
More curious is the Bostock Court’s own treatment of those cases. 
Bostock, knowing all about the Supreme Court’s pro-LGBT 
constitutional rights decisions, does not mention any of them by name, 
much less in engage them in any detail.146 
Under different circumstances, this elision might indicate that
Bostock has nothing to do with that body of law. The conclusion is
unwarranted in this instance, no matter how many of Bostock’s readers
practically credit it by treating Bostock as the strict textualist ruling that
it announces it is.147 Regarded this way, Bostock’s textualism appears to
U.S. at 680 (“The Constitution . . . does not permit the State to bar same-sex couples from
marriage on the same terms as accorded to couples of the opposite sex.”).
144. See Spindelman, Masterpiece Cakeshop’s Homiletics, supra note 108, at 373
(discussing the consensus in Masterpiece Cakeshop on Obergefell); see also Bostock, 140 S. 
Ct. at 1823 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“The Court has previously stated, and I fully agree,
that gay and lesbian Americans ‘cannot be treated as social outcasts or as inferior in dignity
and worth.”) (citing Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1727)).
145. A recent, widely noted salvo by Justice Clarence Thomas, joined by Justice Alito,
expresses serious concerns about Obergefell’s impact on faithful conservatives. Davis v.
Ermold, 141 S. Ct. 3 (2020) (statement of Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Alito, respecting
the denial of certiorari). While this statement has been read as a challenge to Obergefell’s
foundations, see, e.g., Joan Biskupik, With Court in Flux, Thomas and Alito Attack Same-Sex
Marriage Ruling, CNN.COM, Oct. 5, 2020, https://www.cnn.com/2020/10/05/politics/thom
as-alito-obergefell-same-sex-marriage-analysis/index.html [https://perma.cc/2FNC-3KNG],
and may actually imply it, on a tight reading, it stops short of that, calling instead for next-
generation protections for faithful conservatives in light of Obergefell. The problems flagged
by Justice Thomas’s statement in Davis would, of course, be solved by overturning
Obergefell, but it is telling that, assuming Justices Thomas and Alito would approve that
conclusion, their intervention, which stops short of calling the question, may be at least in part
a function of an awareness that, for the time being anyway, the prospect is lost. But see id.
(“It is not as easy to declare — as it was just a month ago — that the high court is unlikely to
reverse the milestone decision [Obergefell v. Hodges] that now seems woven into American
life.”).
146. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558; Windsor, 570 U.S. 
744; Obergefell, 576 U.S. 644.
147. See, e.g, Grove, supra note 2, at 267 (accepting that Bostock was a case about
“textualisms,” namely the “formalistic textualism” of the majority, and the “flexible 
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be independent of the Supreme Court’s pro-LGBT constitutional rights
jurisprudence.
Various signs in Bostock contraindicate these appearances. Bostock
does not expressly say it is following the Supreme Court’s pro-LGBT 
constitutional rights decisions, nor does it expressly invoke those
decisions as support for its conclusion, including its legal justice
rationale. By deed, however, if not by direct words, Bostock weaves their
deeper logics into its ruling.148 In this way, the Supreme Court’s pro-
LGBT constitutional rights jurisprudence provides Bostock with its
epistemic content. It is the means by which Bostock knows that legal
justice requires Title VII’s sex discrimination rule to be read to provide
LGBT and non-LGBT persons the same treatment under the law.
A modest, initial indication of how Bostock constructs its holding
atop the Supreme Court’s pro-LGBT constitutional rights precedents—
or more exactly their effects—hides in the opinion in plain sight. As it is
explaining why sexual orientation discrimination is sex discrimination,
Bostock conjures a hypothetical in which a married lesbian employee— 
who happens to be a “model” employee—is discriminated against 
because of her marriage to her “wife.”149 In context, the hypothetical goes
to show that, but for this employee’s sex, she would not have suffered
discrimination, making what happened to her sex discrimination under
Title VII’s rules.150 In context, there is nothing extraordinary about this
maneuver. Without any fanfare, Bostock treats same-sex marriage as a
commonplace of social and legal life that can be casually invoked—and
leveraged—along the way to its doctrinal account.
Bostock provides other deeper, and more significant textual signs
that its vision of legal justice and thus its pro-gay and pro-trans
interpretation of Title VII’s sex discrimination ban conform to the Court’s
pro-LGBT constitutional rights cases. If, from one point of view, this
makes the formalities of Bostock’s decision not to cite or engage the
Court’s pro-LGBT constitutional rights precedents seem somewhat 
textualism” of the dissents). For additional examples, see sources cited supra note 2.
148. A template is in Obergefell. See, e.g., 576 U.S. at 675–76 (“[T]he State laws
challenged by the Petitioners in these cases are now held invalid to the extent they exclude 
same-sex couples from civil marriage on the same terms and conditions as opposite-sex
couples.”).
149. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1742 (discussing hypothetical of a “model employee” who
might be a woman with a “wife”). For another relevant passage, see id. at 1751
(citing Note, The Legality of Homosexual Marriage, 82 YALE L.J. 573, 583–584 (1973)).
150. Id. at 1742 (rounding out the point).
   
            
       
      
         
        
       
      
   
        
      
       
      
            
     
       
          
         
  
 
            
      
     
 
               
      
        
           
             
           
              
      
              
           
         
       
           
             
            
            
          
              
          
          
        
          
5992021] BOSTOCK’S PARADOX
beside the point, it is not for that reason alone unimportant. The Court’s
evasion remains tactically useful in other respects.151 
The turning-point decisions in the Court’s pro-LGBT constitutional
rights line—Lawrence v. Texas on sexual intimacy and Obergefell v.
Hodges on the right to marry—raise their decisional curtains on legal
stages set by even earlier constitutional precedents involving sexual
privacy and marriage rights that, in their origins, were deeply 
cisheterosexualized.152 Lawrence and Obergefell engage the 
heterosexualized dimensions of the earlier cases not in order to reaffirm
them and the erstwhile heterosexual exclusivity of constitutional sexual 
privacy or constitutional marriage rights that they entailed. Instead,
Lawrence and Obergefell acknowledge these features of the earlier
rulings in order to call them out and to reconstitute them in pro-lesbian
and pro-gay terms—terms that, in their extensions, render sexual 
orientation identity and sex, more generally, irrelevant to who gets legal
rights.153 Among the practical consequences of these maneuvers is how,
in rendering sex a non-defining condition for legal treatment in the cases,
they yield trans sexual intimacy and marriage rights.154
151. See infra note 184 and accompanying text; see also infra Part III.B.
152. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564–66 (discussing earlier constitutional privacy 
decisions); Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 663–76 (discussing earlier constitutional marriage 
rulings).
153. See Marc Spindelman, Surviving Lawrence v. Texas, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1615, 1630
(2004) [hereinafter Spindelman, Surviving Lawrence v. Texas] (“Translated: the [Lawrence]
Court vindicates sexual liberty by recognizing heterosexuals’ sexual rights and advances
‘equality of treatment’ by extending that liberty to lesbians and gay men.”). For additional
relevant discussion, see Catharine A. MacKinnon, The Road Not Taken: Sex Equality in
Lawrence v. Texas, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1081, 1082–84 (2004) (engaging Lawrence v. Texas, its
treatment of the sex “inequality on the face of the [Texas sodomy] statute” that was at issue
in the case, and the way in which “[s]ex equality was Lawrence’s ‘road not taken’”).
154. See Phyllis Randolph Frye & Katrina C. Rose, Responsible Representation of Your
First Transgendered Client, 66 TEX. B.J. 558, 561 (2003) (noting that Lawrence v. Texas may
have rendered prior concerns about the enforcement of Texas’s “Homosexual Conduct
Statute” against transgender individuals “moot”). For views in more cross-cutting directions,
see Paisley Currah, The Other “Sex” in Lawrence v. Texas, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 321,
322 (2004) (noting that “Lawrence . . . does not end the state’s ability to police the very
definition of male and female,” allowing the state to continue its “role as a central defender
of the ideological coherence of the boundaries between the categories of male and female”
and “the continuation of a legal regime in which transgender people are denied equality before
the law”); Craig Willse & Dean Spade, Freedom in a Regulatory State?: Lawrence, Marriage
and Biopolitics, 11 WIDENER L. REV. 309, 311, 328 (2005) (suggesting that trans people may 
be implicated by Lawrence and its end to “criminal stigmatization of one type of consensual
adult sexual activity,” but recognizing Lawrence’s logic affirms harmful “systems of
regulating gender, sexuality, and family structures through violent and punitive
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Lawrence and Obergefell thus make the history they do by
broadening rights announced in earlier rulings in ways that ensure they 
conform to the Court’s newfound understanding of the equal dignity,
worth, and first-class constitutional stature of lesbian women and gay
men, consistent with substantive due process and equal protection
guarantees.155 The legal breakthroughs in these cases proceed from the
recognition that lesbian women and gay men, and trans people by
implication, possess the essential attributes of constitutional personhood
involved in the foundational sexual privacy and right to marry rulings as
much as cisheterosexuals do. Rights originally recognized for
cisheterosexuals lose their exclusive cisheterosexual orientation,
becoming general rights that all these people—straight, lesbian, gay, cis, 
and trans—are entitled to enjoy equally.
Moreover, as Lawrence makes very plain and as Obergefell makes
plain enough, these conclusions do not simply vindicate the constitutional
rights of LGBT persons.156 The principled, broadened rearticulations of
constitutional rights in these cases solidify the basic legal foundations on
which they rest. Lawrence and Obergefell’s shared project of 
generalizing and neutralizing established constitutional rights keeps those
rights from being exposed or undermined as unprincipled forms of special
constitutional pleading. Following Lawrence and Obergefell, sexual 
intimacy and marriage rights can no longer be doubted or dismissed as
identity-based power plays delivered by, and on behalf of, the socially 
powerful that, in their partiality, fail the conditions of neutral, principled
mechanisms”). For the point in relation to Obergefell, see generally Broadus, supra note 4.
155. See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575 (“Equality of treatment and the due process right 
to demand respect for conduct protected by the substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in
important respects, and a decision on the latter point advances both interests.”); Obergefell,
576 U.S. at 672 (“The right of same-sex couples to marry that is part of the liberty promised
by the Fourteenth Amendment is derived, too, from that Amendment’s guarantee of the equal
protection of the laws. The Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause are connected 
in a profound way, though they set forth independent principles.”); see also Lawrence, 539
U.S. at 579 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“I base my conclusion on the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.”).
156. A more comprehensive account of this point is in Spindelman, Surviving Lawrence
v. Texas, supra note 153, at 1619–32 (noting the ways in which Lawrence is about an
affirmation of heterosexual rights). Justice Anthony Kennedy’s majority opinion in
Obergefell makes the point for itself when it observes that the same-sex couples involved in
the case do not mean to disparage marriage through their constitutional claims, but rather seek
to affirm it. Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 681 (“It would misunderstand these men and women to
say they disrespect the idea of marriage. Their plea is that they do respect it, respect it so
deeply that they seek to find its fulfillment for themselves.”).
   
      
        
       
           
      
          
      
        
       
      
   
       
        
        
         
 
            
           
            
          
    
              
        
            
            
        
          
               
              
            
        
       
             
         
             
        
               
        
             
 
            
            
        
          
       
          
6012021] BOSTOCK’S PARADOX
constitutional adjudication required by the rule-of-law.157 
While Lawrence and Obergefell are thus rightly touted as pro-LGBT 
victories, they nevertheless vitally partake of “interest convergences” that
link the constitutional rights and fates of LGBT persons to those of
cisheterosexuals—and the other way around.158 Constitutional persons
all, they stand together as one with equal rights under—and before—the
law. Hardly irrelevant, the elimination of the cisheterosexual exclusivity
of the earlier sexual intimacy and marriage right protections is
accomplished by rulings that preserve and leverage their underlying
cisheteronormativity. Rights once tailor-made for cisheterosexuals are
now equally available to everyone.
Returning to Bostock, the Court’s majority opinion replicates
Lawrence and Obergefell’s maneuvering, but on statutory interpretation
terrain. Bostock commences its initial textualist gambit by placing Title 
VII’s sex discrimination rule and key, earlier Supreme Court decisions
157. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 15 (1959) (discussing the importance of principled decision-making by the courts).
It is worth noting that the account being provided here reverses and dynamizes thinking that
“[t]he rule of law is ordinarily understood to be a basic condition for the legitimacy of liberal
states,” with “[i]ts demands . . . expressed in provisions of the U.S. Constitution like the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses.” Gowder, supra note 36, at 1024. For a similar
perspective on rule-of-law values being basic to constitutional values, see, for example, WEST,
supra note 3, at 4 (2003) (“The prominence of this understanding of law’s essence — that 
law, and the Rule of Law, simply is that which protects individual freedom from political
overreach — unites and perhaps partly explains a good deal of contemporary constitutional
law: it provides the unstated major premise of particular interpretations of quite general 
constitutional phrases.”); id. at 5–6 (“A Rule of Law that fears politics, and that crafts a
Constitution so as to disable politics, does so, because of the latter’s essential, irredeemable
irrationality . . . .”); id. at 58–59 n.1 (noting that the rule of law encompasses
constitutionalism). Justice Sandra Day O’Connor made note of the relevant point in her
separate opinion in Lawrence. 539 U.S. at 584–85 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[S]o long as
the Equal Protection Clause requires a sodomy law to apply equally to the private consensual 
conduct of homosexuals and heterosexuals alike, such a law would not long stand in our
democratic society.”); id. at 585 (quoting from Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York,
336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring), including the observation that, “[t]he 
framers of the Constitution knew, and we should not forget today, that there is no more
effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and unreasonable government than to require 
that the principles of law which officials would impose upon a minority be imposed
generally”).
158. See Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980) (describing the idea of “interest convergence” in 
the context of racial equality, observing that “[t]he interest of blacks in achieving racial
equality will be accommodated only when it converges with the interests of whites”). For a 
discussion of “interest convergences” in Bostock, see Jeremiah A. Ho, Queering Bostock, J.
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 75–83) (on file with author).
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interpreting it squarely in view.159 Bostock’s review of the relevant
authorities indicates that, as originally written, Title VII and its caselaw
were for and in the interests of cisheterosexuals, a point to which the
opinion returns when it discusses how, at the time of its enactment, the
law reflected certain group-based power arrangements—of
cisheterosexuals over lesbian women, gay men, and trans people.160 In
doing so, Bostock fails to take critical note of cisheterosexuality’s own
hierarchical construction by sex. This feature of the opinion need not be
applauded, but, in context, it appears to reflect the Court’s wish to
highlight—and not bury—Title VII’s historical cisheterosexual
exclusivity, its traditional exclusion of lesbian women, gay men, and
trans people.161 Bostock’s focus on that unhappy tradition—itself a
reminder of how the Court’s interpretation of Title VII did not openly
break with it until this case—is, at long last, the occasion for doing just 
that.162 Bostock abandons any defense of the old ways as it witnesses this
feature of legal history while also parting ways with it. Bostock’s vision
of legal justice provides the idealized terms the opinion relies on to 
perform this “unexpected” rupture with Title VII’s legal past—a rupture 
that reformulates the statute’s present and its future.163 By eliminating the
cisheterosexual exclusivity of Title VII’s sex discrimination ban, Bostock
generalizes and neutralizes the law while conforming it to the dictates of
legal justice, which it understands to require lesbian women, gay men, 
and trans people to be treated under this law exactly like cisheterosexuals
are.
Similarly in step with the Supreme Court’s pro-LGBT constitutional
rights jurisprudence is how Bostock’s legal justice rationale spawns pro-
gay and pro-trans statutory interpretation holdings that deliver LGBT
rights while proudly and conspicuously safeguarding the rights of 
cisheterosexuals. Rebuffing arguments for Title VII’s sex discrimination
159. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., Ga., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1739–44 (2020).
160. See id. at 1751 (talking about “homosexual and transgender employees in the 1960s” 
as “groups that were politically unpopular at the time of the law’s passage”).
161. For some illumination of cisheterosexuality’s hierarchical construction by sex that
configures reasons why Bostock’s elision of it in the setting of a sex discrimination ruling
should not be applauded, see sources cited supra notes 76, 114.
162. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998), may be thought 
of as an exception insofar as it opened the door for anti-gay and anti-trans sex discrimination
claims, as discussed in part as to anti-gay sex discrimination, including harassment, claims,
in Spindelman, Sex Equality Panic, supra note 59.
163. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1751.
   
      
      
        
      
        
        
         
        
          
            
       
      
         
 
            
        
         
     
         
          
       
     
          
 
        
       
 
            
            
              
            
             
              
               
        
        
                 
          
          
   
          
            
6032021] BOSTOCK’S PARADOX
rule’s cisheterosexual exclusivity, Bostock repeatedly notes how, in
principle, defense positions for that conclusion would have unacceptably 
cast doubt on sex discrimination protections that cisheterosexuals have 
long enjoyed.164 Sexual harassment law and motherhood discrimination 
protections lead the list, but protections that cisheterosexual men have
received against sex discrimination, including against same-sex sexual
harassment, are also in view.165 Preserving these rules and the legal
benefits that they confer not because they are actually in any legal danger,
but because this is what Bostock’s understanding of legal justice requires,
Bostock extends them to lesbian women, gay men, and trans people. As
it does so, Bostock categorically refuses to allow Title VII’s sex
discrimination ban to be exclusively for the benefit of cisheterosexuals.
The law’s underlying cisheteronormative torque, however, is not itself
removed.
Here is one final check to allay any lingering doubts about whether
Bostock’s pro-gay and pro-trans vision of legal justice hews to the path
marked by the Court’s pro-LGBT constitutional jurisprudence. As in that
jurisprudence, Bostock places the burden of persuasion in its ruling on 
those who oppose formally equal treatment for LGBT persons under law.
Bostock treats defense positions that are at odds with the implications of
its legal justice rationale with active skepticism. In effect, Bostock
requires defenders of gay-exclusive and trans-exclusive readings of Title 
VII to bear the burden of overcoming the opinion’s call for formal legal 
justice for LGBT persons under the law.166 
Seen this way, despite earlier appearances, Bostock’s distribution of 
persuasive responsibility is not a debater’s trick by which the Court’s
164. See, e.g., supra Part II.A.1; see also, e.g., Spindelman, The Shower’s Return: Part I, 
supra note 9, at 83–84; Spindelman, The Shower’s Return: Part III, supra note 9, at 107–10. 
Complicating matters was that, while defense arguments in the case sought to exclude lesbian
women, gay men, and trans people from sex discrimination protections, there were offerings
in defense positions that insisted this was not a total exclusion of these individuals from
statutory sex discrimination protections. See Brief for the Petitioner at 25–31, R.G. & G.R.
Harris Funeral Homes, Inc. v. EEOC, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019) (No. 18-107) (suggesting that a
sex discrimination claim, not a “transgender status” discrimination claim, was still available
to Aimee Stephens, though not successfully advanced); Brief for Petitioners Altitude Express, 
Inc. and Ray Maynard at 45, Altitude Express, Inc. v. Zarda, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2019) (No. 17-
1623) (maintaining that Title VII does not bar sexual orientation discrimination, but
suggesting that “[g]ays and lesbians, no less than heterosexuals, may prevail on sex-
discrimination claims,” pointing to sex stereotyping as an example).
165. Here is a return to the discussion earlier in supra Part II.A.1.
166. Two examples have already been discussed. See supra Parts II.A.1–2.
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opinion dodges legal accountability for its own positions. Against the
backdrop of Bostock’s legal justice rationale, the allocation of persuasive
responsibility reflects what legal justice—in step with the Court’s pro-
LGBT constitutional caselaw—would ordinarily be thought to require: a
strong, but not yet wholly irrebuttable, presumption of legal equality for
LGBT persons and their cisheterosexual counterparts.
Like Bostock’s position respecting the formal equality of 
cisheterosexual, lesbian, gay, and trans persons under law, its decision to
set its formal equality presumption where it does and to make that rule
hold absent sufficiently powerful countervailing arguments lines up with 
the instructions in the Supreme Court’s pro-LGBT constitutional
jurisprudence. Across that body of law, the Court places the burden of
persuasion—and justification—on state actors who would defend laws
differentiating between and among LGBT and non-LGBT persons in
ways that give LGBT people fewer legal rights and protections than their
non-LGBT counterparts receive.167 
Of course, the private party defendants in Bostock are not state actors
subject to the U.S. Constitution’s strictures. Through their lawyers, who
are officers of the Court, though, they would have had the Court—and
the Justices, plainly state actors—deploy the Court’s institutional
authority in ways that would have affirmed Title VII’s sex discrimination
rule as cisheterosexually exclusive.168 That reading of the statute involves
167. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (holding that Colorado failed to carry its
burden of proving Amendment 2 was “directed to any identifiable legitimate purpose or
discrete objective,” and rejecting Colorado’s “primary rationale” for the measure); Lawrence
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (“This, as a general rule, should counsel against attempts
by the State, or a court, to define the meaning of the relationship or to set its boundaries absent
injury to a person or abuse of an institution the law protects.”); id. at 578 (describing the rights 
of “petitioners . . . to respect for their private lives,” and noting that “[t]heir right to liberty
under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without the
intervention of the government,” and then commenting that “[t]he Texas statute furthers no
legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the
individual”); United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 775 (2013) (“The federal statute is
invalid, for no legitimate purpose overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure
those whom the State, by its marriage laws, sought to protect in personhood and dignity.”); 
Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 679 (2015) (“The respondents have not shown a
foundation for the conclusion that allowing same-sex marriage will cause the harmful
outcomes they describe.”); id. at 681 (“The Court, in this decision, holds same-sex couples 
may exercise the fundamental right to marry in all States. It follows that the Court must also
hold—and it now does hold—that there is no lawful basis for a State to refuse to recognize a
lawful same-sex marriage performed in another State on the ground of its same-sex
character.”)
168. See WEST, supra note 3, at 20 (explaining that “[j]udges, acting independently of ‘the
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an exercise of state power that operates in formally unequal ways as
between lesbian women, gay men, and trans people, on the one hand, and
cisheterosexual women and men, on the other. Before taking that action,
the Bostock Court—in keeping with the instructions of its pro-LGBT 
constitutional rights jurisprudence—puts the justifications for that
reading of Title VII to the test.
Following the Supreme Court’s pro-LGBT constitutional rights
jurisprudence and drawing authority from it, Bostock—including both its
ideal of legal justice and other aspects of the opinion that derive from, or,
anyway, that correspond to it—is on solid legal ground. While Bostock
neither expressly cites nor discusses any of the Supreme Court’s pro-
LGBT constitutional rights rulings, it does not have to for it to adhere to
their teachings in ways that make Bostock a legitimate and lawful ruling,
if not precisely on the textualist terms that it propounds.
One risk that this understanding of Bostock raises is how easily it
can generate the misimpression that Bostock is an ordinary, constitutional 
pass-through ruling: in basic form, a constitutional decision that happens
to be rhetorically dressed in rule-of-law legal justice and statutory
interpretation terms.
The legal situation that Bostock reflects and produces is more 
nuanced than that—nuance that comes into view as the Supreme Court’s
pro-LGBT constitutional rights jurisprudence is followed to its own rule-
of-law legal justice roots.
From the Bowers v. Hardwick dissents to the majority opinion in
Romer v. Evans, the Supreme Court’s pro-LGBT constitutional rights
jurisprudence begins its constitutional practice by articulating legal rules
that emerge from neither thin-air nothingness nor merely the Supreme 
Court’s earlier privacy decisions.169 These early LGBT-affirming rulings
were constructed by reading the Court’s earlier privacy decisions along
state,’ can thereby make real the otherwise illusory promise of a state whose power is limited
by law,” and then noting the “dilemma” that “judges are themselves individuals, employed by
the state, and hence are themselves ‘state actors’”); id. at 21 (“To summarize: liberalism
requires that the discretion of state actors be limited, and limited by law. Judges must enforce
these limits, but judges are also themselves state actors whose discretion must be cabined.”). 
This is not to forget the precise positions taken by the defense in the cases Bostock collects,
on which see infra text accompanying notes 197–98.
169. See generally Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 199–214 (1986) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting); id. at 214–20 (Stevens, J., dissenting); cf. also Romer, 517 U.S. 620.
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with, and in light of, the abstract rule-of-law ideal of legal justice that 
broadly undergirds constitutional adjudication in the open textures of the
Fourteenth Amendment.170 First the Hardwick dissents and then the
Romer majority opinion leveraged what at the time was an off-the-rack,
proceduralist vision of legal justice—requiring, generally, that like cases
and like persons be treated alike—in the course of articulating new
constitutional formulations for how lesbian women and gay men should
be treated as a matter of constitutional right.171 Legal justice supplied
170. And elsewhere. On the convergence between rule-of-law and constitutional 
principles, see supra note 157. See also, e.g., WEST, supra note 3, at 8 (“These ideas . . . 
constitute the dominant conception of the virtue of legal justice. . . . They also undergird large
chunks of constitutional argument – the Constitution is our highest Law, and if the point of
Law is to constrain and tame politics, and if politics is what sovereigns produce, then the point
of the Constitution is to forbid certain outcomes by the political branches.”). On the
porousness of rule-of-law principles to “nonlegal social facts,” which here may function as
pass-throughs operating through background constitutional rules, see GOWDER, supra note
36, at 1025 (“Our rule-of-law judgments depend not merely on legal facts, like the language
of legal rules or the actions of public officials, but also on the nonlegal social facts that give
meaning to those legal facts.”). It could well be that “nonlegal social facts” encompass various
iterations of political morality or first-order moral and/or ethical rules or values that thus
underwrite both rule-of-law and constitutional norms and rules. See, e.g., WEST, supra note
3, at 110 (framing an argument involving the rule-of-law’s moral underpinnings); Ronald
Dworkin, A Special Supplement: The Jurisprudence of Richard Nixon, N.Y. REV. BOOKS
(May 4, 1972), https://www.nybooks.com/articles/1972/05/04/a-special-supplement-the-juris
prudence-of-richard-/ [https://perma.cc/K7KB-D5QL] (discussing constitutional law’s
normative moral underpinnings). If so, in a certain sense, morality and/or ethics might supply
the relevant regulatory normativity—and the basis for legal management—all the way down.
Thanks to Angela Harris for engagement on this point.
171. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 218–19 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[E]very free citizen has the
same interest in ‘liberty’ that the members of the majority share. . . . [T]he homosexual and
the heterosexual have the same interest in deciding how he will live his own life, and, more
narrowly, how he will conduct himself in his personal and voluntary associations with his 
companions. State intrusion into the private conduct of either is equally burdensome.”); id. at
206 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“[W]hat the Court really has refused to recognize is the
fundamental interest all individuals have in controlling the nature of their intimate 
associations with others.”); Romer, 517 U.S. at 633 (“Central both to the idea of the rule of
law and to our own Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection is the principle that
government and each of its parts remain open on impartial terms to all who seek its
assistance.”). For precedent and stare decisis as rule-of-law concerns, see, for example, WEST,
supra note 3, at 7 (describing “our dominant understanding of legal justice” as involving “the
imperative that presses upon judges to ‘treat likes alike,’ or to follow precedent, or to comply
with stare decisis”). It may be worth another thought about Justice Scalia’s sense that stare 
decisis is not a textualist value in this light. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. For the 
Aristotelian point, see Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 542– 
43 (citing ARISTOTLE, ETHICA NICOMACHEA V.3.1131a–1131b (W. Ross trans. 1925), and 
ARISTOTLE, METAPHYSICA I.5.1055b–1056b (W. Ross trans. 1925)) (noting that “Aristotle,
building on the work of Plato,” observed that, “[e]quality in morals means this: things that are
alike should be treated alike, while things that are unalike should be treated unalike in
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these early rulings with a conceptual shell that shaped opinions
recognizing that lesbian women and gay men were entitled to
constitutional protections heterosexuals already received on both due 
process and equal protection grounds.
Carefully launching what would become a much larger and more
significant constitutional sequence, Romer emblemizes this translational 
undertaking. Romer struck down a Colorado constitutional amendment
that effectuated a categorical, class-based exclusion of lesbians and gay 
men (and other non-heterosexuals) from legal protections that were
ordinary parts of public life in the state and that heterosexuals could and
did take for granted.172 Romer held that provision of the state constitution 
violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.173
Romer’s position was that the amendment’s unprecedented,
“[s]weeping,” and “comprehensive” exclusion of lesbian women and gay 
men from the ordinary terms of legal life was an equal protection
violation in a literal sense.174 The political maneuvering that resulted in
lesbian women and gay men being made into legal pariahs failed to
recognize how they were entitled to the law’s basic respects as
constitutional persons just like heterosexuals.175 This conclusion— 
expressing the minima that the Romer Court would tolerate as a matter of
Equal Protection rules, themselves consistent with rule-of-law legal 
justice ideals—was modest, but highly significant.176 In rejecting the idea
proportion to their unalikeness”).
172. Romer, 517 U.S. at 624 (setting forth the terms of the state constitutional 
Amendment); see also id. at 626–27 (discussing the Colorado Supreme Court’s “authoritative
construction” of the amendment).
173. Id. at 635–36 (announcing the holding in the case).
174. Id. at 627 (describing the measure as “[s]weeping and comprehensive”); id. at 635
(“We must conclude that Amendment 2 classifies homosexuals not to further a proper 
legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone else.”). For the argument in the Romer
litigation, see Brief for Laurence H. Tribe, John Hart Ely, Gerald Gunther, Philip B. Kurland, 
and Kathleen M. Sullivan as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 3–4, Romer v. Evans, 
517 U.S. 620 (1996) (No. 94-1039), 1995 WL 17008432 (“Amendment 2 is a rare example
of a per se violation of the Equal Protection Clause. . . . Amendment 2 renders a ‘class of
persons’ in Colorado completely ineligible for the protection of its laws from an entire
category of mistreatment.”).
175. See Daniel Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The Pariah Principle, 13 CONST. COMMENT.
257, 258 (1996) (“[T]he principle we believe underlies Romer . . .[,] in a nutshell, forbids the
government from designating any societal group as untouchable, regardless of whether the
group in question is generally entitled to some special degree of judicial protection . . . or to
no special protection . . . .”).
176. For early, prophetic commentary that puts its finger on Romer’s “radicalism,” see
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that lesbian women and gay men were categorically different from
heterosexuals, this historic ruling paved the way for subsequent High 
Court decisions filling in and filling out the requirements of constitutional
justice in ways that recognized that, far from being categorically different 
from heterosexuals, lesbians and gay men were like them in basic
respects.177 As decisions in Lawrence v. Texas, United States v. Windsor,
and Obergefell v. Hodges deepened and widened the scope of Romer’s
constitutional justice principles of LGBT equal treatment, a certain gap
between what the original rule-of-law ideal of legal justice meant and
what constitutional justice was coming to require, appeared—then
grew.178 
Bostock fits into the story at just this point. Without any ballyhoo
and without specifying all the details of what it is up to, Bostock
engages—and returns—the gesture from the foundations of the Court’s
pro-LGBT constitutional rights jurisprudence. On statutory interpretation 
terrain, Bostock practically affirms that principles of constitutional
justice, as they have developed, remain principles of legal justice, too. In
announcing its reading of Title VII’s sex discrimination ban based on a
conception of legal justice that draws authoritative supports from the 
Court’s pro-LGBT constitutional rights decisions, Bostock leverages
their vision of constitutional justice while announcing an updated, 
substantive account of legal justice that functions in the decision as an
Louis Michael Seidman, Romer’s Radicalism: The Unexpected Revival of Warren Court
Activism, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 61 (1997).
177. For one version of this difference principle, see Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186,
191, 194 (1986) (indicating that “[n]o connection between family, marriage, and procreation
on the one hand and homosexual activity on the other” existed, and that arguments that same-
sex intimacies were entitled to constitutional protections like those afforded to “family,
marriage, and procreation” were “at best, facetious”).
178. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003) (“Equality of treatment and
the due process right to demand respect for conduct protected by the substantive guarantee of
liberty are linked in important respects . . . . When homosexual conduct is made criminal by
the law of the State, that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual 
persons to discrimination both in the public and in the private spheres.”); Obergefell v.
Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 675 (2015) (holding that the challenged marriage laws “abridge central
precepts of equality” because they denied same-sex couples “all the benefits afforded to
opposite-sex couples” and this served to “disrespect and subordinate” gays and lesbians); see 
also Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1727 (2018)
(“[G]ay persons . . . cannot be treated as social outcasts or as inferior in dignity and worth. . . . 
[T]he laws and the Constitution can, and in some instances must, protect them . . . . At the
same time, the religious and philosophical objections to gay marriage are protected views and
in some instances protected forms of expression[,] [a]s this Court observed in Obergefell
. . . .”). On the relationship between constitutional and legal justice, see supra note 170. 
   
      
       
        
         
      
         
        
         
         
      
   
         
       
          
          
       
         
      
 
              
             
         
           
          
           
    
          
            
              
          
                
          
          
               
             
               
          
                   
             
            
           
          
         
         
              
6092021] BOSTOCK’S PARADOX
operative rule-of-law rule. Bostock diffuses, proliferates, normalizes, and 
entrenches the idea that, in the U.S. rule-of-law system, legal justice now
broadly requires LGBT persons to be treated just like cisheterosexuals.179
Of course, the strictures of constitutional justice persist after
Bostock. They formally govern state action involving anti-LGBT 
discrimination. But now, in the age of Bostock, they have been
supplemented by a new rule-of-law ideal of legal justice that, running
alongside them, manages the wider operations of law and legal rules,
including in cases involving the adjudication of extra-constitutional and
sub-constitutional legal claims, like the statutory interpretation questions
that Bostock involves. 
In Bostock’s wake, a plaintiff no longer needs to advance a
constitutional claim against arguably discriminatory state action against
LGBT persons in order to receive the benefits of the constitutional
promise of LGBT equal rights under law. That promise—embodied in
Bostock’s pro-gay and pro-trans ideal of legal justice—is now also one
that courts and other legal actors must heed when faced with any legal 
claim of right involving anti-LGBT discrimination.180 
179. For some suggestion of historical examples of constitutional norms getting out ahead
of rule-of-law norms from which they derived, before being reincorporated back into them in
their particularities, hence normalized and diffused, see WEST, supra note 3, at 40 (discussing 
relevant examples). Alternatively, it might just be that rule-of-law norms set legal minima
that make at least some constitutional rules in a particularized sense supererogatory from a
rule-of-law point of view—until that point in the development of the law when constitutional
norms are returned to the rule-of-law the floor, which they then lift. 
180. Some federal actors have already started hearing—and heeding—the call. Relevant 
federal judicial decisions in a growing list include: Grimm v. Gloucester Cnty. Sch. Bd., 972
F.3d 586, 593 (4th Cir. 2020) (“resoundingly” affirming that “equal protection and Title IX
can protect transgender students from school bathroom policies that prohibit them from
affirming their gender”); Kasper ex rel. Adams v. Sch. Bd. of St. Johns Cnty., 968 F.3d 1286,
1292 (11th Cir. 2020) (holding that school district “policy barring Mr. Adams from the boys’
restroom [does not] square[] with the Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection and Title
IX’s prohibition on sex discrimination”); see also C.P. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Ill., No.
3:20-cv-06145-RJB, 2021 WL 1758896, at *1 (W.D. Wash. May 4, 2021) (“The fundamental
issue in this motion is whether a plaintiff who alleges that he was denied insurance coverage
for medical treatment because he is transgender states a claim for sex discrimination under 
Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act . . . . This Court finds that he does.”); Ray v.
McCloud, No. 2:18-cv-272, 2020 WL 8172750, at *1, *8, *8 n.9 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 16, 2020) 
(applying intermediate scrutiny in case involving trans equal protection claim); infra note 182. 
But see Hennessy-Waller v. Snyder, No. CV-20-00335-TUC-SHR, 2021 WL 1192842, 1, 8
(D. Az. Mar. 30, 2021) (denying minor plaintiffs’ request for preliminary injunction against
enforcement of Arizona Medicaid policy that excluded gender reassignment surgery while 
indicating, in part, that Bostock involves only Title VII sex discrimination claims). For recent 
action by the Biden Administration and within it, see Exec. Order No. 13988, 86 Fed. Reg.
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So much is encompassed by Bostock’s stated conclusion expressing
what legal justice requires: “[A]ll persons”—understood in context to 
refer to cisheterosexuals, lesbian women, gay men, and trans people—are 
equally “entitled to the benefit of the law’s terms.”181 “Law” in this setting
is not merely a narrow, specific reference to Title VII’s sex discrimination
ban, but an indication of “law” in a wide, rule-of-law sense.182 LGBT 
7023 (Jan. 20, 2021), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-01-25/pdf/2021-
01761.pdf [https://perma.cc/RG3T-JYNH]; Pamela S. Karlan, Principal Deputy Assistant
Att’t Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, C.R. Div., Memorandum on Application of Bostock v.
Clayton County to Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (Mar. 26, 2021), 
https://www.justice.gov/crt/page/file/1383026/download [https://perma.cc/9AYK-SRDN]
(“Executive Order 13988 sets out the Administration’s policy that ‘[a]ll persons should 
receive equal treatment under the law, no matter their gender identity or sexual orientation.’”). 
The Trump Administration took a different perspective on Bostock’s scope. See, e.g., Chris
Cameron, Trump Presses Limits on Transgender Rights Over Supreme Court Ruling, N.Y.
TIMES (July 24, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/24/us/politics/trump-transgender-
rights-homeless.html [https://perma.cc/C534-8HQN]; Chris Johnson, How the Trump
Administration Is Getting Around Bostock to Allow Anti-Trans Discrimination, WASHINGTON 
BLADE, Sept. 16, 2020, https://www.washingtonblade.com/2020/09/16/how-the-trump-
administration-is-getting-around-bostock-to-allow-anti-trans-discrimination/ [https://perma.
cc/B4RK-B32A]. Proposed federal legislation includes the Equality Act, H.R. 5, 117th Cong.
§ 2(a)(1) (2021) (making clear that sex discrimination includes discrimination that “occur[s]
on the basis of the sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, pregnancy, childbirth, or a related
medical condition of an individual, as well as because of sex-based stereotypes,” and noting 
that the measure builds on, extends, and “makes explicit” Bostock’s holding that anti-gay and 
anti-trans discrimination are sex discrimination); see Equality Act, S. 393, 117th Cong. §
2(a)(1) (2021) (same).
181. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., Ga., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1751 (2020).
182. Bostock is thus not simply “persuasive” authority on the meaning of state laws, 
including state anti-discrimination measures, that contain express sex discrimination
provisions. Bostock’s rule, on this view, is a thicker, operative rule-of-law rule that has
normative force that should drive legal understandings of those state law rules. For some
movement in these directions in state courts, see, for example, People v. Rogers, 950 N.W.2d
48 (Mich. 2020) (vacating a prior judgment of the Michigan Court of Appeals finding that
“gender” in Michigan’s criminal ethnic-intimidation statute did not encompass intimidation
“motivated by the fact that a person is transgender,” People v. Rogers, 951 N.W.2d 50, 57–
59 (Mich. Ct. App., 2020), and remanding to that court for reconsideration in light of Bostock);
Tarrant Cnty. Coll. Dist. v. Sims, No. 05-20-00351-CV, 2021 WL 911928 at *4 (Tex. Ct.
App. Mar. 10, 2021) (“In order to reconcile and conform the [Texas Commission on Human
Rights Act (TCHRA)] with federal anti-discrimination and retaliation laws under Title VII,
we conclude we must follow Bostock and read the TCHRA’s prohibition on discrimination
“because of . . . sex” as prohibiting discrimination based on an individual’s status as a
homosexual or transgender person.” (quoting TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 21.051 (West))). For
an example of state legislative action in the same directions, see S.B. 119, 134th Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2021) (amending certain provisions of the Ohio Revised Code “to
enact the Ohio Fairness Act to prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or
gender identity or expression”); id. (“For purposes of the Revised Code, any provision 
respecting sex discrimination includes discrimination because of a person’s sexual orientation
   
         
       
    
            
  
           
        
        
     
        
           
       
         
        
     
         
             
       
      
             
     
 
              
           
         
    
             
          
            
            
       
            
       
    
  
       
              
        
             
          
             
        
          
       
6112021] BOSTOCK’S PARADOX
equality—including a deep and broad presumption of an entitlement to
the same legal treatment that cisheterosexuals receive—is thus now the
rule-of-law’s, not just constitutional law’s, standard fresh air, the setting
within which legal judgments about LGBT rights and equality are to be
made.183 
This, then, is a snapshot of the legal schematic that Bostock
effectuates: Bostock’s ideal of legal justice occupies a kind of 
constitutional “advance position.” It stands out ahead of—and at a certain
distance from—the constitutional rules that give it authoritative legal 
force, but without themselves being directly and immediately implicated 
or at stake. This is why Bostock can declare for the first time ever that
legal justice requires state actors, including courts, to afford LGBT
persons equal access to legal rights claims under Title VII’s sex 
discrimination ban, without forcing legal argument to work within any
constitutional grooves. The erstwhile, strictly constitutional justice 
requirement that LGBT and non-LGBT persons be treated formally just
like one another by the state is honored as a function of what legal justice
commands. Presented with no strong countervailing reasons for
overcoming legal justice’s presumption of equal treatment, courts and 
other legal actors are to act just as Bostock does when it reads Title VII’s
sex discrimination rule in pro-gay and pro-trans ways.
or gender identity or expression.”). This does not mean that there will not be questions, indeed,
challenging questions, about how to follow Bostock’s rule-of-law rule of LGBT equal 
treatment, particularly but not only in jurisdictions that, unlike the federal system at the time
of decision in Bostock, prohibited sex discrimination and anti-LGBT discrimination on
separate lines. Cf. Kyle C. Velte, The Nineteenth Amendment as a Generative Tool for
Defeating LGBT Religious Exemptions, 105 MINN. L. REV. 2659, 2703–06 (2021) (discussing
pattern of state public accommodations laws). Nor does it in any way forget the wave of anti-
trans legislation in state legislatures that has come in Bostock’s wake, hard to square with its
rule-of-law promises of formal equality for trans people. See, e.g., Wyatt Ronan, 2021 Slated 
to Become Worst Year for LGBTQ State Legislative Attacks as Unprecedented Number of
States Poised to Enact Record-Shattering Number of Anti-LGBTQ Measures Into Law,
HRC.ORG (Apr. 22, 2021), https://www.hrc.org/press-releases/2021-slated-to-become-worst-
year-for-lgbtq-state-legislative-attacks [https://perma.cc/TW2V-9VMW] (tracking state anti-
LGBTQ bills, many of which are anti-trans).
183. This does not mean that LGBT claims and positions will always prevail against
counter-claims that also implicate legal justice or other rule-of-law values. For limits that 
Bostock itself contemplates, see, for example, Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1754 (“[H]ow . . . 
doctrines protecting religious liberty interact with Title VII are questions for future cases
too. . . . [W]hile other employers in other cases may raise free exercise arguments that merit 
careful consideration, none of the employers before us today represent in this Court that
compliance with Title VII will infringe their own religious liberties in any way.”). For further
discussion of the point, see infra text accompanying notes 208–09, 231–34. 
   
         
        
           
         
         
             
   
       
 
b. Legal Justice’s Phenomenology: Bostock’s Textualism as
Experience
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But notice: Nothing in Bostock ever places Title VII’s sex
discrimination ban, or Title VII more generally, into any sort of
constitutional peril or doubt. Not even close. Bostock thus does not neatly
fit into the category of “constitutional avoidance” decisions.184 It occupies
a new and different kind of legal space, hence the idea of legal justice 
sitting in a kind of constitutional advance position, well out in front of
conventional constitutional claims.
Having come this far, it looks as though Bostock’s extra-textualist 
achievements are on a collision course with Bostock’s self-presentation 
as a textualist ruling. That is right—to a point. At the same time, however, 
Bostock’s extra-textualist features also recast and help explain Bostock’s
textualism in a somewhat different light.
Bostock’s textualism centers on its conviction that, “[a]t bottom, 
these cases involve no more than the straightforward application of legal 
terms with plain and settled meanings.”185 Bostock returns to this position
later on when—just before putting its ideal of legal justice into play—it 
announces that it wishes to preserve, and not “abandon[, its] role as [a 
statutory] interpreter.”186 This disavowal ironically captures what
Bostock, in fact, proceeds to do when it identifies legal justice as a
normative interpretive guide. Forthcoming like this, Bostock
acknowledges that it is not simply discovering—but actively crafting—
Title VII’s text. The opinion’s self-image as a faithful interpreter of the
statute’s plain meaning is thus wish fulfillment in the Freudian sense.187 
184. For some relevant discussion of the constitutional avoidance canon, see SCALIA &
GARNER, supra note 53, at 426. While Bostock itself does not raise or come close to raising
any suggestion that Title VII’s sex discrimination ban was in any zone of constitutional danger
or doubt, saying all this does not miss how an anti-sex-discrimination statute that expressly 
excluded lesbian women, gay men, and trans people from its protections would raise very
serious constitutional questions—both before and after Bostock. Further thoughts along these
lines are discussed infra Part III.A.
185. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1743.
186. See id. at 1751. There is also the prospect that wrapping itself in the authority of its 
own pro-LGBT constitutional decisions would place a bullseye on them at a moment when
their own security and stability had finally seemed to be largely beyond doubt. But see supra
note 145. 
187. SIGMUND FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 32 (James Strachey trans. &
ed., W.W. Norton 1989) (1930) (“[E]ach one of us behaves in some one respect like a 
paranoic, corrects some aspect of the world which is unbearable to him by the construction of
a wish and introduces this delusion into reality.”).
   
          
       
         
         
        
       
        
          
      
       
 
       
          
          
    
        
           
         
       
           
         
        
       
             
            
          
        
        
         
       
 
               
           
         
 
            
          
 
         
   
   
6132021] BOSTOCK’S PARADOX
An important truth lurks in this account, nevertheless—at least if one 
treats Bostock’s self-description as textualist phenomenologically, as a
report on the judicial experience of reading Title VII’s text in the context 
of the claims that Bostock involves. There are, after all, conditions of
interpretive constraint shaped by authoritative texts that are now visibly
a part of the legal landscape that Bostock engages.188 If Bostock’s
interpretivism founders where the opinion offers its legal justice
rationale, it is in the authority beneath that rationale—the Court’s pro-
LGBT constitutional rights decisions—that one discovers a foundation
for the judicial experience that Bostock effectively describes: of feeling
interpretively boxed in.189 
The Supreme Court’s pro-LGBT constitutional rights decisions are
fairly characterized in terms that Bostock uses to describe Title VII’s sex 
discrimination ban. Taken as a larger set, these decisions now look to be
“clear,” “straightforward,” “plain,” and “settled” on the basic question of
lesbian and gay formal equality, with Bostock itself putting to rest 
whatever questions may have been lingering on the status of trans
equality within that body of law.190 Seen generally along these lines, the
Court’s pro-LGBT constitutional rights jurisprudence does more than
supply Bostock’s legal justice ideal with authoritative content. It does that
in ways that both structure and drive the Court’s selection from among 
the interpretive options before it, making Bostock’s result, however
“unexpected” it may have been, feel legally foreordained.191 
To recognize this is not to deny that Bostock’s final gloss on Title
VII is the product of interpretive choices that the Court has made.
However strong a driving force underneath the Bostock decision, the
Court’s pro-LGBT constitutional rights jurisprudence does not and could
not in any simple way dictate Bostock’s results. Short of that, however,
the rules of those decisions and their pro-LGBT trajectories are powerful
enough to serve as a meaningful contouring guide, capable of
188. For a larger account framing a phenomenology of judging from a critical perspective
that also has the rule of law in its sights, see DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF
ADJUDICATION, FIN DE SIÈCLE 169–71 (1997) (discussing the experience of judging and
interpretive constraint in relation to the indeterminacy critique).
189. See, e.g., Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1751 (invoking the “tilt” of “the scales of justice”); 
id. at 1743 (“At bottom, these cases involve no more than the straightforward application of
legal terms with plain and settled meanings.”).
190. Id. at 1737 (“clear”); 1743 (“straightforward”); id. (“plain”); id. (“settled”); see also
supra note 154.
191. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1751.
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conditioning the approach and the answers to the statutory interpretation
questions Bostock involves and resolves. The Court’s pro-LGBT 
constitutional rights decisions push toward—or even shove in the
direction of, if they do not strictly require—Bostock’s bottom line.
If not precisely on the terms that Bostock claims, it is possible, then,
to account for Bostock as involving interpretations of Title VII’s sex 
discrimination ban that are produced by an experience of anterior textual
constraint. It is just that that constraint is found not in Title VII’s text, as
Bostock’s textualism suggests, but in the texts that are beneath Bostock’s
anti-textualist, legal justice rationale. Strange as this may sound, 
Bostock’s textualism may be thought to conform to—and not simply be 
entirely at right angles with—its anti-textualist dimensions. To a limited
degree, Bostock’s anti-textualism harmonizes with, and helps to explain,
its textualist results.192 
At the same time as Bostock’s anti-textualist dimensions help make
sense of its textualist conclusions, they do not finally provide a
rationalization for Bostock on its own textualist terms. Nor could they.
Far from singularly operating as Bostock’s textualism’s negation, though,
Bostock’s anti-textualist features go to show the complex and subtle
interrelations amidst the elements of Bostock’s textualist/anti-textualist 
paradox.
These dynamics also hold true in reverse in a relevant sense. 
Bostock’s textualism and its vision of the possibilities of textual
determinacy shore up a conventionally deterministic approach to legal
authority that itself underwrites the anti-textualist features of Bostock’s
text, specifically, the sense that the Court’s pro-LGBT constitutional
rights jurisprudence can be described as a steady and fixed, if still
evolving, body of law that has now, through and with Bostock,
underwritten a transformation in what the rule-of-law ideal of legal 
justice requires, not just as a matter of constitutional right but of more
general legal obligation within our wider U.S. rule of law regime.
192. All these moves, of course, are intensely fraught from the point of view of the
indeterminacy thesis, particularly its hard forms, as noted supra note 6.
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III. BOSTOCK RECONFIGURED: THE DISSENTS AND SOME UNANSWERED 
QUESTIONS 
A. The Dissents 
How do the Bostock dissents by Justices Alito and Kavanaugh hold 
up in this light?
Initially, a compressed treatment of both of the Bostock dissents
looks past their differences to their shared effort to pin their textualist 
conclusions on their understandings of the original, “ordinary public
meaning” of Title VII’s sex discrimination rule.193 While the dissents fill
out their reasoning in different ways—ways that obviously matter to the
dissenting Justices themselves—both of them make the ordinary public
meaning of Title VII’s sex discrimination ban at the time it was enacted
a conceptual centerpiece of their rulings, sufficient for the interpretive 
conclusions that they reach.194 Because Title VII’s sex discrimination
ban, by its historical terms, announced a cisheterosexual-exclusive rule,
the dissents reason, it did not and does not cover anti-gay or anti-trans
discrimination as sex discrimination today.195 
193. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1767 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“In 1964, ordinary Americans
reading the text of Title VII would not have dreamed that discrimination because of sex meant
discrimination because of sexual orientation, much less gender identity. The ordinary
meaning of discrimination because of ‘sex’ was discrimination because of a person’s
biological sex, not sexual orientation or gender identity.”); id. at 1825 (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting) (“The ordinary meaning that counts is the ordinary public meaning at the time of
enactment—although in this case, that temporal principle matters little because the ordinary
meaning of ‘discriminate because of sex’ was the same in 1964 as it is now.”); id. at 1828
(“For phrases as well as terms, the ‘linchpin of statutory interpretation is ordinary meaning,
for that is going to be most accessible to the citizenry desirous of following the law and to the
legislators and their staffs drafting the legal terms of the plans launched by statutes and to the
administrators and judges implementing the statutory plan.’” (first quoting WILLIAM
ESKRIDGE, INTERPRETING LAW 81 (2016); and then citing SCALIA, supra note 121, at 17)).
194. See supra note 193; see also Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1756–57 (Alito, J., dissenting)
(noting that the majority opinion “‘proceed[s] on the assumption that “sex” . . . refer[s] only
to biological distinctions between male and female.’ If that is so, it should be perfectly clear
that Title VII does not reach discrimination because of sexual orientation or gender identity”);
id. at 1757 (“If ‘sex’ in Title VII means biologically male or female, then discrimination
because of sex means discrimination because the person in question is biologically male or
biologically female, not because that person is sexually attracted to members of the same sex
or identifies as a member of a particular gender.”). Compare id. with id. at 1738–39 (majority 
opinion) (discussing ordinary public meaning).
195. See id. at 1769–73 (Alito, J., dissenting) (discussing anti-gay and anti-trans norms in
society and under law); id. at 1828–29 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (carefully delineating 
differences between sex and sexual orientation as a function of “language and psychology”
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In different ways, the Bostock dissents acknowledge that their
historically based readings of Title VII’s sex discrimination rule reflect
historically normative positions on what in an earlier day might have been 
referred to as “homosexuality” and “transsexualism.”196 On this level, the
dissents do not affirm—contemporaneously—either the sameness or the 
equal dignity and worth of cisheterosexuals and LGBT persons.
Practically, invoking historical determinants, they reject it.
In the course of the Bostock litigation at the Supreme Court, old and
widely outmoded ideas of gay and trans difference and otherness—ideas
that not only differentiated between and among cisheterosexuals and
LGBT persons but that also abnormalized, even pathologized, gay and
trans identities, and hence gay and trans people—achieved a certain
degree of prominence.197 Remarkably, if depressingly, though also not
wholly unpredictably, these discriminatory lines underwrote defense
positions in the cases Bostock resolves.198
This was especially true of the anti-trans claims that the Bostock
as well as “history and sociology,” while relying on ordinary understandings of sex 
discrimination to justify a heterosexually exclusive result in the case). As Justice Kavanaugh’s
dissent explains, it “does not separately analyze discrimination on the basis of gender identity,
[but] this opinion’s legal analysis of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation would 
apply in much the same way to discrimination on the basis of gender identity.” Id. at 1823
n.1.
196. See, e.g., MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: VOLUME I: AN 
INTRODUCTION 43 (Robert Hurley trans., 1978) (1976) (discussing the historical emergence
of “the homosexual” in a “famous article of 1870,” and suggesting that “[h]omosexuality 
appeared as one of the forms of sexuality when it was transposed from the practice of sodomy
onto a kind of interior androgyny, a hermaphrodism of the soul,” and concluding that “[t]he
sodomite had been a temporary aberration; the homosexual was now a species”); Susan
Stryker, (De)Subjugated Knowledges: An Introduction to Transgender Studies, in THE
TRANSGENDER STUDIES READER 1, 4 (Susan Stryker & Stephen Whittle eds., 2006)
(describing the history of “the word ‘transgender,’” and noting Virginia Prince’s “[f]irst usage
use of the term . . . to refer to individuals like herself whose personal identities she considered 
to fall somewhere on a spectrum between ‘transvestite’ (a term coined in 1910 by Dr. Magnus
Hirschfeld) and ‘transsexual’ (a term popularized in the 1950s by Dr. Harry Benjamin)”). The
Bostock majority opinion itself does not abandon the term “homosexuality.” See, e.g.,
Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1737, 1741, 1742. 
197. For discussion of the litigation that traces these lines, see generally Spindelman, The
Shower’s Return: Part I, supra note 9; Spindelman, The Shower’s Return: Part II, supra note
9; Spindelman, The Shower’s Return: Part III, supra note 9; Spindelman, The Shower’s
Return: Part IV, supra note 9; Spindelman, The Shower’s Return: Part V, supra note 9;
Spindelman, The Shower’s Return: Part VI, supra note 9.
198. For some additional background, see generally Marie-Amélie George, Framing
Trans Rights, 114 NW. U. L. REV. 555, 603–07 (2019) (tracing relevant aspect of debates about
trans rights that played out in some ways in the Bostock litigation).
   
      
      
      
       
      
           
          
       
     
        
        
       
         
       
       
          
          
         
         
        
         
            
          
       
       
   
          
 
            
             
          
             
              
             
              
         
   
                
       
          
            
           
6172021] BOSTOCK’S PARADOX
litigation involved. Defense arguments, along with often bolder
arguments offered by different amici, characterized trans people, 
specifically trans women, as abnormal, violent, criminal, sexually
predatory, and monstrous in ways that did not simply counsel not
including anti-trans discrimination within Title VII’s terms, but that also, 
more insidiously, sketched a line of thought that would call for re-
imposing mental health and criminal controls on trans people in order to
check the social threats that they wrongly—and disturbingly—were
claimed inevitably to pose.199
If the good news is that the Bostock dissents do nothing expressly to 
endorse these ideas, they scarcely do anything expressly to disavow
them.200 (Nor for that matter does the Court’s Bostock opinion, which 
simply lets them drop in the face of the pro-gay and pro-trans
interpretation of Title VII that it issues.201) Nevertheless, within the
dissents, florid, historical forms of anti-gay and anti-trans discrimination
are fully legible and legally normative, if in a highly particular way: In
the context of the cases that Bostock decides, those historical forms of
anti-gay and anti-trans discrimination are deployed so as to explain why
lesbian, gay, and trans people as such are not the beneficiaries of Title 
VII’s sex discrimination ban. To that extent, anti-gay and anti-trans
normativities are allowed to carry the day in the dissents as a matter of
law, and are given legal and social space to persist and breathe as a result.
Seen this way, the Bostock dissents figure a conflict not only with 
the Bostock majority opinion, but also with the outlooks, holdings, and
trajectories of the cases comprising Supreme Court’s pro-LGBT 
constitutional rights jurisprudence. 
This point has real jurisprudential stakes for the Bostock dissents,
199. The arguments are carefully traced in the sources cited supra note 197. 
200. For some related discussion in Justice Alito’s dissent, see Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1778
(Alito, J., dissenting) (noting that the “Court dismisses questions about ‘bathrooms, locker 
rooms, or anything else of the kind’”). The dissent shows some sympathy for some aspects of
these defense and defense-minded positions in the case, including the idea that trans women
may inflict “serious psychological harm” on “women who have been victimized by sexual
assault or abuse,” who may “experience . . . seeing an unclothed person with the anatomy of
a male in a confined and sensitive location such as a bathroom or locker room” as injurious.
Id. at 1779.
201. Or perhaps more precisely, it brackets some of them. See id. at 1753 (majority
opinion) (discussing “sex-segregated bathrooms, locker rooms, and dress codes” and
suggesting that their status under law, including Title VII, was not before the Court, which
had not had “the benefit of adversarial testing about the meaning of their terms,” and so
concluding that the opinion does not mean to “prejudge any such question today”).
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including the textualist methods they embrace. Now that Romer,
Lawrence, Windsor, and Obergefell are good and settled constitutional
law, the dissents’ positions—which legally endorse anti-gay and anti-
trans normativities for purposes of construing Title VII in the present 
tense—are legally anomalous. It is these opinions—and not the Bostock
majority opinion, as they claim—that broadly lack authoritative legal 
supports. Missing them, the Bostock dissents—and not the Bostock
majority opinion—are properly viewed as both lawless and illegitimate
at once.202
This is because, consistent with the Supreme Court’s pro-LGBT 
constitutional rights jurisprudence, anti-gay and anti-trans prejudices are
not to be treated as legally sound. They are not a proper basis for
governmental action like the construction of a statute—at least not
without some special justification beyond, as Romer v. Evans put it over
a generation ago, “a bare desire to harm” members of a politically
unpopular group, precisely what the Bostock majority opinion says gay
and trans people were back when Title VII was enacted.203 Without
rejecting Romer, the Bostock dissents nevertheless flout its rule by
authorizing widespread, intense prejudices against gay and trans people,
such as they were understood and circulated in 1964, to supply the
conditions for their present-day exclusion from the protections of Title
VII’s sex discrimination ban.204 Neither of the dissents asks for—or
gives—a justification beyond historical group-based animus before
treating it as legally normative for purposes of their textualist inquiries
202. The point as to the substance of constitutional law, derived from the Supreme Court’s
LGBT rights jurisprudence, is expressed in Spindelman, Masterpiece Cakeshop’s Homiletics, 
supra note 108, at 381 (“Nothing may stop religious or moral views on the status of
homosexuality from being expressed in the public arena, but those views, however else they 
circulate, cannot become the basis for anti-lesbian and anti-gay state action.”). The line from
Masterpiece Cakeshop to the results in Bostock is sketched in id. at 406. See also supra note
42.
203. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996) (“‘[I]f the constitutional conception of
“equal protection of the laws” means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare . . . 
desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental
interest.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 
(1973))); Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1751 (“As . . . today’s cases exemplify, applying protective
laws to groups that were politically unpopular at the time of the law’s passage—whether
prisoners in the 1990s or homosexual and transgender employees in the 1960s—often may be
seen as unexpected.”).
204. The only citation to Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), in Bostock appears in
Justice Kavanaugh’s dissent, Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1833 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting), where
it is cited, apparently, approvingly. 
   
   
              
         
           
        
       
        
      
            
        
        
         
       
      
          
       
           
           
         
    
    
  
           
       
           
 
        
   
           
            
         
         
           
       
         
            
          
         
           
           
         
         
6192021] BOSTOCK’S PARADOX
and results. 
The crux of the problem that the dissents thus both face but, in their
own ways, otherwise refuse to meet, is that their textualist approaches to 
Title VII’s sex discrimination rule lead them to endorse constructions of
its terms founded in historical forms of anti-gay and anti-trans animus
that are themselves now constitutionally out of bounds. Whatever the
virtues of the textualist methods practiced by the Bostock dissents—their
capacity, as Justice Kavanaugh’s opinion says, to generate clear, fixed 
statutory meanings that enable the public to know what the law is, and
that respects the Court’s role in our constitutional and rule-of-law
systems—they remain legally wanting.205 They yield interpretations of
Title VII that do not accord with basic U.S. law and its requirements. 
Without non-discriminatory reasons, they “tilt the scales of justice in 
favor of the strong or popular and neglect the [constitutional] promise
that all persons are entitled to the benefit of the law’s terms.”206 Settled
principles of constitutional justice foreclose these results.
Who can say why the dissents do not engage these problematics?
They themselves do not. Though the problematics must register on some
level, the dissents think them away in opinions that show themselves
unprepared to affirm both the deep legitimacy and broad sweep of the
authority of the Supreme Court’s pro-LGBT constitutional
jurisprudence.207
One prospect is that the dissents continue to think of the
constitutional precedents as limited, substantive constitutional rulings
that are only implicated in cases involving the adjudication of claims of
205. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1825 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (discussing rule-of-law and
democratic accountability values).
206. Id. at 1751 (majority opinion). Indeed, as the Court’s Bostock opinion itself flags, to 
pin Title VII’s sex discrimination rule’s meaning to the original public meaning in 1964 in
principle raises questions about the legitimacy of doctrines developed in the intervening years
on behalf of cisheterosexuals, mainly cisstraight women, that do not accord with a narrow
understanding the original public meaning of the law. Id. at 1747, 1751–52.
207. Justice Kavanaugh’s dissent’s brief discussion and citation of the Court’s pro-LGBT 
constitutional rights decisions indicates some meaningful fidelity to them, just not the kind of
deep and abiding fidelity to them that they warrant in the context of a case like Bostock, along
the lines reflected in the Bostock majority opinion. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1833 (Kavanaugh, 
J., dissenting). How one might square a commitment to abiding by those decisions and the 
dissents’ positions in Bostock is suggested infra in the text accompanying notes 208–09. For
another perspective on what is happening in the dissents, see id. at 1773 (Alito, J., dissenting)
(“According to the Court, an argument that looks to the societal norms of those times 
represents an impermissible attempt to displace the statutory language.”).
   
     
        
        
     
           
          
      
       
         
       
   
 
               
                
           
              
              
                
              
            
           
        
      
               
           
        
            
      
              
          
       
        
          
          
         
             
              
               
             
         
           
          
          
              
            
              
           
620 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  69
illicit state action—not cases involving extra-constitutional or sub-
constitutional claims about the meaning of the outputs of the federal
legislative process. This position may travel with, or be animated by, the
thought that the Court’s pro-LGBT constitutional rights jurisprudence
deserves respect to its limits, but no more, or that it must actually be
circumscribed, so as to secure the blessings of faithful conservatives’ and
traditional moralists’ liberties, including those of religious and traditional 
morality-minded employers who were not wholly unrepresented in the
cases Bostock decides.208 Whatever their reasons, the dissents effectively
treat the Court’s pro-LGBT rights jurisprudence as bounded authority
that does not speak to—or help determine—Bostock’s results.209 
208. See E.E.O.C. v. R.G. &. G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560, 567–68 (6th 
Cir. 2018), cert. granted in part sub nom. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc. v.
E.E.O.C., 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019), and aff’d sub nom. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (citations
omitted) (noting that Stephens’s employer, “Thomas Rost[,] . . . has been a Christian for over
sixty-five years” and “proclaims ‘that God has called him to serve grieving people’ and ‘that 
his purpose in life is to minister to the grieving’”); Brief for Petitioner at 5, R.G. & G.R. Harris
Funeral Homes, Inc. v. E.E.O.C., 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019) (No. 18-107) (citations omitted)
(reiterating that Rost has been “a devout Christian for more than 65 years, a former member
of the deacon board at Highland Park Baptist Church, and a prayer leader at corporate events”
and stating that the funeral home’s mission statement “confirms that the company’s ‘highest
priority is to honor God in all that [they] do’”).
209. For the dissents’ engagement with religious limits in the cases, see, for example,
Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1780 (Alito, J., dissenting) (noting amicus briefs “filed by a wide range
of religious groups” “argu[ing] that ‘[r]eligious organizations need employees who actually
live the faith,’ and that compelling a religious organization to employ individuals whose
conduct flouts the tenets of the organization’s faith forces the group to communicate an
objectionable message” (quoting Brief for Nat’l Ass’n of Evangelicals et al., at 3, Bostock v. 
Clayton Cnty., Ga., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020) (Nos. 17-1618, 17-1623, 18-107))); id. at 1823
n.2 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“As the Court today recognizes, Title VII contains an 
important exemption for religious organizations. The First Amendment also safeguards the
employment decisions of religious employers. So too, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
of 1993 exempts employers from federal laws that substantially burden the exercise of
religion, subject to limited exceptions.” (citations omitted)). For a fuller picture, see
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1727
(2018), reaffirming Obergefell, which Justice Alito joined. See also id. (“[G]ay persons . . . 
cannot be treated as social outcasts or as inferior in dignity and worth. . . . [T]he laws and the
Constitution can, and in some instances must, protect them . . . . At the same time, the religious
and philosophical objections to gay marriage are protected views and in some instances
protected forms of expression[,] [a]s this Court observed in Obergefell.”); see also id. at 1747
(Thomas, J., concurring) (“[T]he fact that this Court has now decided [Obergefell] [does not] 
somehow diminish Phillips’ right to free speech. . . . Obergefell itself emphasized that the
traditional understanding of marriage ‘long has been held—and continues to be held—in good
faith by reasonable and sincere people here and throughout the world.’” (citing Obergefell v.
Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 657 (2015))). For pertinent observations from Justices Alito and
Kavanaugh during oral arguments in Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, see Transcript of Oral
Argument at 68–69, 80–82, Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 140 S. Ct. 1104 (2020) (No. 19-
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The limitations of this position come into view by indulging a
counterfactual reconstruction of Bostock—as if the Supreme Court’s pro-
LGBT constitutional rights decisions did not exist. Then, the historical
discriminations against lesbian women, gay men, and trans people the
dissents treat as authoritative might broadly, anyway, be legally 
legitimate, and hence lawful, normative touchstones for readings of Title
VII’s sex discrimination rule that exclude anti-gay and anti-trans
discrimination.210 
This is, in fact, not simply a counterfactual, but a recollection of the
historical situation of the Title VII sex discrimination decision reached in 
1992 by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Dillon v. Frank,
decided after Bowers v. Hardwick came down but before Romer v. Evans
did.211 Formally, Dillon involved the question whether Title VII’s sex
discrimination prohibition barred anti-gay sexual harassment.212
123).
210. This point holds true even for Justice Kavanaugh’s dissent, which presents its
arguments in ways that seem calculated to make it seem hip to at least who lesbian women
and gay men are, its position on trans people being more tempered and raising some active
questions about what the opinion actually understands about Stonewall, which it invokes as a
milestone historical event. See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1828–29 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting)
(“[Treating sexual-orientation discrimination as sex discrimination] rewrites history. Seneca
Falls was not Stonewall. The women’s rights movement was not (and is not) the gay rights
movement, although many people obviously support or participate in both.”). On Justice
Kavanaugh’s dissent’s treatment of trans people, they are submerged in a footnote as an
extension of lesbians and gay men who are treated by the opinion “in much the same way.” 
Id. at 1823 n.1. The word “transgender” is not in the opinion, and the term “gender identity”
is found nowhere beyond the dissent’s first footnote. This all is rounded out by the conclusion
of the opinion which subtly and rhetorically reperforms a form of trans erasure aside from
what is in its first footnote. The dissent concludes with a nod that “it is appropriate to
acknowledge the important victory achieved today by gay and lesbian Americans,” 
“[m]illions” of whom “have worked hard for many decades to achieve equal treatment in fact
and in law,” while “exhibit[ing] extraordinary vision, tenacity, and grit—battling often steep 
odds in the legislative and judicial arenas, not to mention in their daily lives. They have
advanced powerful policy arguments and can take pride in today’s result.” Id. at 1837. Against 
this, the silence about trans people in the opinion’s concluding paragraph is striking. Thanks
to James Pfeiffer for productive engagement on this point.
211. See Dillon v. Frank, No. 90-2290, 1992 WL 5436 (6th Cir. Jan. 15, 1992). Dillon
makes an appearance in Justice Alito’s Bostock dissent, Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1777 n.41
(Alito, J., dissenting), where it is cited as authority for “the positions of the EEOC.” Id. at
1777. Dillon deals with only one part of the relevant historical situation. For a wider
perspective that includes aspects of the history of trans sex discrimination rights under Title
VII, see, inter alia, Jessica A. Clarke, How the First Forty Years of Circuit Precedent Got
Title VII’s Sex Discrimination Provision Wrong, 98 TEX. L. REV. ONLINE 83 (2019).
212. See Dillon, 1992 WL 5436, at *1, *4 (rejecting a Title VII claim that anti-gay sexual
harassment constituted sex discrimination on the ground that “only discrimination based on 
   
           
          
   
     
         
      
        
             
            
        
        
         
           
   
          
     
    
          
         
 
         
         
          
            
               
                
       
              
           
      
          
            
          
   
            
            
         
          
             
               
          
             
               
          
      
622 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  69
Announcing that it did not, Dillon relied on then-conventional tools of
statutory interpretation that more or less track the textualist lines of the
Bostock dissents.
While Dillon, like Bostock, ventured no express constitutional
argument in support of its result, the ruling bore the hallmarks of a 
decision that reflected and reinforced the spirit of its constitutional age—
during Hardwick’s reign, in which legal difference, exclusion, othering,
and state definition of the lives of LGBT persons was the order of the
day.213 In this era, the notion that lesbians and gay men and their 
intimacies were anything like heterosexuals and theirs, as epitomized, for
instance, by the sacred bonds of traditional marriage, was often seen as 
Hardwick famously and awfully characterized it: “facetious,” a joke.214 
The broadly homophobic order in that moment, later reflected in the
unprecedented and sweeping Colorado constitutional amendment that
Romer struck down, involved the deep legal normativity—for some, a felt
imperative—of pariahdom for homosexuality and the homosexuals who 
practiced it: criminalization of lesbian and gay intimacies, as in 
Hardwick, and hence, in important respects, a kind of criminalization of
lesbians and gay men themselves, along with, as in Romer, their exclusion
being male or female is prohibited by Title VII,” not “‘anything related to being male or
female, sexual roles, or to sexual behavior’” (footnote omitted)). For one insightful
contemporaneous account of how Dillon involved a misreading of Title VII, see Samuel A. 
Marcosson, Harassment on the Basis of Sexual Orientation: A Claim of Sex Discrimination
Under Title VII, 81 GEO. L.J. 1, 1–3, 12–13, 23–27, 31–32, 34, 38 (1992) (discussing Dillon).
213. For some perspective on the status of LGBT persons around the time of Title VII’s
enactment, see generally Brief for Historians as Amici Curiae Supporting Employees,
Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., Ga., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020) (Nos. 17-1618, 17-1623, 18-107)
(discussing historical context around Title VII’s enactment, and into the mid-1970’s), and 
Edelman, supra note 20, at 553–56 (discussing events in 1964). For some historical context 
on state classifications of, and discrimination against, LGBT persons as offered as part of an 
argument for overturning Bowers v. Hardwick, see generally Brief for Professors of History
George Chauncey et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 
558 (2003) (No. 02-102).
214. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191–94 (1986) (noting the country’s history of
criminal sodomy laws and stating that “[a]gainst this background, to claim that a right to
engage in such conduct is ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition’ or ‘implicit in 
the concept of ordered liberty’ is, at best, facetious”); see also Janet E. Halley, Romer v.
Hardwick, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 429, 435 (1997) (“‘I don’t think about sex when I read
Hardwick and I don’t think about what sex acts are at issue. I think how they hate me.’”
(quoting letter from William B. Rubenstein, Consulting Associate Professor, Stanford Law
School (Nov. 11, 1996))); Thomas B. Stoddard, Bowers v. Hardwick: Precedent by Personal
Predilection, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 648, 655 (1987) (noting that “the majority resorted to a
flippancy verging on contempt” when “it described Michael Hardwick’s invocation of 
constitutional protection as ‘at best, facetious’”).
   
         
 
         
          
      
        
        
          
       
           
          
       
 
          
      
            
        
          
          
       
       
      
      
 
         
            
              
           
          
           
   
     
           
             
         
        
         
       
              
                 
           
      
     
6232021] BOSTOCK’S PARADOX
from the ordinary transactions and protections of public and private
life.215 
Much as the Bostock dissents’ positions on the meaning of Title
VII’s sex discrimination ban are Dillon-like, they lack the supports that
Dillon once had in wider constitutional and rule-of-law rules. The
Bostock dissents are cut off from dominant constitutional positions— 
positions that, as Bostock indicates, now define what legal justice, as a
rule-of-law concept and practice, means. Seen as only being out of step
with constitutional justice requirements, the Bostock dissents’
interpretations of Title VII’s sex discrimination rule look like nothing so
much as atavistic hangovers that are legally problematically prepared to
tolerate anti-gay and anti-trans prejudices as the basis for law, including
judicial decision-making.216 
Whether they intend it or not, the Bostock dissents may yet function 
as symbolic beachheads—or rallying cries—from which those who
remain opposed to LGBT equality gains under law may keep their dreams
of legal revolution in a literal sense alive, aspiring to return to the days
and ways of life of yore. Modestly, the dissents flag the prospect that
future positive law changes in pro-LGBT directions must come not from
the Supreme Court via extensions of its pro-LGBT constitutional
jurisprudence, but through the actions of the political branches that heed
its larger, rule-of-law teachings.217 Without disagreeing that they should, 
consistent with the Bostock majority’s teaching, what is misguided about 
215. For discussion of the Colorado constitutional amendment, see supra text 
accompanying notes 172–75. For an additional, relevant note on what that amendment did,
see Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) (“We find nothing special in the protections
Amendment 2 withholds. These are protections taken for granted by most people either
because they already have them or do not need them; these are protections against exclusion 
from an almost limitless number of transactions and endeavors that constitute ordinary civic
life in a free society.”).
216. See also supra note 145. 
217. For expressions of conventional notions of Congress/Court principal/agent relations
at work in the Bostock dissents, see, for example, Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., Ga., 140 S. Ct.
1731, 1755 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Usurping the constitutional authority of the other
branches, the Court has essentially taken [a proposed House bill’s] provision on employment
discrimination and issued it under the guise of statutory interpretation. A more brazen abuse
of our authority to interpret statutes is hard to recall.” (footnote omitted)); id. at 1823–24 
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“[O]ur role as judges is to interpret and follow the law as written
. . . . If judges could rewrite laws based on their own policy views, . . . the critical distinction
between legislative authority and judicial authority . . . would collapse . . . [and] the Judiciary
would become a democratically illegitimate super-legislature . . . .”). Cf., e.g., SCALIA, supra
note 121, at 9, 13, 17, 38 (discussing principal-agent notions in different ways).
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the dissents is their embrace of historical anti-gay and anti-trans
normativities, which they find legitimate in the present tense, and as the
basis for Supreme Court decision-making now. From a constitutional
perspective, and, after Bostock, from a rule-of-law perspective as well, 
the dissents’ positions are outliers that express a minority view on what 
constitutional justice and now legal justice demand—even on the current
Supreme Court.218 
B. Some Unanswered Questions 
For everything it does and for all the legal ground that it occupies,
Bostock remains an unfinished project. With Justice Kavanaugh’s
dissent, Bostock’s “implications . . . will likely reverberate . . . for years
to come” as its meaning is tested and clarified.219
The questions Bostock raises are large, challenging, and
consequential. Without attempting to resolve them, here are but a few of
the more prominent questions it prompts, which lower courts, legislators, 
and executive officials have already begun to grapple with in different
ways.
Does Bostock’s holding that anti-gay and anti-trans discrimination
are always and necessarily sex discrimination under Title VII— 
particularly given the constitutional supports beneath this ruling—mean
that the Supreme Court’s constitutional precedents involving sex
discrimination rights are also now to be interpreted in parallel ways?220 If 
218. See Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2077 (2017) (reaffirming Obergefell’s
commitment to provide same-sex couples “the constellation of benefits that the States have 
linked to marriage’” (citing Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 670 (2015))); Masterpiece
Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1727 (2018) (reaffirming Obergefell);
see also V.L. v. E.L., 136 S. Ct. 1017 (2016) (vindicating Obergefell’s principle in the case
of a same-sex couple but without citing Obergefell). For how this point ties into the prospects
that Bostock may be understood as a decision that results from a constitutional avoidance
canon, see supra note 184.
219. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1836–37 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting); see also id. at 1783
(Alito, J., dissenting) (“Although the Court does not want to think about the consequences of 
its decision, we will not be able to avoid those issues for long. The entire Federal Judiciary
will be mired for years in disputes about the reach of the Court’s reasoning.”).
220. Justice Alito’s Bostock dissent notes dimensions of this prospect. Id. at 1783 (Alito,
J., dissenting) (“Under our precedents, the Equal Protection Clause prohibits sex-based 
discrimination unless a ‘heightened’ standard of review is met. By equating discrimination
because of sexual orientation or gender identity with discrimination because of sex, the
Court’s decision will be cited as a ground for subjecting all three forms of discrimination to
the same exacting standard of review.” (citations omitted)). For a related thought in Justice 
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anti-gay discrimination and anti-trans discrimination are recognized as
constitutionally prohibited sex discrimination, what would this mean for,
and do to, the Court’s pro-LGBT constitutional rights jurisprudence?
Should the rulings in cases like Romer, Lawrence, Windsor, Obergefell,
along with the rights that they involve, be reconfigured as constitutional
sex discrimination decisions involving constitutional sex equality
rights?221 Will the Supreme Court yet recognize that lesbian, gay, and
transgender equality is integral to the project of achieving sex equality, 
and with it the elimination of cisheterosexual male dominance and the 
ideologically driven hierarchy of cisstraight men over cisstraight women
that has long gone with it?222 Does Bostock prefigure a future governed 
by a new, integrated track for the different types of sex discrimination 
rights it has started to recognize, or will Bostock be the inaugural move
Kavanaugh’s dissent, see id. at 1833 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“All of the Court’s cases 
from Bowers to Romer to Lawrence to Windsor to Obergefell would have been far easier to 
analyze and decide if sexual orientation discrimination were just a form of sex discrimination
and therefore received the same heightened scrutiny as sex discrimination under the Equal
Protection Clause.”).
221. Cf. generally Susan Frelich Appleton, Missing in Action? Searching for Gender Talk
in the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 97 (2005); MacKinnon, supra
note 153.
222. A few of the sources that could be cited here include MacKinnon, supra note 153
(making the argument in the context of a discussion of Lawrence v. Texas, while tracing
earlier, foundational work along these lines); Spindelman, Gay Men and Sex Equality, supra
note 76 (treating the relationship between gay male sexuality and sex equality, including male
supremacy and cisheterosexual male/cisheterosexual female hierarchy). Additional sources 
that fill out the account of anti-gay and anti-trans discrimination as sex discrimination in
different ways include I. Bennett Capers, Sex(ual Orientation) and Title VII, 91 COLUM. L.
REV. 1158 (1991) (arguing sexual orientation discrimination is sex discrimination under Title 
VII); Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The
Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 58–60 (1995)
(discussing sexual orientation discrimination as sex discrimination under a Title VII sex 
stereotyping claim); Koppelman, supra note 76 (offering various accounts for why anti-
lesbian and anti-gay discrimination are forms of sex discrimination); Vicki Schultz,
Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1777–78 (1998) (arguing that
anti-gay discrimination is sex discrimination consistent with Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989), described as “instruct[ing]” that “imposing pressure to conform to
preconceived notions of appropriate manhood or womanhood at work is the essence of
differential treatment ‘because of sex’ within the meaning of Title VII”); Francisco
Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of “Sex,”
“Gender,” and “Sexual Orientation” in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1,
18 (1995) (discussing the “sexual orientation loophole” to claims of sex discrimination); Brief
for Anti-Discrimination Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting the Employees at 14–16,
Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., Ga., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020) (Nos. 17-1618, 17-1623, 18-107)
(arguing that anti-trans discrimination “also punishes men and women for departing from
traditional gender roles”). 
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in a second, supplemental line of constitutional and rule-of-law rights that 
LGBT persons may pursue when they are subject to discrimination?223
What might this mean for the standards of review to be applied in
cases adjudicating anti-LGBT discrimination involving LGBT 
classifications? Will the standard of review be what the LGBT
constitutional rights cases have so far indicated, something like 
heightened rational basis review with serious bite?224 Or will it be the
near-strict, but formally intermediate scrutiny standard of United States
v. Virginia and subsequent cases?225 Could the standard of review for
anti-LGBT claims be different depending on which doctrinal path for
analyzing anti-LGBT discrimination parties invoke and courts pursue? 
Relatedly, how will these constitutional matters map onto what
Bostock’s rule-of-law ideal of legal justice requires? Accepting that 
Bostock demands a presumption of strict legal equality between LGBT
and non-LGBT persons, exactly how strong will countervailing interests
223. A very loose analogy is found in the Supreme Court’s “right-to-counsel”/“self-
incrimination” doctrines, as discussed in Yale Kamisar, Miranda Thirty-Five Years Later: A 
Close Look at the Majority and Dissenting Opinions in Dickerson, 33 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 387, 407 
(2001) (noting that “[t]he Warren Court ‘could have developed Escobedo [v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 
478 (1964)], into a doctrine . . . mandating that no waiver of rights would be accepted unless
the accused had first consulted with counsel,’” but then observing that Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966), “cut off that possibility . . . by continuing to move in the same general 
direction but ‘switching tracks’—moving from a right to counsel rationale to a self-
incrimination rationale, one which allowed the police more room to maneuver”). Thanks to 
Joshua Dressler for engagement on this point.
224. See Nan D. Hunter, Sexual Orientation and the Paradox of Heightened Scrutiny, 102
MICH. L. REV. 1528, 1529 (2004) (describing how, in the wake of Lawrence v. Texas, “the 
extreme deference of old-fashioned rational basis review has now been complicated by the
Court’s recognition that at least some adverse treatment of gay people is invidious and
disfavored,” while noting that Justice O’Connor’s concurrence suggested “two tiers of
rational basis review as well,” and anticipating that inquiries into differentiation based on
sexual orientation would require an aspect of heightened scrutiny); Pamela S. Karlan, Loving
Lawrence, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1447, 1449–50, 1461–62 (2004) (noting how Lawrence v. Texas
and Romer v. Evans “sidestep[ped]” the “conventional doctrinal framework” of strict scrutiny
and rational basis review, and suggesting that “cases about sexual orientation may transform” 
the “modern framework on heightened scrutiny,” perhaps toward a future “in which tiered
scrutiny no longer operates mechanically” and scrutiny is more “contextual and
incremental”); Jane S. Schacter, Obergefell’s Audiences 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 1011, 1016 (2016)
(“While Obergefell made no reference to standard of review, did it nevertheless plant the
seeds for heightening scrutiny for purposes of equal protection analysis at a later point?”).
225. 518 U.S. 515, 532–34 (1996) (describing the heightened standard of review for laws
that classify by sex); see also Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1783 (Alito, J., dissenting) (anticipating
future arguments that that heightened standard of review applies to anti-gay and anti-trans
discrimination); id. at 1832 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (discussing the Court’s “rigorous or
heightened constitutional scrutiny of laws that classify on the basis of sex”).
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have to be for that presumption to yield? Is skepticism grounded in an 
ideal of legal justice practically looking for rational reasons beyond
traditional justifications for anti-LGBT discrimination or for “important”
or “exceedingly persuasive” ones?226 Is Bostock a hint that the Supreme
Court will, at last, formally announce sexual orientation and trans identity
classifications are inherently suspect, or at least quasi-suspect, in a classic
Carolene Products sense?227 
What might all this mean for the questions that Bostock explicitly
brackets about the meaning of sex discrimination under other federal and 
state statutes? About how to resolve regularly transphobically inspired
claimed conflicts between cis and trans women in private, sex-segregated 
spaces like bathrooms, showers, and locker rooms?228 About how 
religious and traditional moral liberty claims should be handled when
they conflict with statutory sex discrimination rights?229 It is no surprise
that a number of lower courts have already started following Bostock’s
clearly pro-LGBT cues in the direction of expanding statutory sex
discrimination protections for trans people under other federal laws, but
it remains to be seen whether Bostock’s radiations will cross-cut, as
Bostock suggests they may be, in the face of religious and traditional
moral liberty claims.230 
226. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197–98 (1976) (noting the standard of review,
including “important governmental objectives”); Virginia, 518 U.S. at 532–34 (same,
including “exceedingly persuasive justification”).
227. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (noting that
“prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends 
seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to 
protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial
inquiry”). The decision in Ray v. McCloud, No. 2:18-cv-272, 2020 WL 8172750, at *1, *8 
(S.D. Ohio Dec. 16, 2020), “find[ing] that transgender individuals are a quasi-suspect class 
entitled to heightened scrutiny” under the Equal Protection Clause, is certainly in keeping
with this understanding of Bostock, which the opinion cites. Id. at 8 n.9.
228. See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1753 (“The employers worry that our decision will sweep 
beyond Title VII to other federal or state laws that prohibit sex discrimination. And, under
Title VII itself, they say sex-segregated bathrooms, locker rooms, and dress codes will prove 
unsustainable after our decision today. But none of these other laws are before us . . . .”); see 
also Ronan, supra note 182 (tracking state anti-LGBTQ bills, many of which are anti-trans).
229. See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1754 (“[H]ow these doctrines protecting religious liberty
interact with Title VII are questions for future cases too.”).
230. See supra notes 180, 182. For a particular inflection of these cross-cutting impulses 
in the context of a First Amendment academic freedom claim, see Meriweather v. Hartop,
No. 20-3289, 2021 WL 1149377 (6th Cir. Mar. 26, 2021) (recognizing First Amendment
protections in academic setting in case involving professor’s treatment of a trans student).
Critical commentary on Meriweather is in Andrew Koppelman, Abuse As a Constitutional
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Recognizing the generally expansive, pro-LGBT possibilities that
Bostock opens up, it may still prove to be an accurate prediction that
Bostock’s “reasoning . . . suggests that [the] victory [in the case] will be 
limited in significant ways in the near future,” including by “another
statute, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, [which] might prevent
Title VII from prohibiting discrimination by employers who have
religious objections.”231 But if Bostock’s constitutional underpinnings
and their own rule-of-law legal justice extensions are treated as the deep
and far-reaching legal norms that they imply they are, analysis in future
cases where Bostock’s pro-LGBT protectionism conflicts with religious
and traditional moral liberties should be more challenging than Bostock’s
reservations on the question, on their own, might be thought to suggest.232 
Tied into not only the Supreme Court’s pro-LGBT constitutional
jurisprudence, but also implicating the Supreme Court’s even more 
longstanding constitutional sex discrimination rules, it can hardly be a
fait accompli that Title VII’s sex discrimination protections—or the
protections found in similar federal measures—will be limited in the face
of claims under the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act.233 Well-
established precedents in the constitutional sex discrimination arena— 
themselves broadly synced with other constitutional equality concerns, 
most famously based on race—reject traditional religious and moral 
views and values as legitimate constraints on cisheterosexual women’s
Right: The Meriweather Case, THE HILL, (Apr. 15, 2021), https://thehill.com/opinion/
judiciary/546444-abuse-as-a-constitutional-right-the-meriwether-case [https://perma.cc/MJ9
A-7WRA], and Darren Rosenblum, Misgendering Students Is Not ‘Academic Freedom.’ It’s 
an Abuse of Power, WASH. POST (Mar. 31, 2021, 9:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/opinions/2021/03/31/misgendering-students-is-not-academic-freedom-its-an-abuse-po
wer/ [https://perma.cc/GT4T-WCAC]. The contours of some of these conflicts are a bit
clearer now that Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, No. 19-123, 2021 WL 2459253 (U.S. June
17, 2021), has been handed down, just as this work goes to press. How Fulton relates to the
ideas developed in these pages will have to await another day.
231. Leah Litman, Progressives’ Supreme Court Victories Will Be Fleeting, THE
ATLANTIC (July 14, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/07/court-gave-
progressives-hollow-victories/614101/ [https://perma.cc/U8CL-JJ3Z].
232. And even more challenging still if one takes account of the position set forth in Velte, 
supra note 182, at 2662 (arguing that the Nineteenth Amendment should be understood as a
tool for “[d]efeat[ing]” LGBT religious exemption claims).
233. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1754 (discussing the Religious Freedom Act and calling it a 
“kind of super statute” that “might supersede Title VII’s commands in appropriate cases”).
For a view of Title VII itself as a kind of “bedrock statute,” see Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra
note 116, at 1238.
   
         
    
       
         
         
          
         
     
       
           
        
        
   
      
        
         
            
           
     
          
         
        
         
          
 
             
           
      
           
              
        
       
         
         
            
   
           
           
            
      
 
       
     
6292021] BOSTOCK’S PARADOX
sex discrimination rights.234 Why should LGBT rights as sex
discrimination rights be any different? After Bostock, could they be?
Of course, Bostock’s formal evasion of the constitutional
underpinnings that support it may help, to some degree, to load the dice
in the next generation “culture war” cases that already are, and otherwise
are likely to be, coming down the pike. The evasion makes it somewhat
easier for the Supreme Court—if it chooses to—to stick with Bostock’s
textualist self-description and portray the conflicts in future cases as
involving merely dueling statutory interpretation and conflict plays. One
item worth tracking as the caselaw unfolds is whether rulings in these
cases come at the expense of Bostock’s legal justice promises, with their 
constitutional justice supports. In theory anyway, they should not be 
readily sacrificed.
Particularly not since Bostock, despite the ostensible judicial 
humility of its leading textualist self-portrait, shows the Supreme Court
is no ordinary servant of the nation’s lawgivers, but their “Ruler” as
well.235 Having achieved the ground that it does in Bostock, there is no
simple way for the Supreme Court to abandon it without effectively
practicing constitutional and rule-of-law retrenchment. This may not be
difficult as a conceptual or practical matter, though it may prove more
challenging, as Bostock and other recent cases show, than a conservative 
Justice might like on prudential or principled legal grounds.236 
What is more, Bostock makes the arguments for limiting
constitutional and rule-of-law rights for LGBT persons harder to defend
234. See Ann E. Freedman, Sex Equality, Sex Differences, and the Supreme Court, 92
YALE L.J. 913, 915, 918, 952 (1983) (noting that “[t]he subordination of women has
traditionally been justified by arguments drawn from biology or nature, in turn often equated 
with divine command,” and noting Supreme Court doctrinal developments); Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, Gender and the Constitution, 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 2 (1975) (describing the
“traditional attitudes and legal regulation” toward women in “Anglo-American literature and
case reports” whose “strains are echoed even to this day”: “First, women’s place in a world
controlled by men is divinely ordained; second, the law’s differential treatment of the sexes 
operates benignly in women’s favor”). For one example of white supremacy’s claimed
religious underpinnings, plainly repudiated by the Supreme Court, see Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1, 3 (1967).
235. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1753 (“[T]he same judicial humility that requires us to refrain
from adding to statutes requires us to refrain from diminishing them.”); Obergefell v. Hodges,
576 U.S. 644, 713 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Today’s decree says that my Ruler, and the Ruler
of 320 million Americans coast-to-coast, is a majority of the nine lawyers on the Supreme 
Court.”).
236. See, e.g., June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2133–42 (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring) (emphasizing prudential considerations).
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than they otherwise might have been. Bostock advertises that the risks of
not continuing the principled pro-LGBT jurisprudential project include
creating needless legal uncertainty about constitutional and rule-of-law
positions that the Court has already staked out. The questions that Bostock
leaves future Court decisions to struggle with, too, themselves belie 
Bostock’s textualist claim to be a “simple,” “straightforward” ruling.237 
Bostock is the “momentous” ruling it itself touts—but in ways that far
exceed the momentousness of its textualist statutory interpretation self-
account.238 
IV. CONCLUSION 
You may think Bostock is more or less problematic for being the
paradoxical, multifaceted, and far-reaching decision that it is. Whatever 
else it is, Bostock is not—as the dissents portray it—up to any 
conventional game of statutory updating unmoored to anything but
judicial preference, or will, or the national mood bereft of legal authority
beneath it.239
Affirmatively, Bostock is a decision that offers instruction about the
judicial processes that have been engaged and deployed as part of the
efforts to overcome historical and still-ongoing practices and norms in 
society and law of anti-lesbian, anti-gay, and anti-trans discrimination—
discrimination that, as the Bostock dissents show, has been, and remains,
a meaningful dimension of the fabric of American law and life. Like the
larger political struggles to which Bostock is related, the play in the
Court’s opinion in the case, adjudicating disputes that are bound up with
processes of legal, social, and cultural transformation, is complex,
237. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1741 (“simple”); id. at 1743 (“straightforward”).
238. See id. at 1741.
239. See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1755–56 (Alito, J., dissenting) (Bostock “actually
represents . . . the theory that courts should ‘update’ old statutes so that they better reflect the
current values of society. If the court finds it appropriate to adopt this theory, it should own
up to what it’s doing.” (citations omitted)); id. at 1761 (“By proclaiming that sexual
orientation and gender identity are ‘not relevant to employment decisions,’ the Court updates
Title VII to reflect what it regards as 2020 values.”); id. at 1835 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting)
(“The majority opinion insists that it is not rewriting or updating Title VII, but instead is just
humbly reading the text of the statute as written. But that assertion is tough to accept.”). But
see Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 357 (7th Cir. 2017) (Posner, J.,
concurring) (“I would prefer to see us acknowledge openly that today we, who are judges 
rather than members of Congress, are imposing on a half-century-old statute a meaning of
‘sex discrimination’ that the Congress that enacted it would not have accepted.”). See also
supra note 42.
   
        
    
        
         
          
    
          
         
       
             
          
            
        
        
  
         
       
    
        
         
           
        
         
       
        
       
       
         
          
         
        
     
          
 
               
               
      
            
               
           
   
6312021] BOSTOCK’S PARADOX
paradoxical, messy, and inconsistent, not a pure specimen of the legal
arts, including the judicial craft.
Is Bostock a textualist decision? Yes. Does it involve the negation of
textualist precepts? Also yes. Does the negation of its textualism reframe
and refract that textualism in new and different light? It does. Can a
judicial opinion be textualist and anti-textualist, and non-textualist-but-
still-textualist at the same time? By means of the leading theories and
conventional thinking on the subjects, no. And yet, despite what these
theories and conventional ideas tell us about what should be, and even
can be, here is Bostock in the wilds of the law, being the improbable thing
it should not—and cannot—be. Draw your battle lines if you want. Insist
that Bostock’s “real” truth is to be found in either its textualism or its anti-
textualism in simple terms. Or on some other equally simple, consistent 
grounds. If forced to pick, I know which grounds I would choose. Do 
you?
Confronted with the stylized legal situation that Bostock manifests,
there is something that feels—no, that is—incredibly real, even rich, 
delightful, and joyful about finding conceptual complexity and 
theoretical messiness in a judicial text like this. If we can resist the
impulses to simplify and conceptually tidy Bostock up, and also the
impulse to take it or parts of it down, there is a small chance we might 
begin to marvel at the beauty in its humanity, in its complexity, its
paradoxes, its contradictions, its rivenness, its confidence, its sensitivity,
its evasions, its trickiness, its truth-telling, its phenomenology, its
question-begging, some or all of which may seem—if you want to insist 
on seeing matters this way—like deep textual imperfections.240 Law being
a complex and imperfect product of our complex, imperfect, dynamic, 
social multiverses, why should legal opinions be any different? How
could law fully transcend its social determinants like that? Was it not
onward a century ago that we supposedly moved past the idea of law as
inhabiting a “special heaven . . . [of] absolute purity, freed from all 
entangling alliances with human life”?241 
Bostock is an opinion that is deeply committed to its own textualist 
240. This is not to imagine unqualified acceptance of messy rulings because they are
messy, of course, any more than it is to suppose anyone unqualifiedly accepts rulings that are
perfectly conceptually simple and neat because they are simple and neat.
241. Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM.
L. REV. 809, 809 (1935); see id. at 811, 811 n.7 (talking about “[l]awyers trained by long
practice [to] . . . believ[e] what is impossible,” and quoting then citing LEWIS CARROLL,
THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS 81 (1871)).
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identifications, but not so resolutely that it loses its sense of the purposes
of the larger legal project—and processes—that it is practicing, and the
responsibilities of governance that courts, especially the Supreme Court,
undertake to try to keep law from reducing to discriminatory power
politics.
Not without complications or future conditions, and not beyond 
critique from across the political spectrum, Bostock will undoubtedly
make the lives of lesbian, gay, and trans workers in the U.S. both just a
little more equal, and, frankly, easier, less dominated by the vicissitudes
of homophobia and transphobia, and the complex ways they can lead a
self to live and be at work, as in the remainder of life. This is why some
people, again, wept tears of joy on first reading Bostock’s text.
This complex victory—part textualist, part anti-textualist, and
differently textualist in its anti-textualism; part statutory interpretation, 
part justice-doing related to constitutional governance through an 
expansion of constitutional rules into rule-of-law legal justice terms— 
will not be the last word on the ways in which workplace equality and
freedom from discrimination function as workplace management tools.
Bostock’s benefits, such as they are, track chiefly for those workers who
can get and keep qualifications that otherwise qualify them to get and
keep their jobs.
This is no small matter. In the current, extended moment—with
millions struggling to get and pay for an education, much less an adequate
or equal one, many living, struggling, out of work, on meager and 
inadequate unemployment benefits that leave them wondering if they can 
get and keep a roof over their heads and food in their own and sometimes
loved ones’ mouths and bellies—it is hard not to keep the victory Bostock
represents in perspective.242 Then, too, clear in this mix are the ways that
242. See Kevin Carey, What About Tackling the Causes of Student Debt?, N.Y. TIMES:
THE UPSHOT (Nov. 18, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/18/upshot/student-debt-
forgiveness-biden.html [https://perma.cc/7ANQ-AJRK] (noting the $1.7 trillion in
“American outstanding student loan debt” and a “recent report . . . that the wealth gap between
Black and white recent college graduates increased by over 50 percent from 2000 to 2018, in
part because of higher borrowing by Black students”); Diane Coyle, Working Women of Color
Were Making Progress. Then the Coronavirus Hit., N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/14/opinion/minority-women-unemployment-covid.html
[https://perma.cc/3HHQ-SG5V] (noting that women of color suffered distinctive losses of
total jobs lost in December 2020); Sydney Ember, Unemployment Claims Rise Sharply,
Showing New Economic Pain, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/
2021/01/14/business/economy/unemployment-claims.html?searchResultPosition=1 [https://
perma.cc/F9Z3-M35J] (noting unusually high “initial claims for state unemployment
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cisheterosexuals who authored and joined Bostock and its dissents
remain, even after the decision has come down, the normative reference
points for who is to get rights under Title VII’s sex discrimination law
and law in a wider sense.243 
Though Bostock opens the door to future changes that strike me, and
maybe you, too, or maybe not, as for the political good, it still achieves
what it does while casually proceeding from subject and ideological
positions—as cisheterosexuals and about cisheterosexuality—that the
cases collected under its name challenge in different ways. These are
subject and ideological positions that still provisionally buy into bio-sex
definitions from the opinion’s start to its end.244 These are subject and
ideological positions that repeatedly express self-referential concerns
about what refusing the pro-gay and pro-trans sex discrimination claims
here would mean for cisheterosexuals.
For the time being, then, we continue with cisheterosexuals legally
governing a basically cisheteronormative way of American life that,
cueing applause, has thankfully yielded an opinion allowing lesbian
women, gay men, and trans people access to this way of life on terms we
did not set and may not fully endorse, but anyway find ourselves
practically having to live. Where is the meaningful alternative that can
presently be produced to scale?
So, I for one am happy about Bostock’s paradoxicality, its
confusions, its messiness, and even its sometimes labyrinthine qualities.
They show Bostock’s relation to humanity, and its own queerness, a
foundationless ground from which to achieve a detached, and persistently
critical perspective on the ruling. In practices of messiness like this— 
where identity-based boundaries are perfectly clear, then not, where
boundaries rule and then suddenly yield, where realities and appearances
are clear until, upon examination, they become manifestly confused, even
confusing—some people’s political dreams for living today and
benefits” compared to historical benchmarks); Nikole Hannah-Jones, The Resegregation of
Jefferson County, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/
06/magazine/the-resegregation-of-jefferson-county.html [https://perma.cc/WAM8-2RWR]
(detailing a “wave of resegregation” in American schools, particularly across the South, and
a corresponding delivery of “inferior resources” to “segregated black schools”).
243. Accord Ho, supra note 158 (manuscript at 74–88).
244. For a still-significant discussion of the problematicness of this position within the
Supreme Court’s sex discrimination jurisprudence, see Katherine M. Franke, The Central
Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 1 (1995).
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tomorrow begin.245 The complex identifications of the Supreme Court’s
Bostock opinion may yet be a sign that other complex social identities
and ways of living—of being in the world—may someday find more of a
home in the law than they now receive. If, to be clear, that is what folks
are after.
To be sure, not everyone is.
245. For one germane take on queerness, see Ian Halley, Queer Theory by Men, 11 DUKE
J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 7, 38, 51 (2004) (describing sexuality as “dark, unknown to us, riven 
by paradox and reversal,” and suggesting that queer theoretic work tends toward an 
irrationalism that “seeks and values paradox, contradiction, catachresis, and crisis”). Cf.
Delmore Schwartz, In Dreams Begin Responsibilities, IOWA REV., Fall 2014, at 163; WILLIAM
BUTLER YEATS, Responsibilities, reprinted in THE POEMS 99 (Scribner 1997) (“In dreams
begins responsibility.”). I thank James Pfeiffer for the lead on the Yeats.
